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Rob Bryer
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
THE ROOTS OF MODERN CAPITALISM:
A MARXIST ACCOUNTING HISTORY OF
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS IN ENGLAND
Abstract: A major debate neglected by accounting historians is the
importance of landlords in the English agricultural revolution. The
paper uses accounting evidence from the historical literature to test
Marx’s theory that, from around 1750, England’s landlords played a
pivotal role by adopting and then spreading the capitalist mentality
and social relations by enclosures and changes in the management of
their estates and tenants. It gives an accounting interpretation of
Marx’s theory of rent and argues that the available evidence supports
his view that the conversion of English landlords to capitalism under-
lay the later stages of the agricultural revolution. The conclusion ex-
plains the linkages in Marx’s theory between the agricultural and
industrial revolutions, and calls on accounting historians to conduct
archival research into the agricultural roots of modern capitalism.
INTRODUCTION
To fulfill the promise of accounting history we must engage
with important theoretical and historical debates, particularly
those about the genealogy of modern business. A critical debate,
neglected by accounting historians, concerns the origin of busi-
ness in agriculture. Economic historians have struggled to ex-
plain the ‘agricultural revolution’, the massive increase in output
that by around 1850 allowed England’s population to grow
through previous historical limits. Many believe the period
“c.1700 - c.1850 . . . was a time of momentous change, in which
the output of English agriculture increased by a factor of around
3.5 . . . ” [Wade Martins and Williamson, 1999, p. 2]. Most agree
on the broad outlines of the change. In 1500 around 80% of the
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Professor Mike Turner (Hull),
Roger Hulme, and Marianne Pitts (Warwick), Professor Stephen Walker
(Cardiff) and two anonymous referees, for helpful comments.
Submitted March 2003
Revised September 2003
Accepted September 2003
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British population worked in agriculture, and by 1850 it was
only one in four. Between 1770 and 1850 Britain’s population
doubled, but it maintained and may eventually have even in-
creased overall living standards without large imports of food.
Output per worker in agriculture probably doubled. By 1800,
while many small farmers survived, England had a unique rural
structure with many landlords leasing farms to tenants who em-
ployed landless wage laborers. Except for some areas of the Low
Countries, it had the most productive agriculture in the world.
Many think a particularly important factor was the increase in
labor productivity that was much faster in England than in Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, exactly “when and how this dramatic trans-
formation was brought about is a matter of considerable de-
bate . . . ” [Campbell and Overton, 1991, p. 5; see also, Overton,
1996a, p. 1; Turner, Beckett and Afton, 2001, Preface]. Modern
historians, however, unite in their scorn for the traditional ex-
planation that the revolution was the product of an “increase in
rationality, a new spirit of commercialism in farming” because
it is “consistent with nearly any pattern” of change [McCloskey,
1972, p. 30]. Lord Ernle, for example, the authoritative early
20th century agricultural historian, thought that driving the
revolution was a “new race of men” (1961, p. 222). The paper
supports the traditional approach by precisely defining this new
rationality as a ‘calculative mentality’, and uses accounting to
explain and then test Marx’s theory that the English agricultural
revolution was a critical element in the transition from feudal-
ism to industrial capitalism.
Historians neglect Marx’s theory even though many accept a
broadly similar chronology. Marx saw the beginnings of change
in the late 15th century, but thought the revolution began with
the formation of a class of capitalist farmers by around 1670,
and that capitalist landlords spread and deepened the revolution
from around 1750.1 Historians often argue an important ele-
ment from 1750 was that many English landlords began to see
“it was in their commercial interests to take a positive lead in
promoting change . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, pp. 157, 171]. For ex-
ample, from 1700 to 1750 an index of English and Welsh land-
lords’ investment in “Structures, etc.,” increased from 112 to
1 Always remembering that “epochs in the history of society are no more
separated from each other by hard and fast lines of demarcation, than are
geological epochs” [Marx, 1996, p. 374]. ‘Revolution’ can mean profound change
or rapid change. Here we mean profound change, no matter that it took 200
years or more.
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114, but from 1750 to 1800 it increased to 143, and by 1850 to
232 [Allen, 1994, Table 5.4, p. 109]. E.P. Thompson detected
what he called an “important moment of transition” around
1750. He noted the landlords’ “far more aggressive agrarian pos-
ture” and “meticulous . . . attention to accountancy . . . ” [Th-
ompson, 1978, p. 44]. The paper argues that these changes came
from the landlords’ conversion to capitalism. Modern historians,
by contrast, often assume the English landlord had always been
a “capitalist”, an “entrepreneur” who “had to take decisions
about the use of his own capital . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, pp. 137,
138; Mingay, 1963, p. 268].2 The question they do not ask is why,
in that case, it was only from around 1750 that landlords began
to demand “a level of profit sufficient to support the lifestyle
expected of an aristocrat . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 138]? It is no
answer to say that the “expanding economy, . . . widening mar-
kets and rising prices . . . invited . . . sufficiently flexible . . . land-
owners to invest more capital and farmers to improve productiv-
ity . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 284]. We must ask why English
landlords, unlike their continental counterparts, were “suffi-
ciently flexible” to accept the invitation of the markets by invest-
ing to increase productivity? The answer, the paper argues, re-
veals their vital contribution. It was not simply the provision of
capital. As Mingay himself suggests, the landlords’ most signifi-
cant contribution was “perhaps their attitude toward economic
development . . . ” [1963, p. 201]. The paper defines this attitude
and uses accounting evidence to support Marx’s view that their
vital contribution was spreading capitalist social relations and
its mentality which gave the idea of “improvement” its mean-
ing.3
The paper first explains Marx’s theory of the transition to
capitalism, his theory of the agricultural revolution, and his
theory of rent, as integral elements of a testable accounting his-
tory. According to Marx, to become capitalists, landlords had to
adopt a rate-of-return-on-capital mentality. The paper then ar-
gues that this mentality spread throughout the landlord class
during the financial revolution of the late 17th and early 18th
centuries. The following part examines Marx’s assertion that the
2 I shall follow Marx and most historians who refer to landlords, farmers,
etc., in the masculine, even though “estate affairs were often temporarily or
permanently in the hands of wives, daughters, or widows” [Mingay, 1976, p. 89].
3 In the 18th century ‘improvement’ usually meant investment in agriculture
for profit; ‘To enhance in monetary value’ (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on
Historical Principles, 1973]. “[W]hen landlords spoke of ‘improvement’, it was
usually an ‘improved rental’ they had in mind . . . ” [Mingay, 1963, p. 172].
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capitalist mentality — the search for higher rents by increasing
the rate of return on the capital employed in the farm — drove
parliamentary enclosures. It concludes that landlords used en-
closures to impose capitalist accountability on their tenants,
thereby spreading its relations and mentality. Rents usually in-
creased sharply after enclosure, and continued to increase well
into the 19th century. Marx was critical of Ricardo’s theory of
rent that attempted to explain these increases. Economic histo-
rians often rely on Ricardo’s theory to explain the rent setting
process and the historical trends. The paper contrasts Marx’s
and Ricardo’s theory of rent as alternative accounting histories,
and criticizes Allen’s [1992] well-known use of Ricardo’s theory
to support his controversial assertion that enclosures did little to
further the agricultural revolution. Put simply, Ricardo’s theory
implies that accounting was irrelevant to enclosures and manag-
ing rents, whereas Marx’s theory implies that it was central to
both. The paper argues that Ricardo based his theory on a faulty
understanding of capitalist accounting that Allen perpetuates.
Finally, the paper explores the accounting implications of
Marx’s theory for how capitalist landlords should manage their
rents. It discusses how English landlords determined their rents;
how they chose the length of their leases and the size of their
farms; how they made fixed capital and other investments; and
supports Marx’s theory with the available accounting evidence.
The conclusion explains the linkages in Marx’s theory between
the agricultural and industrial revolutions, his ‘queer story’ of
rent in which English landlords helped to create the industrial
revolution that, ultimately, undermined their position as a pow-
erful class by turning them into investors, undifferentiated ele-
ments of the capitalist class. The paper concludes that account-
ing historians can make a critical contribution to important
historical debates by elaborating and testing Marx’s theory of
the transition to capitalism against the large amount of still
unexplored archival material available.
A MARXIST ACCOUNTING HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION
Marx argued that industrial society emerged from long pro-
cesses of class conflict resulting in the overthrow of the feudal
mode of production by the capitalist mode of production. A
society’s mode of production combines its ‘forces of production’
— the material and human means of production — and its ‘so-
cial relations of production’ — the modal relations of economic
13
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superiority and subordination that condition the way owners of
the means of production extract surplus value from labor. Ac-
counting is central to understanding and testing Marx’s theory
because rationalizing and reproducing each set of social rela-
tions — each way of extracting surplus — is a particular calcula-
tive mentality and a mode of accountability [Bryer, 2000a]. The
feudal mentality pursued the direct appropriation of surplus la-
bor (labor itself, commodities or cash) from self-sufficient peas-
ants, and feudal landlords and merchants kept income and ex-
penditure accounts. The capitalist mentality pursues the rate of
return on capital employed in production by extracting surplus
value from the sale of commodities or services produced by
wage labor, and the capitalist keeps balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts. To use this correspondence to explain and
test Marx’s theory of the agricultural revolution and the role of
landlords, we must first explain his theory of the transition to
capitalism as a testable accounting history of the interrelation-
ships between revolutions in the social relations of production
and revolutions in accounting and calculative mentalities. Marx
proposed a two-step transition to the capitalist mode of produc-
tion that we should observe as the transition from the feudal to
the capitalist way of accounting.4 Step one is from the feudal to
a transitional, ‘capitalistic’ or ‘semi-capitalist’ mentality and
ways of accounting. Step two is from the semi-capitalist to the
capitalist mentality and accounting. Figure 1 summarizes the
ideal-typical historical modes of accounting we should see ac-
cording to Marx’s theory:
4 This and the following two paragraphs summarise a discussion of Marx’s
theory of the transition to capitalism and the views of his critics and supporters
in Bryer [2000a] and a preliminary survey of accounting evidence in Bryer
[2000b].
FIGURE 1
Accounting Signatures of the Transition
from Feudalism to Capitalism
Calculative Feudal Semi-capitalist Capitalist
Mentality
Accounting Consumable CS Profit
Signature Surplus ——————— ———————
(CS) Opening Capital Capital Employed
14
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Marx says the first decisive step towards capitalism oc-
curred around 1550 when some farmers undertook enclosures
and employed wage labor. Although, like modern capitalists
these farmers exploited wage labor, they were only “formally”
capitalists, only semi-capitalists, because they made no attempt
to change the methods of production, and continued to pursue
feudal surplus using charge and discharge accounting. Semi-
capitalists of a different kind appeared in trade with the first
joint stock companies. These enterprises, employing socialized
capitals, were the first to pursue a rate of return on capital.5
These merchants were only semi-capitalists because they pur-
sued consumable surplus divided by the initial capital advanced.
The capitalist mentality is the product of the semi-capitalist re-
lations and mentalities that emerged in agriculture and trade.
Capital from the land flowed into trade, and capital from trade
flowed back onto the land bringing with it the return-on-capital
mentality. Farmers harnessed the merchant’s rate of return
mentality to their mentality of exploiting labor in production
giving us the capitalist mentality. This mentality was revolution-
ary because it drove farmers, landlords, entrepreneurs and, ulti-
mately, managers to continuously increase the intensity and
productivity of labor to earn an excess return on capital. Capital-
ists, in short, pursued the ‘real subsumption’ of labor by manag-
ing production to increase the return on capital employed.
Capitalism appeared when peasants became “free” wage
workers and faced “free” capital [Marx, 1973, p. 502-503]. Capi-
tal began to win its freedom when landed and mercantile inter-
ests merged as semi-capitalist farmers invested in privateering
ventures, for exploration, commodity production and interna-
tional trade. Conflicts over who would reap the rewards from
international trade culminated in the ‘bourgeois revolution’ of
5 The paper uses the terms ‘socialised’ and ‘social capital’ to describe a con-
tinuum from recognisably social to fully social capital, the “thing” that Marx
called “total social capital” [Marx, 1988, p. 23]. Socialised and social capitals are
both pooled. Socialised capital involves pooling across a limited number of
investors for limited purposes. Capital becomes social by losing its identity with
its owner, but in the early stages with socialised capital there are restrictions on
who can invest in the capital and its purposes — on the transferability and the
uses of capital. An example is a partnership where the entry of a new partner
requires the agreement of the other partners. By contrast, at its upper limit fully
social capital involves pooling across all investors and all investments. All mem-
bers of an investing society can participate in a social capital; the capital is freely
usable for any lawful business; and is freely transferable - for example, market-
able government debt and listed shares. Here the identity of the owner with the
functioning of capital disappears and the social restrictions are minimal.
15
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the mid-17th century which resulted in the victory of the rate-of-
return-on-capital mentality over the feudal mentality [Bryer,
2000b]. The bourgeois revolution paved the way for the ‘finan-
cial revolution’ that matured into a large and active market in
government debt. In Marx’s theory, the financial or “credit sys-
tem . . . is itself on the one hand an immanent form of the
capitalist mode of production and on the other hand a driving
force of its development into the highest and last possible
form . . . ” [1981, p. 742]. Government debt provided a riskless
foundation for the development of joint stock companies [Marx,
1976b, pp. 919-920]. Capital gained its freedom in these markets
for social capital where the required return on capital appeared
and provided the owners of capital with the means for judging
their investments [Bryer, 1994a].
Peasants were ‘freed’ from their land by enclosures that
reached a new intensity from the 1760s, completing by parlia-
mentary means a process that began in the 16th century. Marx
thought that many farmers became capitalists from 1670 to
1750 helping to create capitalist landlords [1981, pp. 276, 751,
754, 938]: “the farmer turns capitalist before capitalists become
farmers . . . ” [1969a, p. 17]. In other words, ordinary farmers
became capitalists before landlords and merchants became capi-
talist farmers. According to Marx, landlords became capitalists
in two steps. The first was the appearance of capitalist tenant
farmers turning their landlords into de facto capitalists, even
though they were not necessarily consciously active capitalists.
Landlords as a class took the second step when social capital on
a national scale and the first real land market appeared and the
typical landlord’s mentality changed from a focus on feudal rent
to a focus on the rate-of-return on capital. Semi-capitalist land-
lords soon became conscious and active capitalists if they had
capitalist farmer tenants. Capitalist landed property “is a spe-
cific historical form, a form transformed by the intervention of
capital and the capitalist mode of production . . . ” [Marx, 1981,
pp. 751, 754]. In other words, capitalist farmers and social capi-
tal created capitalist landlords. Capitalist farmers engage in the
real subsumption of labor. This, Marx says, only gets “under
way” from around 1670, and improvement and cost reductions
only “set in” from around 1750 [1981, p. 938]. Marx’s theory, in
short, is that “wage labour in its totality is initially created by the
action of capital on landed property, and then, as soon as the
latter has been produced as a form, by the proprietor of the land
himself. This latter then ‘clears’ . . . the land of its excess
mouths . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 276]. Modern landed property
16
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appears as a “form” when capitalist farmers appear, and then,
says Marx, the “proprietor”, the landlord, finishes the job. Driv-
ing him to clear his land of excess mouths — that is, to increase
labor productivity through enclosures and other investment —
was the landlord’s conversion to capitalism.
Capitalist landlords were a necessary condition for the in-
dustrial revolution: “Although capital can develop itself com-
pletely as commercial capital without th[e] transformation of
landed property it cannot do so as industrial capital . . . ” [Marx,
1981, p. 277]. First, capitalist landlords led in completing the
creation of universal wage labor [Marx, 1981, pp. 276-277]. Sec-
ond, through enclosures, other investment, and the active man-
agement of their tenants, landlords made capitalist attitudes the
common form. To become a capitalist the landlord “needs only
to transform his workers into wage workers and to produce for
profit instead of for revenue . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 277], that is,
change his mentality to produce for capitalist profit instead of
feudal rent. As the capitalist mentality spread in agriculture, it
spread in ‘industry’ because “[o]riginally, agricultural labour
and industrial labour are not separate: the second is an append-
age of the first . . . ” [Marx, 1981, pp. 770-771]. As the real
subsumption of labor gave an economic advantage, the capital-
ist revolution quickly spread: “Once it has appropriated agricul-
ture and mining, the manufacture of the principal textiles, etc.,
it moves on to other sectors . . . ” [Marx, 1976b, p. 1036]. The
capitalist appropriation of industry is Marx’s ‘industrial revolu-
tion’ [Bryer, 2004b]. Figure 2 summarizes Marx’s history of the
capitalist revolution.
In reading figure 2 we must remember that class conflict
drove each transition. Marx’s history of capitalism is the history
of how socialized and social capital eroded and eventually over-
threw “the socio-political limits in which capital was con-
fined . . . ” [Marx, 1976b, p. 1030]. It will take accounting histori-
ans many years to test all aspects of Marx’s theory of the
transition to capitalism. The focus for this paper is when and
how English landlords became capitalists, Marx’s landlords’
revolution, and its consequences.
The Landlords’ Revolution: An important element in creating
capitalist landlords was the change to money rents and legally
secure leases from the late 16th century. Apart from allowing
the farmer to keep a surplus as prices rose and rents lagged
behind, when the capitalist farmer appeared the legal basis of
money rents also promoted the transition to the capitalist land-
17
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lord [Marx, 1981, p. 934]. When the landlord got contractually
determined capitalist rent he became, de facto, a capitalist:
“With the intervention of the capitalist farmer between the land-
owner and the actual working tiller . . . [t]he nature of rent
thereby changes. . . . Instead of rent, the normal form of surplus-
value is now profit, and rent now counts as . . . surplus
profit . . . ” [Marx, 1981, pp. 935-936]. Rent becomes “generally
acknowledged” as surplus profit, that is, by the landlords as
well. Surplus profit is the excess of a farm’s total profit over that
part retained by the farmer. Only after 1750 did this, Marx’s
capitalist rent, become rent’s “normal and dominant form”.
Landlords had commuted most labor rents and rents in kind
into contractual money rents by around 1600. During the 17th
century most landlords gave up farming for themselves, letting
almost all their land to tenants for money rent. However, it does
not necessarily follow that “capitalist relations had arrived in
the English countryside . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 136]. In Marx’s
theory, money rents remained feudal unless the tenant was a
capitalist. For example, in Aberdeenshire money rents had re-
placed feudal obligations by 1600, but as late as 1780 landlords
“had not yet come to define the main potential of their estates to
be capitalistic rent . . . ” [Carter, 1977, p. 54]. Aberdeenshire
FIGURE 2
Marx’s History of the Capitalist Revolution
1550 1650 1750
FS/OC r r
 socialised merchant  bourgeois revolution financial revolution
capital
 WL  P/CE  P/CE
 semi-capitalist capitalist  capitalist
farmers farmers  landlords
agricultural/manufacturing/industrial revolutions
Key: = influence of social relations and mentality
FS = feudal surplus
OC = opening capital
WL = wage labor
P = profit
CE = capital employed
r = the required return on capital
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landed property only became “thoroughly capitalist, simply a
source of ground rent for the owner” [Carter, 1977, p. 56] by the
end of the Napoleonic wars.6 Marx would agree that this did not
mean “responsibility had therefore passed from the landown-
ers . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 136]. Landlords gave up farming dur-
ing the 17th century, and this time for good, not only because
their feudal powers had declined, but because they had, for the
first time, adopted the rate-of-return on capital mentality. When
larger landowners no longer “wished to tie capital up in farm
stock . . . [t]he view became firmly established that if there was
capital to spare it was safer and possibly more lucrative to invest
it in mortgages, purchase of land or the Funds . . . ” [Mingay,
1963b, pp. 168-169].
Also pushing landlords towards the rate-of-return on capital
mentality was the land market starting in the late 17th century.
In this market, “the capitalized rent, the price of land, and there-
fore its alienability and actual alienation, now becomes an im-
portant aspect . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 938]. Besides its direct im-
pact on the landlords’ mentality, this market helped to drive the
transition in other ways. One important consequence was that
“urban and other holders of money can buy plots of land with a
view to leasing them either to peasants or to capitalists, and
enjoy the rent on their capital thus invested as a form of inter-
est. This factor, too, helps to promote the transformation of the
former mode of exploitation, of the relationship between owner
and actual tiller, and of rent itself . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 938].
Fuelling the land market were Royalist attempts to recover es-
tates after the Restoration, demand from the larger landowners
to consolidate and extend their estates, and demand for land
from wealthy merchants and businessmen. Finally, and criti-
cally important in promoting the rate-of-return mentality, was
the appearance of a national capital market, based on a huge
growth in public debt to finance war in the interest of trade. By
1750 landlords generally saw investment in stocks and shares or
land as essentially the same because both provided a return on
capital. With growing indebtedness, rising rents, and the finan-
cial benefits of capitalist agriculture plain for all to see, many
landlords became consciously and actively capitalist. Now they
wanted their tenants to increase their rents by increasing the
rate-of-return on the capital invested in their farms. This could
6 As Carter defines neither capitalistic, capitalist nor ground rent, we take
his description at face value.
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explain why only then “a growing number of landlords became
actively engaged in the process of agricultural improvement”,
whereas before 1750 “few of them had taken a personal interest
in the farming on their estates . . . ” [Roebuck, 1973, p. 17]. Ac-
cording to Marx, before 1750 most landlords retained their feu-
dal mentality. We can directly test this theory by translating it
into accounting ideas and looking for changes in the ways land-
lords accounted for rents.
An Accounting Translation of Marx’s Theory of Capitalist Ground
Rent: According to Marx, the transition to capitalism entailed a
change in the mode of accountability [Bryer, 2000a]. If so, we
should find changes in the ways landlords calculated their rents
and used accounts to manage their tenants. Feudal rent (FR) is
the total consumable surplus (CS) from a farm minus the con-
sumption of the farmer (FC). That is, FR = CS - FC. Here we
expect the landlord to account for cash flows or income and
expenditure in the feudal fashion using charge and discharge
accounting, and to use coercive individual accountability. Capi-
talist rent, by contrast, is the total profit of the farm minus the
farmer’s profit, that is, the general or average rate of profit on
the capital the farmer owns, and the accountability is economic.
Instead of coercion, the landlord relies on market forces and
accounting calculations to discipline his tenants into producing
the maximum rate-of-return on capital from the farm. The gen-
eral or average rate of profit emerges in industry and trade. In
modern finance theory the equivalent is the required return on
the market portfolio [Bryer, 1994a]. Marx’s theory of capitalist
rent is simply that “[l]anded property enables the proprietor to
lay hold of the difference between the individual profit and the
average profit . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 787]:
Ri = riKTi - rGKFi.
Ri = capitalist ground rent from farm i;
ri = the rate-of-return on the capital employed in farm i;
KTi = the total capital employed in farm i by the landlord
KTi = and the farmer,
rG = the general rate of profit, and
KFi = the capital the farmer employs in farm i.
Marx distinguished “absolute” from “differential” rent. Ab-
solute rent is central to his theory of the interconnections be-
tween the agricultural and the industrial revolutions. He defines
it as “the excess of value over the average price of raw pro-
duce . . . ” [Marx, 1969, p. 142]. Agricultural commodities sell for
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more than they should because agriculture uses more labor and
less material inputs and is, therefore, less productive than indus-
try, and this is the source of the landlord’s absolute rent. Agri-
cultural products are, therefore, relatively more valuable and so
agriculture earns a higher return on capital than industry. In
industry the market competes any excess returns away. In agri-
culture it does not because the landlord steps in and collects the
excess as absolute rent [Marx, 1969b, p. 41]. On top of absolute
rent is any differential rent. Differential rent arises from farms
that earn above average profits from above average natural fer-
tility, location, or investment of capital, below average wages or
taxes, or suppressing the farmers’ returns below the general rate
of profit. Marx attributed the discovery of the theory of differen-
tial rent to James Anderson in 1777, “a practical farmer” who,
like a modern capitalist, thought “[t]he soil can be continuously
improved . . . ” [Marx, 1969b, pp. 114, 145]. The capitalist land-
lord thinks of all his rent as differential rent, and this is our
focus in parts three, four and five. The paper’s conclusion ex-
plains the role of absolute rent in Marx’s theory of the industrial
revolution.
Capitalist landlords do not pursue the largest amount of
rent, but the maximum “rate of rent”, that is, “rent in proportion
to the agricultural capital advanced . . . ” [Marx, 1969a, p. 107;
1969b, p. 113]. The rate of rent depends upon the profitability of
the farm, the proportion of the capital the landlord provides,
and the general rate of profit:
R KF
— = rF + —— [rF - rG]
KL KL
R = total rent,
KL = the landlord’s capital employed,
rF = the rate-of-return on the capital employed in the farm,
KF = the farmer’s capital employed,
rG = the general rate of profit.
According to Marx’ theory, therefore, we expect the con-
sciously active capitalist landlord’s system of accounting to en-
compass his rent, his rate of rent, the total profitability of the
farm, and the return to the farmer. A landlord’s system of ac-
counting includes not only the final accounts, that may only
record the collection of rent and his expenditures, but his whole
system of accountability which includes the financial calcula-
tions he performs and the discipline they impose on tenants to
pursue the maximum rate-of-return on capital.
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A capitalist landlord sets his rents so an efficient farmer
keeps the general rate of profit on his capital. If the farmer is a
capitalist he will not accept less for long. This is what Marx
means when he says that with the appearance of the capitalist
farmer the nature of rent “thereby changes”. If the farmer is a
capitalist, the landlord is to this extent “thereby” a capitalist
whether consciously and actively or not. However, there is no
guarantee that an unconscious and inactive de facto capitalist
landlord will collect the maximum rate of rent. If he charges too
much his tenants will not invest their capital or may desert his
farms. If he charges too little, he enriches his tenants at his
expense. The landlord or his tenants may invest too little or too
much. According to Marx, therefore, we should expect that as
landlords with capitalist tenants acquire the rate-of-return on
capital mentality they soon become consciously active capital-
ists and spread its mentality by imposing it on all their tenants.
We should find evidence of this transition in their accounts and
changes in their systems of accounting, in the way landlords
held their tenants accountable for rent. The landlord could tell
us he is a capitalist by the way he calculates his rent demand;
how he decides his investments in enclosures or other improve-
ments, the length of his leases, the size of his farms, or the
capital his tenants should have. English landlords came to do all
of these things in the capitalist manner. To explain why, we start
by tracing the genesis of the capitalist landlord in the history of
the financial revolution and developments in landlords’ account-
ing practices. This supports the view that the landlords’ rate-of-
return on capital mentality came from their immersion in social
capital.
THE GENESIS OF THE CAPITALIST LANDLORD
On the surface, there was nothing new in the relationships
between landlords and commerce from the late 17th century.
Landowners were not major initial investors in stocks and
shares [Beckett, 1989, p. 548]. “Men of commerce had always
entered into landownership, and there was a more restricted
inflow of such newcomers in the 18th century than in the previ-
ous two centuries . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 268]. From the later
16th century landed gentry had invested in merchant ventures
and, with some reservations, landowners continued to mingle
and merge with wealthier merchants and businessmen [Mingay,
1976, pp. 6-10]. But never before had landed society lived in a
world of social capital. From the Restoration in 1660 to the
22
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collapse of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, commercial and fi-
nancial revolutions engulfed English society [Carswell, 1993;
Dickson, 1967]. Building on a steep upturn in trade, ship-build-
ing and merchant capital, by around 1750 England had a na-
tional market for capital based on ‘public credit’, mainly govern-
ment debt to finance wars to protect and extend the North
American and West Indian markets [Dickson, 1967, p. 11]. Lon-
don was the focus, a city that inevitably drew the wealthy land-
owner and his family, and where they banked their rents. Land-
owners borrowed heavily on mortgages from insurance
companies. Many landowners may have bought stocks and
shares. Some merchants became landowners in a national land
market in which landlords were also buyers extending and con-
solidating their estates. From all these directions, landlords were
pushed to adopt the rate-of-return on capital mentality.
The Appearance of the Modern Mortgage: Under classical com-
mon law, the borrower (mortgagor) transferred the freehold of a
property to the lender (mortgagee) for the duration of the mort-
gage, usually six months. The freehold reverted to the lender if
the borrower defaulted by as little as one day, and he still owed
the principal. From around 1600 the Courts of Chancery began
accepting petitions from defaulting borrowers and ordered re-
demption of their property on payment of interest and principal
in cases of special hardship, and from 1625 it automatically gave
relief when the borrower offered payment within a reasonable
time [Simpson, 1961, p. 227]. Where the borrower did not pay,
the lender could foreclose. In the early 17th century judges be-
gan to agree that if the borrower paid the interest the lender
could not force the owner to sell land [Finch, 1956, p. 32;
Beckett, 1986, p. 296]. The elements of the modern law of mort-
gage existed by the early 17th century, but only at the end of the
century were mortgages automatically and indefinitely extend-
able so long as the borrower paid interest. Only from the 1690s
did investors consider mortgages raised on estates “as good as
investment in the ‘funds’º” [Mathias, 1983, p. 51]; “a routine
device for using land to raise long-term finance . . . ” [Allen,
1992, p. 104]. By the end of the century, if the lender wanted
repayment of his money, “normally he had no difficulty in find-
ing a purchaser to whom he could assign his mortgage . . . ”
[Finch, 1956, p. 32]. Landlords also “had no difficulty in finding
lenders, for credit was no longer dependent on the personal
reputation of the borrower . . . ” [Finch, 1956, p. 131]. This
greatly expanded their borrowing capacity, and in the 18th
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century they exploited it to the hilt. As their debts rose, land-
lords immersed themselves in the universe of social capital
where, perhaps, for the first time, the remorseless deduction of
interest from their rents convinced many that the rate-of-return
on capital governed their extravagant lifestyles.
Many English landlords borrowed to improve their lands.
This might explain why Denmark, Germany and France had
similar increases in wheat yields to those in England, but lower
labor productivity [Allen, 1992, pp. 1, 56]. It could also explain
why the trend towards larger farms markedly accelerated in the
18th century [Allen, 1992, p. 86]. However, the important ques-
tion is whether the appearance of modern mortgages caused
these changes, or the mentality that demanded bigger and more
productive farms produced the modern mortgage? Why was
there a delay in introducing modern mortgages? A possible ex-
planation is the widespread adoption of the rate-of-return on
capital mentality by landlords only in the 1690s with the begin-
nings of a national capital market. The notion of “long-term
finance”, that is, the clear separation of capital and interest,
exists only within the rate-of-return on capital mentality. In the
feudal mentality a mortgage is a “pledge” [Simpson, 1961, p.
132]. That is, the owner pawns his land, and in law this is no
different from pawning his silver plate. By the early 17th cen-
tury judges had established the legal principle of unfettered re-
demption — provided the borrower obeyed the laws of capital
by paying the interest. Writers and parliament began to value
land and property using present value, more and more thor-
oughly as the 17th century wore on, and lessors used it when
financing London’s rebuilding after the Great Fire of 1666
[Scorgie, 1996, pp. 240-242]. In 1668 Sir Thomas Culpeper’s
discourse in favor of reducing interest from 6% to 4%
“support[s] a contention that landowners understood and used
discounting to assist them in managing their woodlands . . . ”
[Scorgie, 1996, p. 244]. However, using the certainty of the law
as our guide, only by the 1690s was it generally accepted that
land was capital, an income earning asset in which the mort-
gagor had an inalienable “estate”, the “equity of redemption”
[Simpson, 1961, p. 228]. Chancery judges ignored contractual
agreements and applied the laws of capital. Just as the land was
capital to its owner, the debt was capital to the mortgagee,
usually secured by giving him the power of sale [Simpson, 1961,
p. 229]. The modern accounting rules of ‘deprival value’ ap-
plied to both. The value of land to a borrower is its income-
earning ability. To compensate for its loss we must give him its
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replacement cost, its current market value. The value of the land
to the lender, however, is only the face value of the debt, and if
we deprive him of the security of the land we must compensate
him by giving him back his money. When these rules became
widely accepted, mortgages became negotiable financial securi-
ties.
Stocks, Shares and Loans: Even if landlords had wanted to sell
their land and invest in stocks and shares, at first they had
limited opportunities. Only by 1695 did more than one hundred
joint stock companies exist [Carswell, 1993, p. 8]. Several peers
held stock in the New East India Company from the late 1680s
to 1707, and peers held stock in the Bank of England [Beckett,
1986, pp. 80-81]. From the 1690s to 1750 government borrowing
created a range of financial securities, but initially, “the landed
classes as a whole were not significant contributors of new capi-
tal for public loans . . . ” [Dickson, 1967, p. 302]. Some notable
landowners were initial investors in the funds, for example,
Lord Townshend [Dickson, 1967, p. 265; Rosenheim, 1989, p.
157]. However, many more may have invested in the secondary
markets. Evidence suggesting that they did is Sir Robert
Walpole’s reason for killing a scheme to reduce the interest on
the National Debt in 1737 that “the younger sons of landed
gentry, as well as ‘monied men’, would be sufferers . . . ”
[Langford, 1999, p. 46]. Furthermore, very few large landowners
escaped unscathed from the collapse of the South Sea Bubble in
1720 [Beckett, 1986, pp. 81, 86], which was an unforgettable
experience for them. Their flight back into land (buying land or,
more likely, lending to other landowners) and the increase in
land value forged the link between the rate of interest and the
price of land [Beckett, 1986, pp. 81-83]. By the early 18th cen-
tury “potential buyers looked at the return on the funds to de-
cide the timing of a purchase . . . ” [Beckett, 1989, p. 558]. From
around 1750, landowners are “switching their interests around
according to the rate of interest”, and they use the same ap-
proach when making investments in improvement, that is, “by
the expected rate of return . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 84; 1989, pp.
565, 585, 586, 605].
The Late 17th Century Land Market: Encouraging the spread of
the capitalistic mentality in the landowning class, particularly in
the period 1650 - 1690, was an influx of wealthy merchants
[Beckett, 1986, pp. 71-73, 117, 553; Carswell, 1993, p. 9; Clay,
1985, pp. 143, 160]. There was a great deal of movement in the
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land market from around 1750 [Beckett, 1989, p. 552]. Notably
active were those “who were not farmers or gentry with deep
roots in the countryside, but were employed in trade, industry,
or the professions; or who lived, in an urban setting, the lives of
leisured gentlemen on incomes from the funds . . . [who] did not
see their property as a treasured inheritance but as a useful
capital asset . . . ” [Clay, 1985, p. 174]. Successful lawyers im-
mersed in commercial life were also important buyers of land
up to 1750 [Beckett, 1986, pp. 67-68]. Substantial planters from
the British West Indies with connections to the London money
market bought estates in England [Clay, 1985, p. 190]. Investors
in the ships’ companies engaged in the slave trade often did the
same [Davis, 1962]. Through the first half of the 18th century,
landowners “had to accept within their ranks men with mercan-
tile-based fortunes” [Beckett, 1989, p. 545]. Supporting Marx’s
view that this helped to promote the capitalist mentality, Defoe,
Smith and others thought that “commercial wealth . . . greatly
enhanced the economic efficiency using the land”; that
“[c]ommercial instincts brought to the land habits of accounting
and profit calculation learned in trade, habits of ploughing back
capital into a business to expand it . . . ” [Mathias, 1983, pp. 149,
5]. To test this assertion we need to examine landlords’ ac-
counts.
Landlords’ Accounts: Evidence of landlords beginning to use
double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) would suggest they had a
capitalistic mentality because DEB automatically gave them
the means to calculate rate-of-return on capital [Bryer, 1993a].
In 1660 Abraham Liset published Amphithalami, or, The
Accomptants Closet, the first English book on DEB for estates.
This gives a worked example with a running commentary of the
ledger of a gentleman’s estates for the year ended 31 December
1658. Liset keeps accounts for two estates and two stewards. He
debits all property accounts with the capital value at 1 January
1658. He debits rents collected to the steward and credits the
property, and he makes opposite entries for disbursements and
expenditures. At the end of the year, Liset carries the opening
balance of the property forward and transfers the excess of rent
over disbursements to the gain and loss account [Lee, 1981, p.
544]. With such accounts it would be possible for the landlord to
calculate the feudal rate-of-return on his capital.
The first known example of DEB applied to estate accounts
are those of the Francis Willughby Executorship, 1672-1682
[Lee, 1981]. Sir Henry Barnard, the principal trustee, installed
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these accounts in 1673, possibly using Liset as a model. As ex-
ecutor, his interest was in financial control, so he did not value
the estates. Sir Henry kept the accounts on a cash basis, draw-
ing no distinctions between capital and revenue expenditures,
and he did not periodically balance them. To remedy these de-
fects, in 1676 Sir Henry “brought down . . . an Accomptant, so
that in a short time I hope to perfect all your accounts . . . ” [Lee,
1981, p. 545]. We know nothing of the provenance of this
Accomptant, Thomas Godfrey. Godfrey’s new system “provided
Sir Henry with a potent instrument of financial control over the
estates in his charge, far superior to any other then available, so
far as is known . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 548]. By valuing the estate
properties it would also have provided the means for calculating
the estate’s rate-of-return on capital.7
How do we explain this early application of DEB to estate
management? To Lee it “was the work of an obscure accountant
three centuries ago with few or no models to guide him and
with ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ more than two
centuries in the future”, the work of a “talented man” [1981, p.
548]. Thomas Godfrey as an individual might remain obscure,
but his social role and his models and accepted principles need
not. Although Godfrey called himself an Accomptant, this did
not have the traditional meaning — one who prepares charge
and discharge accounts [Lee, 1981, p. 545]. Godfrey’s title had
the modern meaning — one who provides the means (accounts)
to hold others accountable. He might be an early example of an
emerging profession of Accomptants. The English East India
Company hired ‘accountants’ from the early 17th century [Bryer,
2000b], and other joint stock companies are likely to have been
doing the same. The connection with socialized capital could
also explain Godfrey’s accounts. The “year 1676 was a crucial
one for the Willughby’s. Henry Barnard became a knight; Emma
[Willughby] became the third wife of Josiah Child (1603-1699),
one of the richest men in England”, and Godrey installed the
new accounting system. Josiah Child happened to be “a London
merchant, a director of the East India Company, and later its
Governor . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 548]. From 1677 “extensive invest-
ments were made under Sir Josiah Child’s influence in the stock
of the East India Company . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 549]. This is pre-
cisely the type of social milieu in which, according to Marx, the
7 Although Godfrey set up capital accounts each with “a unique set of assets
and liabilities . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 545] it is not clear whether these included more
than accumulated rents.
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rate-of-return mentality of socialized capital should be growing
towards the end of the 17th century.
A rate-of-return on capital mentality spreading within the
landed gentry could explain the steady flow of manuals of
double entry estate accounts from the reprint of Liset in 1684
[Lee, 1981, p. 544]. For example, Thomas Richard’s The
Gentleman’s Auditor [1707]; Roger North’s The Gentleman
Accomptant [1714]; Richard Hayes, The Gentlemen’s Complete
Book-keeper . . . [1741]; and Anon, The Gentleman’s and Lady’s
Accomptant [1744]. Roger North advocated and presented a so-
phisticated system of estate accounts based on DEB [Parker,
1997]. North had early experience of government in London, but
spent most of his life as a gentleman farmer and author in Nor-
folk. Roger’s brother was the well-known Dudley North, author
and merchant. North’s “emphasis, not only upon accountability,
but also on what he called ‘Managery’ . . . ” [Parker, 1997, p. 37],
is consistent with the increasing interpenetration of the mentali-
ties of socialized capital and capitalist agriculture. Parker says
“Richards presents charge and discharge in double-entry cloth-
ing . . . ” [1997, p. 37]. However, he says this only because “no
values are placed on the properties”, even though there is space
for the accountant to insert a capital value. An account existed
for “My Lord B’s Estate in general . . . ” [Parker, 1997, p. 37].
The “Estate in general”, is the Lord’s capital. Parker is right that
other books of the late 17th and even early 18th century used
charge and discharge or only cash receipts and payments, which
would support the view that the rate-of-return mentality was not
yet general. Consistent with this, Lee thinks DEB in estate ac-
counts “was probably not common before 1750 . . . ” [Lee, 1981,
p. 551]. Jones says from around 1750 we see a “transition from
the charge and discharge basis to double entry accounts, in-
tegrated the one with the other . . . ” [1985, p. 41]. A clear ex-
ample is the account books of Herbert Mackworth of Gnoll,
Glamorgan, for 1759-1760 [Jones, 1985, p. 53]. They give us
direct evidence of the capitalistic mentality at work. “Attempts
were made to measure the profitability o[f] various aspects of
work undertaken by the Estate with the object[ive] of indicating
overall profitability, thus giving the landlord an idea of what the
Estate could repay him on account of capital, or ‘principal’,
originally advanced or invested . . . ” [Jones, 1985, p. 53]. Not
surprisingly, according to Marx’s theory, Herbert Mackworth
and his son were very keen on improvement [Jenkins, 1983, p.
56]. Oldroyd finds the same attitude on the Bowes’ estates and
“unequivocal evidence of double-entry bookkeeping . . . [in] a
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pro-forma scheme of partnership accounts for lead mining and
smelting, compiled around 1741”, and evidence of its use be-
tween 1741 and 1746 [1999, pp. 182-183].
Landlords did not need DEB to calculate the rate-of-return
on capital; they could modify their well-understood single-entry
systems. Napier thinks it unlikely that landlords used their ac-
counts for this purpose because, for example, for the second
Marquis of Bute “to gain an overall picture of his Glamorgan
estate, he would have had to consolidate in his own mind ac-
counting and other information from several sources . . . ” [1991,
p. 171]. However, Bute did care about the rate-of-return on his
capital. In 1828 he “was advised that a new dock at Cardiff
would cost £66,000 and generate a return of 7% . . . ” [Napier,
1991, p. 166]. The accountant kept his mineral ledger using DEB
from 1826 to 1831 [Napier, 1991, p. 170]. The form of his Ac-
count Current and the Abstract for the estate “suggests that . . .
[the accountant] used a double entry ledger”, if only a “rudimen-
tary one” [Napier, 1991, p. 170]. There are many ways accoun-
tants could adapt charge and discharge systems [Baxter, 1980, p.
70]. Bailiffs’ accounts of farms in hand could provide examples
as “even during the eighteenth century [they] displayed a re-
markable similarity in presentation, in that annual profit and
loss columns and stock valuations were drawn up and farming
matters were clearly separated from other estate interests . . . ”
[Jones and Collins, 1965, p. 87]. Furthermore, the landlord or
his agents could use records of cash receipts and payments in a
variety of ways — adjusting for opening and closing debtors,
creditors and stocks — to measure and control profitability
[Oldroyd, 1999, pp. 182, 197].
The landlords’ adoption of the rate-of-return on capital
mentality is the first step. The following parts argue that from
around 1750 many landlords took the second step by becoming
capitalists and spreading its mentality and social relations
through enclosures, through capital investment, and their man-
agement of rent.
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS AND
PARLIAMENTARY ENCLOSURES
The flood of parliamentary enclosures beginning in the
1760s that swept away the open commonfields and commons
was a critical element in Marx’s landlords’ revolution. To see if
he is right we must examine the landlords’ and farmers’ motives.
Economic historians often misunderstand Marx’s views on
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enclosures. Allen repeats the dominant view. He says Marx
thought “[e]nclosures and large farms created private property
and capitalism . . . ” [1992, p. 2]. Marx has it the other way
around: capitalism created enclosures and large farms. Marx
saw capitalist enclosures not simply as a technically efficient
reorganization of the land, but, crucially, as arenas in which the
farmer would be accountable to the landlord for the capital em-
ployed. They “conquered the field for capitalistic agriculture,
made the soil part and parcel of capital . . . ” [Marx, 1974, p.
685]. They made land “suitable for the application of capital and
labour” [Marx, 1969a, p. 141]. They allowed the capitalist
farmer freedom to maximize the rate-of-return on capital. But,
more important for the landlord, enclosures legally and physi-
cally defined the boundaries of the capital for which he could
hold the farmer accountable. “Enclosure, whether by Parliamen-
tary act or local agreement operated to define and strengthen
the control of individuals over cultivable land . . . ” [O’Brien,
1977, p. 180]. After 1760 enclosures were the landlords’ largest
expenditure [Mingay, 1963b, p. 179; Holderness, 1988, p. 20].
Marx would have agreed that “the growth of capitalist farm-
ing . . . [was] fuelled by enclosure . . . ” [Turner, 1989, p. 58]. He
thought that capitalist landlords and farmers used enclosures to
increase labor productivity by innovation and investment to pro-
duce higher returns on capital and higher rents [Marx, 1974, p.
908]. Consistent with this, Allen shows that 18th century “open
villages were far less innovative than the enclosed” [1992, p. 15].
He finds, however, that these innovations made “only a minor
contribution” to increases in crop yields and labor productivity
[Allen, 1992, p. 15]. He concludes that Marx “exaggerated the
contribution of enclosure to the growth in labour productiv-
ity . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 151]. He thinks the major economic
consequence of enclosures “was to redistribute the existing agri-
cultural income, not to create additional income by raising effi-
ciency . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 181]. In support, Allen calculates the
farmers’ excess returns from open fields and from enclosures
using Ricardo’s theory of rent [1992, p. 174]:
sT = pQ - wL - iK
s = surplus per acre,
T = total acres,
p = the price of total output,
Q = total output,
w = the price of labor including that of the farmer and his
w = family,
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L = total labor hours,
i = the price of capital,
K = the farmer’s capital.
Allen measures Ricardian rent (sT) as sales (pQ) minus
wages, seeds, repairs and all other expenditures on labor, etc.,
(wL) and the “price” of capital (iK) (sT = pQ - wL - iK). His
“capital cost” “equals the depreciation plus the interest of live-
stock and implements, that is, the assets with lives longer than
one year”. He charges 5% only on the farmer’s livestock and
implements, the maximum rate of interest the law allowed
[Allen, 1992, Appendix II]. A major difference between Ricardo
and Marx’s theories of rent, therefore, is that according to Marx
the farmer wanted a return on all of his capital, on his produc-
tive capital and his capital of circulation (his inventories, debt-
ors and cash). Another is that, according to Marx, the farmer
“does not demand customary interest but the customary
profit . . . ” [1969b, p. 158], that is, the general rate of profit.8
If the landlord collected less rent than Ricardo’s theory pre-
dicts, the farmer kept an excess return. Allen finds that land-
lords generally collected Ricardian rent from enclosed farmers.
By contrast, they often failed to collect full Ricardian rents from
open field farmers [Allen, 1982, p. 941]. Allen concludes, there-
fore, that the aim and result of enclosures was to redistribute
surplus; an expression of the landlords’ increased power in the
18th century. In Marx’s terms, he sees enclosures and rent in-
creases as acts of feudal coercion with no revolutionary implica-
tions, “the . . . outcome of a power struggle . . . ” [Overton,
1996b, pp. 162-163]. What follows argues that enclosures pro-
vided the foundation for capitalist accountability: that they did
help landlords to eliminate the farmer’s excess returns, but not
through a power struggle over a given surplus. The landlords
used their remaining feudal power (their dominance of the land
and parliament) to impose capitalist accountability and control
over their tenants. Landlords could not appropriate full eco-
nomic surpluses from open-field farms as there were limits to
their feudal power. To control these surpluses and generate
more, landlords had to transform feudal into capitalist account-
ability. Enclosure was the first essential step, but it was not
sufficient to produce an increase in output and productivity.
Unlike Allen, Marx envisaged no simple enclosure effect — no
8 I critically examine the Ricardian theory of rent in a later section. For the
remainder of this section I take Allen’s empirical results at face value.
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increase in productivity or yields from simply putting up fences,
etc.
An Enclosure Effect?: Enclosed farmers could innovate because
enclosures removed collective constraints on the farmer’s deci-
sions, but why they should is a mystery in Allen’s explanation as
the landlord diverts any excess return to himself. According to
Marx, enclosed farmers innovate because they are accountable
to a capitalist landlord and engage in the real subsumption of
labor to maximize their returns on the largest possible capital.
Arthur Young “strongly believed that the character of the farm-
ers of enclosed lands was quite different from that of the occupi-
ers of the open fields”. He thought the “farmers using enclosures
were more progressive in their ideas, more open to the possibil-
ity of increasing output by adopting improved practice” (quoted
in Mingay, 1975, p. 103]. The reason was that “[e]nclosures raise
rents; high rents made men industrious . . . . Everything must be
turned to good advantage when high rents are paid; the farmer
knows that everything must be profitable; and that very circum-
stance renders them so . . . ” [Young, quoted in Mingay, 1975, p.
104]. Anticipating the ‘results control’ approach of modern man-
agement control theorists [Bryer, 2004c], Young claimed that by
holding tenants accountable for high rents, “[m]en have been
taught to think . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 111]. Certainly,
as land agent Thomas Davis commented of Wiltshire in 1811,
‘[e]nclosures make a good farmer better and a bad one worse’.
Clearly, “enclosure could bring improvement only if the farmers
were ready and willing to innovate . . . ” [Beckett, 1990, p. 39] —
only if they had the appropriate mentality. Enclosures in them-
selves raised neither labor productivity nor yields; in themselves
they played no role [Turner, 1986, p. 687].
Allen, by contrast, looks for an enclosure effect on yields,
and concludes that we must, therefore, control for the effect of
soil and climate, etc. [1992, p. 135]. He controls for soil type and
finds that increased yields from enclosures were insignificant. At
the national level using 1801 crop returns, Turner, however,
finds “the increase in yield that can be postulated as a result of
enclosure were 23% for wheat and barely and 11% for oats . . . ”
[1989, p. 53]. The increase for Northamptonshire “can partly be
attributed to inferior land having been taken out of crop produc-
tion, which necessarily raises the statistical average . . . ”
[Turner, 1989, p. 53]. From Allen’s perspective, Turner’s study
was flawed [Allen, 1994, p. 116]. However, shifting corn pro-
duction to more fertile land after enclosure is a “result of
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enclosure”, the result of applying the capitalist mentality to the
opportunities it created. Therefore, Turner’s increases in yields
give us a better guide to the motives for enclosure than Allen’s.
Only by relying on arbitrary quantitative criteria for deciding
whether changes were ‘revolutionary’ can Allen conclude that
neither productivity nor yield increases were significant because
he finds greater increases during the 17th century. The increases
he finds insignificant might have been significant to the land-
lord and the farmer. We cannot understand enclosures by study-
ing crop yields and productivity in isolation from changing pat-
terns of farming and output [Turner, 1989, p. 53], and to
understand this we must understand the mentality behind them.
If the promoters were capitalists, even apparently small in-
creases in yields and labor productivity in conjunction with
smaller capital per acre [Allen, 1992, p. 18] might have given the
larger enclosed farms significantly greater returns on capital
and, therefore, their landlords greater rents. Did landlords pro-
mote enclosures for these reasons? Was it the case that “from a
landlord’s point of view enclosure was an investment, the profit
from which was a higher rent . . . ” [Turner, 1984, p. 41]? “Were
accountancy procedures, however crude, employed? . . . ”
[Turner, 1984, p. 44]. From Marx’s viewpoint, we must ask
whether enclosers calculated the expected return on the capital
employed. Although we need systematic research, the evidence
available supports the view that many did, using either rate-of-
return, residual income, or present value calculations.
Parliamentary Enclosures, Accounting Calculations and Class
Conflict: In their extensive studies of parliamentary enclosures,
historians only occasionally give us evidence of accounting and
financial calculations, although they often imply they were not
unusual. In 1775 Nathaniel Kent (a Norfolk land steward)
thought that “if an acquisition would contribute towards mak-
ing possible an enclosure or some other rationalization of farm
layout, then it would be worthwhile as an investment . . . be-
cause [of] the high rate of return obtainable from capital . . . ”
[quoted in Clay, 1985, p. 181]. Turner says that some “evidence
suggests that enclosers were sensitive to opportunity costs, in-
voking the capital cost of enclosure only in terms of the fore-
gone income from investing the same money elsewhere . . . ”
[1984, p. 45]. He gives an example from 1775 when the principal
landowner in the Buckinghamshire hamlet of Sedrup calculated
residual income [Turner, 1984, p. 45]. Turner says of this type of
calculation, “while not commonplace, . . . it was not unusual for
33
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2004, Vol. 31, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2004
25Bryer: The Roots of Modern Capitalism
recognized enclosure commissioners and land surveyors to
make this kind of estimate as a preliminary to framing a
bill . . . ” [1984, p. 45]. Sometime in the 1770s Sir William Lee of
Hartwell in Buckinghamshire made a present value calculation
to evaluate an enclosure proposal [Turner, 1984, p. 45]. Land-
lords sometimes calculated the number of years before the rent
increase repaid the capital. The rent increase on enclosure gave
a constant surplus each period, so the reciprocal of the payback
period was the rate-of-return on the initial capital. As the
Sedrup enclosure’s forecast rent increase would have repaid the
capital after three years [Turner, 1984, p. 45], its rate-of-return
was 331/3%. Widespread concern with the rate-of-return on capi-
tal from 1750 could explain why neither price levels nor interest
rates provides a convincing explanation of enclosure activity
[Turner, 1984, p. 51]. If landlords were capitalists they based
their decisions to enclose on the expected rate-of-return that
was a function of expected interest rates and profits.
Acceptance of the capitalist mentality could also explain
why, although rents increased markedly on enclosure, and often
redistributed surplus from tenant to landlord, no serious con-
flict erupted between them. Why, that is, the “tension between
the . . . ideals . . . of paternalistic responsibility for their tenants
. . . [and] the apparent advantages of active, engaged manage-
ment, of improvement . . . probably lessened towards the end of
the seventeenth century . . . ” [Heal and Holmes, 1994, p. 113].
Feudal paternalistic responsibility for tenants meant physical
capital maintenance, that tenants should not be ‘wasted’ [Bryer,
1994b]. In the capitalist mentality it means the tenant earns the
general rate of profit on his capital. Certainly, there was conflict
between landlords and peasants, particularly the smaller farm-
ers and below that had most to lose. Marx, however, would have
agreed “[l]andlords and tenants shared a common interest, but
the ultimate benefit of any improvement went to the land-
lord . . . ” [Turner, 1989, p. 57]. The landlord got the maximum
rate of rent and the farmer got the general rate of profit on the
largest capital. If the equation Ri = riKTi - rGKFi governed rents,
they could double on enclosure (as the conventional wisdom
says they did) if the rate-of-return on total farm capital in-
creased modestly and the farmer took the general rate of profit.
All this could happen without a power struggle between the
two groups. According to Young, enclosed farmers got a lower
rate-of-return on capital than open-field farmers [Allen, 1982, p.
941]. However, if enclosed farmers employed a larger capital
they could earn the same or a larger profit. For example, assume
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before enclosure that the rate-of-return on the total capital of
£100 invested in the farm is 15% and the farmer brings capital
of £50 and takes the general rate of profit of 10%. The rent is
£10 = [0.15 x £100] - [0.10 x £50], and the farmer’s profit is £5.
If, after enclosure, the rate of profit on the farm increased to
16.67%, and the capital employed after enclosure was £150 and
the general rate of profit stayed the same, rent would double to
£20 = [0.1667 x £150] - [0.10 x £50]. If before enclosure the
farmer took (say) a 12% return on his capital so that rent was
£9, conflict could ensue over the redistribution of £1 of surplus.
However, the farmer’s income could stay the same or rise if, as
often was the case, enclosure allowed him to employ a larger
capital [Allen, 1994, p. 98; Overton, 1996b, p. 127]. If in the
example the farmer could invest an additional £10, his profit
stayed at £6, and rent increased to £20.67. Perhaps this is why
initiatives for enclosure “[o]ften . . . came from the larger farm-
ers who desired more compact and easily-worked farms”
[Mingay, 1963b, p. 181] on which they could employ more work-
ing capital, particularly higher densities of livestock [Turner,
1989, p. 50]. This switch continued through the early 19th cen-
tury despite a shift of relative prices favoring grain production.
From 1700 to 1850 the farmers’ capital increased as they ex-
panded flocks and livestock to take advantage of improved pas-
tures and greater production of winter forage [Allen, 1994, p.
117]. This could help explain why farmers benefited, but by less
than landlords, from enclosures [Turner, 1984, p. 44].
Enclosures and Accountability: Allen’s finding that in the late
1760s rents gave enclosed farmers no excess returns but that
open field rents did, is consistent, as Boyer says, with “landlords
learn[ing] how to properly value land only upon its enclo-
sure . . . ” [1993, p. 919]. That is, according to Marx, learning
how to make modern accounting calculations. Allen does not
otherwise explain “why convention was so much better at set-
ting rents on enclosed land than on open-field land . . . ” [Boyer,
1993, p. 919]. Marx’s theory says that whereas from around 1670
growing numbers of farmers could do capitalist accounting,
landlords only became capitalists from around 1750 and learnt
it then. This suggests that until then, open field tenants kept
some or all the surpluses because landlords had neither the
mentality to demand capitalist accountability, nor the systems
and manpower to enforce it. By contrast, Turner, Beckett and
Afton argue that landlords did not claw back surpluses because
they became better at “identifying and extracting the value of
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their shared asset . . . ” [1996, p. 16]. In their view, this happened
because “changes in the economic environment of eighteenth-
century farming initially worked in favour of the tenants, and
that advantage was halted, and to a large degree reversed, at
enclosure . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1996, pp. 234-235].
However, this explanation takes no account of Allen’s find-
ing that by 1806 the gap between rent and surplus on open-field
farms had disappeared. Allen does not explain why open-field
rents captured the full Ricardian rent during the inflation of the
French war years but did not during the 1760s. “[I]f the open-
fields market was in equilibrium in 1806, what does that imply
about the causes of the enormous wave of enclosures at that
time? . . . ” [Boyer, 1993, p. 920]. According to Allen, landlords
enclosed to get the Ricardian surplus. However, they had no
need to enclose in the early 19th century if open-field rents
already transmitted this surplus. By contrast, Marx’s theory ex-
plains these enclosures as the result of spreading demand for
capitalist accountability. That is, the landlord’s motive became
not simply to increase his rents to collect his Ricardian surplus,
nor simply to get increased rents through immediate increases
in productivity. Rather, landlords enclosed to secure capitalist
accountability from their tenants to increase the long run rate-
of-return on the capital employed on their land. Landlords and
farmers, like most political economists, thought that increased
rent was a return for increased efficiency (i.e., was differential
rent), and saw enclosures as the beginning of a program of capi-
tal investment to increase it. As Edward Laurence, the well-
known writer and land steward put it, the improving landlord
“should not immediately think that All is to be set right on a
sudden; but Time and Patience must be allow’d and then some-
thing may be done to Satisfaction. . . . In all . . . cases, a Sum of
Money must be allow’d and expended to make good Deficien-
cies; and this before the Landlord can, or ought, so much as to
think of, an Advance of Rent . . . ” [1731, pp. 2-3].
If landlords judged enclosures and other improvements by
differential rent, what type of rent, Ricardo or Marx’s? It is true
that “we know all too little about how rents were assessed, the
process of agreement between tenant and agent, the methods of
payment and accounting, and the techniques for agreeing abate-
ments, remissions and . . . evictions” etc., [Turner, Beckett and
Afton, 1997, pp. 6-7]. Marx and Ricardo’s theories of rent pro-
duce very different views of how landlords set about managing
their estates. However, only Marx’s theory is consistent with
modern accounting and the evidence we have of its use.
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RICARDO OR MARX’S THEORY OF RENT?
Ricardo recognizes only circulating and fixed capital, and so
does Allen. Ricardo says that “[a]ccording as capital is rapidly
perishable, and requires to be frequently reproduced, or is slow
of consumption, it is classed under the heading of circulating or
of fixed . . . ” [1973, p. 26]. The modern notion of fixed capital
does not depend on its durability. Thinking that it does wrongly
focuses attention on the physical properties of the asset and not
its economic function in the production process [Marx, 1978, p.
298]. The essential point is whether the owner recovers the capi-
tal bit-by-bit over more than one operating cycle. In Marx and
modern accounting the distinction between fixed capital and
circulating capital is not immutable. They are not, as they are in
Ricardo, “a set of definitions under which things are to be sub-
sumed . . . ” [Marx, 1978, p. 303]. Ricardo thought certain ob-
jects the capitalist buys are by their nature fixed and others are
circulating. Modern accountants would agree with Marx that it
is “rather definite functions that are expressed in specific cat-
egories . . . ” [1978, p. 303]; that the functions and categories of
fixed capital are as follows. As labor uses the fixed capital it
transfers the capital’s value to the commodity. Accountants call
the consumption and recovery of this capital depreciation. This
value becomes, first, an element of productive capital as work-
in-progress; then it becomes capital of circulation as finished
stock, debtors or cash, etc. [Bryer, 1999a].
Ricardo ignored these elements of the farmer’s capital of
circulation. His equation for rent simply divides the cash flows
of the farm between the landlord and the farmer (who keeps the
cash flow shielded by ‘depreciation’). Perhaps this is why Allen
confidently claims that rents, having little to do with account-
ing, “were determined administratively or bargained between
landlord and tenant” using “conventions” (for example, open
fields rents were 10s. per acre, and enclosed were 20s.) [Allen,
1992, p. 181]. Furthermore, following Pollard [1965], he claims
that neither landlord nor farmer “could . . . do the requisite ac-
counting . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 183]. Pollard’s key claim was that
leading industrial concerns did not attempt calculations of the
“profit rate on capital” but, as Edwards and Newell say, he “is
certainly wrong” [1991, p. 51].
If we include the use of residual income accounting, there is
evidence that some farmers did calculate the rate-of-return on
capital employed [Bryer, 2004a]. In 1611 Robert Loder calcu-
lated his excess profit on the capital he employed in production
[Bryer, 2000b]. In 1765 a Romney Marsh grazier deducted “1 yrs
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Interest on £560 money advanced on the stock @ 4 per cent”
from his surplus [Reading University Library, KEN 19/1/1, p. 5].
In 1788 Arthur Young published accounts that measured re-
sidual income and calculated the rate-of-return on the “Total
stock of the farm, or capital employed . . . ” [1788, p. 236]. Allen
accepts that 18th century entrepreneurs often used the residual
income approach, although he confuses it with his ‘opportunity
cost of capital’. That is, he says they “typically allowed 5 per cent
interest on the investment and computed the rate of profit on
the residual . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 183]. Allen says “Young . . .
used this value in calculations of farm profits . . . ” [1992, p.
319]. In reality, Young used it as a benchmark for calculating
the excess profit over ‘interest’ as a benchmark rate-of-return. In
the 18th century entrepreneurs and farmers considered any ex-
cess the return to entrepreneurship [Hueckel, 1976, pp. 334-
335].
Were the Agricultural Experts Ricardians?: To bolster his argu-
ment that farmers and landlords set rents innocent of modern
accounting, Allen refers to the widely quoted essay by Tuckett
On Land Valuing published in 1863. Allen claims Tuckett as a
Ricardian because he says “there can be no doubt that the dif-
ference between the produce and the expenses must, in the end,
regulate the rent that a farmer can afford to pay . . . ” [quoted by
Allen, 1992, p. 182]. It is not clear from this that Tuckett is a
Ricardian. Tuckett quotes with qualified approval the “same
idea” that “the fair rent, ‘it is presumed, may be obtained by
estimating the expenses incurred and the profits arising during
the whole course of one rotation of crops on different soils’ . . . ”
[1863, p. 5]. His qualification is that in estimating profits, “to
enter on these needful calculations” over one rotation “will re-
quire great practical experience . . . ” [1863, p. 6]. Tuckett did,
therefore, think it was possible and desirable to estimate “prof-
its” in determining rent. There was no mechanical formula, but
Tuckett clearly thought that the boundary of rent was “profit”
which the land surveyor should estimate as best he could.
Tuckett found “[s]uch calculations . . . very interesting, and I
have often made them for my own satisfaction . . . ” [1863, p. 6].
They should, however, be supplemented by an intimate knowl-
edge of the rent market to gauge the ‘fair’ level of rent. Accord-
ing to Marx, this was the rent that left the farmer with the
general rate of profit on his capital.
Young, Marshall and other experts appear to have had this
formula in mind. Marshall thought, “a proprietor should spare
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no reasonable expense to come at a fair rental value . . . ”
[quoted in Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 17]. He should
use two or three valuers and, presumably, average their valua-
tions to arrive at his forecast. Alternatively, he should use local
market price, the summation of all money-backed forecasts: “in
every neighbourhood, there is a peculiar, yet fair Market
Price . . . ” [Marshall, quoted in Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997,
p. 17]. This is what Squarey meant in 1878 when he said that no
“precise formula can be adopted in fixing its amount . . . ” [1878,
p. 441]. The reason was that in the real world the “rent of land is
that surplus of money which on an average of years, may be
expected to remain after paying the fixed and fluctuating
charges . . . ” [Squarey, 1878, p. 440]. Turner, Beckett and Afton
think Young’s “more sharply defined capitalist attitude” towards
setting rents looks Ricardian [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997,
pp. 19-20]. Given Young’s capitalist understanding of accounts,
however, his attitude looks Marxist. For example, his view that
the landlord should include in his calculation of rent estimates
of the cost of carriage to market. “[The] goodness of roads, and
a moderate distance from market, are circumstances highly nec-
essary to be attended to in the hiring of a farm; and that, if they
are wanting, the rent ought to be estimated accordingly . . . ”
[quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 158]. Put another way, the “general
rule, in the words of David Low [in 1823], was ‘that the landlord
so regulate his demands on the tenant, as not to exact as rent
any part of that fund which is necessary to the farmer as capi-
tal’ . . . ” [Beckett, 1989, p. 610]. This, for Marx, typified the capi-
talist mentality.
Capitalist landlords should seek the highest rent consistent
with maintaining the farmer’s capital, for example, by reducing
rent in response to improvements paid for by the tenant, or
because of hard times. This principle underlay the system of
‘rack renting’ approved of by agricultural experts and practiced,
for example, by Coke of Norfolk [Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 14]. In this context ‘rack’ has two meanings — a ‘hori-
zontal bar’ or ‘shelf’, and to ‘stretch the joints (of a person) by
tugging or pulling’. A rack rent, therefore, was a high, level rent,
unlike earlier forms (mainly beneficial leases and copyholds)
that had the tenant pay a large lump sum followed by a nominal
rent and, perhaps, feudal services in money, labor or kind. A
step towards rack rents was the recognition, beginning in the
17th century, that with beneficial leases the amount the tenant
paid in advance was the present value of the nominal fine
[Finch, 1956, p. 202]. The landlord calculated the fine as so
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many years depending on the rate of interest multiplied by the
difference between the economic rent and the nominal rent
[Stone, 1965, p. 318]. Financial tables existed in the early 17th
century to convert fines into equal annual equivalents, that is,
the equivalent annuity [Finch, 1956, Appendix II, p. 173].
Turner, Beckett and Afton say in practice the fine “was rarely
based on real economic information . . . ” [1997, p. 25]. They
think that only a few “farmers were sufficiently wealthy and
educated to think in this way — the majority kept no records let
alone understood the finer details of accountancy”, but they ad-
mit that David Low’s clearly capitalist “way of thinking was well
established . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 20]. Sir
Ralph Verney’s management of his tenants suggests this way of
thinking also existed in the late 17th century.
Sir Ralph Verney, An Early Capitalist Landlord?: “Sir Ralph’s goal
throughout his life” was “the highest possible rent . . . ” [Broad,
1973, p. 249]. Broad says Sir Ralph reveals his “capitalist view of
the landowner’s position” when he says “I ever was and still am
of the opinion that no man is bound to suffer his tenants to reap
the benefits of his land because they are poor . . . ” [1973, p.
248]. In short, Broad thinks Sir Ralph is a capitalist because he
is “grasping” and “harsh” [1973, p. 213]. However, Sir Ralph
also said, possibly revealing his truly capitalist view, “on the
other side I do believe a landlord is obliged to take but an equi-
table rent for his land so as the tenant by God’s ordinary provi-
dence and blessing upon his honest endeavors may be a gainer
by it. And to my knowledge I never broke this rule . . . ” [quoted
in Broad, 1973, p. 248]. The capitalist rule is that equitable rent
leaves the tenant with the general rate of profit on his capital. A
landlord like Sir Ralph, deeply involved in the personal manage-
ment of his business and knowing the markets well, could with
equanimity leave the calculation of the equitable rent to the
market. Broad says that for Sir Ralph, “[a]s in the true defini-
tion of rack rent, market forces alone determined the level . . . ”
[1973, p. 248].
However, this does not necessarily mean that Sir Ralph was
not a consciously active capitalist landlord. He almost certainly
had a rate-of-return mentality. As a Royalist Sir Ralph had to
sell two-thirds of his pre-civil-war estates, but stabilized his fi-
nancial position by marrying his eldest son to the heiress of a
City merchant whose family had recently settled on the land
[Broad, 1973, p. 7]. He immersed himself in the City, spending
around five months in London every year, and his younger son
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became a successful Levant merchant in the 1650s. He had a
wide circle of friends and contacts, including the Earl of
Warwick and other prominent merchants trading with social-
ized capitals in the West Indies and North America, all vigorous
investors in the East India Company and elsewhere [Brenner,
1993, Bryer, 2000b]. Although Sir Ralph “did not normally in-
vest in commercial enterprises he once put £150 in Africa
Company stock. However, one of the services which he provided
was to arrange the putting out of money for friends and
relatives . . . ” [Broad, 1973, p. 8]. Sir Ralph usually reinvested
the money by lending to landed families, but in 1678 he at-
tempted unsuccessfully to invest £800 in East India stock
through his son John for a friend [Broad, 1973, p. 9]. Clay says,
the “injection of mercantile wealth greatly revived the fortunes
of the Verneys . . . ” [1985, p. 152]. However, their involvement
with mercantile wealth might also have had profound effects on
their mentalities as farmers and landlords. Although Sir Ralph
did little farming himself, only becoming involved when he
could not let particular farms, he was an improving landlord
[Broad, 1973, p. 246].
Broad says that Sir Ralph’s approach to enclosures and im-
provements “was very much in line with the best contemporary
thought on the subject as laid down rather late by Edward
Laurence . . . ” [1973, p. 246]. Laurence published his The Duty
and Office of a Land Steward in 1727, based, he says, on “above
Twenty Years” experience [1731, p. ix]. However, Broad says
that where “Sir Ralph was very much at odds with Laurence’s
idea of good administration was in his basic attitude to his ten-
ants and his consistent insistence on rack renting . . . ” [1973, p.
247]. Arguably, however, while Sir Ralph and Laurence’s land-
lords used different methods, their “basic attitudes” were the
same. Broad does not discuss Laurence’s views, but if they were
a late presentation of the best practice of many landlords in his
day, they were capitalists, just like Sir Ralph. Certainly, Sir
Ralph appears “harsh” in keeping rents as high as possible and
evicting tenants in arrears of more than one year “unless they
had reserves of capital . . . ” [Broad, 1973, p. 252]. Laurence’s
aim was that estates were “let to the Satisfaction of both Land-
lord and Tenant, . . . [f]or altho’ the Lord’s Estate ought to be let
at best advantage, yet it should be let without racking the indus-
trious Tenant . . . ” [1731, p. 84]. Although their methods appear
to be different, by “racking” Laurence means, just like Sir Ralph,
charging rents no higher than an industrious tenant could pay
and earn a “profitable return . . . ” [Laurence, 1731, p. 14].
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Sir Ralph did his energetic best to avoid setting rents too
high by keeping a close watch on the efficiency and capital re-
serves of those who found his rents hard to bear. He tried to
keep potential tenants in reserve, and, when all else failed, even
“Sir Ralph could not avoid reducing his rents . . . ” [Broad, 1973,
p. 252]. Certainly, it would be risky for a “Person of Quality at a
distance” to entrust this method of management to his land
steward who might set his rents too high for a short term advan-
tage to himself (e.g., higher salary) and long term disadvantage
to the Lord. For Lords at a distance, Laurence recommended
formal calculations: “a Steward . . . , should take his Pen in
hand, and make a Calculation with the Tenant . . . of what may
be sold off the Farm, which ought to be . . . at least two Rents, if
it is intended a Farmer should thrive; and thrive he must, or else
the Landlord will suffer first or last. By these Methods and fair
Calculations a Farmer is treated in familiar, easy way, and you
beat, or rather convict, him with his own Weapons. But he will
not be bully’d or hector’d into an advanc’d Rent . . . ” [1731, p.
19]. Here Laurence contrasts the feudal landlord who bullies his
tenants to pay high rents with the capitalist Lord that has his
steward make calculations and talk to his tenants in their lan-
guage — the language of markets and accounting. Sir Ralph
apparently talked mainly of markets, but he was, unlike Sir
Pexall Brocas of Steventon, Hampshire (for example) no bully.
“Brocas’s ‘hard usage’ of his tenants was legendary: demands for
extortionate rents, and for loans that usually proved permanent,
were backed by threats of vexatious lawsuits and the attention
of his thugs . . . ” [Heal and Holmes, 1994, p. 115]. Laurence’s,
by contrast, was the modern way, “not the violent one of forcing
. . . tenants . . . beyond their Power, but the gentle and rational
one of persuading, and instructing them . . . that they may be
able, not only to pay, but to advance their Rents . . . ” [1731, p.
5].
Laurence gives us no details of how to calculate his ‘two
rents’, that is, rent for the landlord and profit for the farmer.
However, he says that stewards should lease to a “careful and
provident Farmer . . . [who] keeps well his Accompts, and wisely
balanceth his Gain and Loss, if he would be assur’d that he gets
by his Farm, and thrives in the world . . . ” [Laurence, 1731, pp.
82-83]. He should also be concerned with the tenant’s capital:
the “Steward, before he lets any considerable Farm to seeming-
good Advantage of an advanc’d Rent, should be well satisfied of
the Ability of the Tenant . . . . A Farm of a Hundred pounds a
year requires at the least Three hundred pounds Stock; and if ’tis
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a grazing Farm, above Four Hundred pounds . . . ” [Lawrence,
1731, p. 127]. This implies the tenant farmer wanted a particular
return on his capital, and the steward should calculate if an
industrious farmer could achieve this. Perhaps this is why
Laurence thought increasing all rents by the same amount was
“unjust” [1731, p. 17], presumably because farms needing the
least improvement should get the highest rent increase because
their rate-of-return on capital was higher?
Rack-renting and Farmers’ Returns on Capital: Beneficial leases
survived in certain areas as late as the end of the 19th century,
but from around 1750 landlords increasingly imposed rack
rents. Turner, Beckett and Afton say that even in the 19th cen-
tury the landlord tempered the “fully articulated ‘rack’ rent” with
“conventions based on social position” because “landlords were
often reluctant to push rents up to the highest possible lev-
els . . . ” [1997, pp. 13-15]. Certainly, rack rents “reflected a de-
sire to assume [more] direct control of their estates”, as did
using more tightly drawn lease contracts, the employment of
professional stewards, and the introduction of DEB [Turner,
Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 15], but these trend are consistent
with Marx’s landlords’ revolution. Also consistent is Hueckel’s
finding that “the long-run equilibrium return to [the farmer’s]
capital over this period probably lay within the range from 9%
to 14% . . . ” [1976, p. 343], approximating the general rate of
profit, which implies that landlords also received ‘fair rents’. In
other words, as capitalists the landlords did push rents to the
‘highest possible levels’ consistent with their ‘social position’. To
what extent did this range result from market forces or the land-
lords’ and tenants’ calculations? According to Allen, if early in-
dustrialists did not understand accounting, the “average farmer”
certainly could not [1992, p. 183]. However, at least some land-
lords and agents did understand capitalist accounting and ac-
countability.
An ideal-typical capitalist landlord’s accounting system
came from the pen of Thomas Lovett, chief agent at Chirk Castle
after 1750. Lovett prepared model accounts for a 400-acre farm.
He starts by calculating the necessary capital, which he reckons
as £1279.14.0. “Now I want to know what profits may be reason-
ably expected from the circulation of this large capital in the
business of Farming . . . ” [quoted in Jones, 1985, pp. 67-68].
Just like a modern capitalist he expects profit from the circula-
tion of capital in production and, to confirm this, in calculating
his profit Lovett deducts “[w]ear and tear in the implements of
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husbandry . . . and the decay in dairy utensils . . . ” [quoted in
Jones, 1985, p. 68]. Lovett then deducts “[t]he interest on his
neat Stock and neat Cash laid out . . . after the rate of £10 per
cent” [quoted in Jones, 1985, p. 68], to calculate his residual
income. Like a modern capitalist he “distinguishes . . . between
revenue and capital and recognises that certain types of ‘capital’
wear out or fall by the wayside and have to be replaced . . . to
maintain his starting capital intact . . . ” [Jones, 1985, p. 72].
Historians have studied only a few leading landlords’ ac-
counts in any detail, and fully supported generalizations must
await systematic research by accounting historians. The follow-
ing part highlights two prime examples where we have some
relevant accounting details, although questions remain. One ex-
ample is Thomas William Coke (‘Coke of Norfolk’) who appears
as an ideal-typical capitalist landlord, a man peculiarly fitted for
his times and for his self-appointed role as promoter of im-
proved agriculture. He was an incurable enthusiast and self-
publicist, not beyond distorting the facts to show himself in the
best possible light [Parker, 1975]. He and the early agricultural
historians, who took him at his word, magnified and distorted
his role in the agricultural revolution. Nevertheless, Coke of
Norfolk and his predecessors are an important test of Marx’s
theory: “the very fact that Cokes management was set up as an
example for others to follow makes . . . his study worth-
while . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 249]. Given that in north
west Norfolk “there were excellent farmers, deploying large capi-
tal, holding Coke farms before Thomas William Coke succeeded
his father” [Parker, 1975, p. 73], the Coke’s appear a classic case
of capitalist farmers producing capitalist landlords. Consistent
with this, the Cokes’ improving leases kept up with, but did not
lead, their progressive tenants [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 76]. Tho-
mas Coke was subject to capitalistic influences. Following their
disaster with the South Sea Bubble, the Cokes never seriously
invested outside agriculture until the 1850s, but they borrowed
heavily [Parker, 1975; Wade Martins, 1980].
Another prominent example is George Granville who inher-
ited the Leveson-Gower estates in 1803 [Wordie, 1982]. With the
estate and title he also inherited the capitalistic mentality of its
agents who, from 1758, had “brought in a new commercial atti-
tude . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 48]. From this time “the estate had
steadily come to be regarded more and more as first and fore-
most an investment, which gave a good or bad return in accor-
dance with the efficiency of the management . . . ” [Wordie,
1982, p. 59]. As we shall see, the evidence supports the view that
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by the 1790s the Leveson-Gower estates had a capitalist chief-
agent, and in 1803 they had a capitalist Lord (George Granville,
the second Earl Gower, was Marquis of Stafford from 1786, and
Duke of Sutherland from 1833). In the early 18th century the
Leveson-Gowers were in debt. From 1750 they were investing in
industrial partnerships and lending money to turnpike and ca-
nals.
Capitalist influence also comes from early industrial capital-
ists [Wordie, 1982, p. 107]. Not only did these entrepreneurs
draw the landlord’s attention to his unexploited mineral wealth,
they drew in his money [Wordie, 1982, pp. 107-108]. Regardless
of the landlord’s intentions this money circulated as capital.
From around 1750, the management of the Leveson-Gower es-
tates changed from what had been a “permissive”, haphazard
involvement, to “direct landlord participation” in industrial and
agricultural development [Wordie, 1982, p. 112]. The following
examines Cokes’, Leveson-Gowers’, and others’ capital calcula-
tions; their focus on the rate of rent; their calculations of the
length of leases, the capital adequacy of tenants, and the appro-
priate size of their farms. It concludes that the accounting evi-
dence supports Marx’s view that the motivation for the direct
involvement of landlords was their capitalist mentality.
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF RENT
Thomas Coke’s guardians took control of the estate in 1707.
In 1708 they reviewed the rents and put them up, starting a
trend that continued until after the Napoleonic Wars [Parker,
1975, p. 4]. In 1717, just before Thomas came of age, the guard-
ians produced a table showing how much the rental of the es-
tates had increased, and how much of this was due better “man-
agement” [Parker, 1975, p. 5]. Parker states the nub of the
management problem for capitalist landlords in his summary of
the principles the guardians applied “to assess accurately the
potentialities of the land, to encourage the tenants to attain
them and to secure a rent correctly reflecting those potentiali-
ties. Too low a rent reduces the landlord’s income, too high a
rent forces farmers to mismanage their farms and harm the
land . . . ” [1975, pp. 5-6]. In Marx’s theory, the “potentialities of
the land” is the potential rate of profit on the farm. Too low a
rent means the farmer gets more than the general rate of profit
on his capital, and too high a rent means the farmer fails to
maintain his capital. Coke’s steward applied these principles in
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1824 when he severely criticized a tenant who sub-leased for
adopting the feudal approach to the management of rent: “he
has squeezed exorbitant rents out of the Tenants, so as to inca-
pacitate them from effecting necessary improvements . . . ”
[quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 177]. “Encouragement” of the ten-
ants meant the landlord helping or fully financing investment
and regulating his demands for rent. Thus, we must not assume
that when Coke allows rent arrears to build up or reduces rents,
as his land steward put it, “from his innate goodness of
heart . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 149], that he is simply searching for
social prestige. Coke and his agents knew that to get his rents
the farmer must have enough capital to efficiently run his farms.
He therefore only let to “good men . . . possessed of good capi-
tal . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 15]. That is, those “greater capitalists”
who were more likely to continue paying rents even if from
accumulated wealth [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 89]. However, to
encourage them Coke made capital investment in his tenants’
farms based on capital calculations.
Capital Calculations: A capitalist landlord will increase rents to
recover the capital he invests in a farm and give him the farm’s
rate of profit on the capital. At the very least, he will want an
‘interest’ return on his capital. For example, in 1711 Coke’s
guardians increased the rent by £10 a year to a tenant “for the
interest of £200 laid out in building a barne and which is to
remain an improved rent . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 8]. As part of
their management of Coke’s estates the guardians decided to
encourage tenants by bearing some or all the costs of marling.
They did this by allowing deductions from rents. For example,
from 1710 to 1715 John Carr of Massingham “marled by agree-
ment 240 acres, and was allowed 8s. an acre in return . . . ”
[Parker, 1975, p. 7, see also p. 41]. An indication of the type of
thinking that might have gone into these calculations is Blaikie’s
(Coke’s steward) claim in 1828 that improvements “on Arable
land may pay £10 p. Cent on Capital, under particularly favor-
able circumstances. Improvements on Grass land, especially
draining wet land may and generally will pay from £50 to £100
p.Cent on Capital expended . . . ” [quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 155,
fn.70]. In 1850 Coke’s land steward “introduced new clauses into
his leases whereby the estate was ensured a return on improve-
ments made to farms: 5% was charged for drainage work and
71⁄2% on the cost of building work . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p.
100]. Coke of Norfolk spent a great deal on farm buildings.
Consistent with a capitalist mentality, as Young said of them,
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“the great object [was] to prevent waste and save labour . . . ”
[quoted in Wade Martins, 1980, p. 143]. The question remains
whether the greater object was to maximize the rate-of-return
on the capital employed. Evidence supporting this is the careful
provision of “adequate implement sheds, as more wear and tear
was caused by implements by leaving them outside than
through actual work . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, pp. 170-171].
‘Wear and tear’ is central to the capitalist idea of the circulation
of fixed capital and accounting for depreciation to recover its
cost.
The Leveson-Gower estates also invested heavily from the
1790s to increase the returns from its tenants’ farms. With the
appointment of John Bishton as chief agent in 1788, “more land-
lord capital than ever before was poured into both of the major
properties . . . as a means of raising rents a view that coincided
exactly with that of the young George Granville who inherited
the estates in 1805 . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, pp. 57-58]. The switch
from an emphasis on consumption to an emphasis on the rate-
of-return from productive investment was, for Marx, the essence
of the landlords’ revolution. By 1850 “interest on landlord’s capi-
tal was a major element in rent”, accounting for some 60% on
average [Holderness, 1981, p. 233].
The Rate of Rent: A landlord keeping his final accounts using
charge and discharge, could still indicate a capitalist mentality
by keeping separate records of investment and showing concern
for the rate of rent. Coke’s audit books, for example, distinguish
land purchases and buildings from repairs. From 1790 to 1882
the total invested in the estate recorded in the accounts was
£536,818 [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 99]. It is unclear how accurate
this total is as it includes a large element for buildings and
repairs [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 99]. Wade Martins thinks Coke’s
investment produced a modest incremental return of 7.6% even
without allowing for an increase in the value of land, or for the
fact that rents might have increased anyway, or that rents in
1882 were at a peak [Wade Martins, 1980, pp. 99-100]. She says
the return could be as low as 4.6%. By contrast, if we take
Coke’s investment as £536,818, with net rents of £59,709, the
estate’s rate of rent in 1882 was 11.1%. Which rate-of-return was
in Coke’s mind? Wade Martin’s incremental rate-of-return ig-
nores the capital invested by Coke and his tenants in 1790, and
they are not in constant prices. To estimate the real capital in
1790 and 1883 would require considerable work even if the data
exists. To show why it could change Coke’s appreciation of his
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returns, suppose, for example that from 1790 to 1883 the capital
in Coke’s estates doubled. If so, the rate of rent in 1790 was 3.4%
[£18,461/£536,818], and by 1883 it was 5.6% [£59,709/
£1,073,636]. Only if, say, the capital in 1790 was a quarter of
that in 1883, would the rate of rent fall with investment from
13.8% to 8.8%. Similar problems arise with Spring’s analysis of
the seventh Duke of Bedford’s “modest” returns from investment
between 1842 and 1861 [1963, p. 49]. Wade Martins explains
Coke’s apparently low returns by notionally adding the “intan-
gible” returns of the “admiration” of his fellow landlords [1980,
p. 104]. Thomas William, however, seemed generally happy with
his returns, and wanted the world to admire him for his invest-
ments. He “took pride in the amount he had invested in his
estates”, and “boasted” in his will (and before he died) that he
had spent £500,000 [Parker, 1975, pp. 94, 154].
Coke’s accounts distinguished expenditure on “improve-
ments” for each estate. Although this heading disappeared after
1784 [Parker, 1975, p. 56], the accountants continued to distin-
guish capital and revenue expenditures. Parker questions
whether they consistently distinguished repairs from improve-
ments, citing an item the accountants classified as improvement
in 1745 “for ‘making new banks, mending old banks’ . . . ”
[Parker, 1975, p. 56]. To decide whether they should have classi-
fied the latter as repairs or improvement we must understand
what the accountants meant by “mending”. At that time it could
mean to ‘amend’, to ‘improve in quality’, to ‘supplement’. If the
workers ‘amended’, that is, converted, the old banks into new
banks (for example, made them wider, deeper, different slope)
the accountants were right to classify this expenditure as im-
provement in the capitalist sense — to increase the store of use-
values available or lower their cost.
Parker’s other example is payments, which he says, “were
not capital investment at all, such as payments to outgoing ten-
ants for crops left growing on their farms . . . ” [1975, pp. 56-57].
While not fixed capital, these payments were for capital of circu-
lation. Parker also questions whether payments for marling are
“fixed investment . . . ” [1975, p. 57], and this after he repeatedly
tells us that the beneficial effects last for up to thirty years! After
the improvements heading disappeared, the accountants did not
religiously distinguish repairs and improvements, particularly
when the repairs element was small [Parker, 1975, p. 95]. Coke’s
books distinguished expenditure on drainage only from 1851
when it became the estate’s responsibility [Wade Martins, 1980,
p. 96], and struck the balance of the “net proceeds” of the estate
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after “everything needed to keep the estate in good order had
already been taken . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 22].
This organization of the accounts reflected Coke’s manage-
ment of the estate. It suggests a strong commitment to the main-
tenance of his estate as his productive capital. As Parker says,
“[t]he fact is expressive of a state of mind. The estate was the
basis of all the Coke life and its efficient management was axi-
omatic. . . . Spending on it . . . was accounted for as a prior
charge, coming before [large] housekeeping and personal
needs . . . ” [1975, p. 22]. On the face of it, this could suggest the
feudal idea of physical capital maintenance. However, evidence
consistent with concern for the rate of rent is provided by the
fact that when Mr Blaikie became the land steward he made
clear that he thought Coke had over invested [Wade Martins,
1980, p. 95].
Certainly, it might seldom be possible to find repair costs as
a separate item in the accounts [Beckett, 1986, p. 201]. Ac-
counts, however, often highlighted important items of capital.
For example, in the accounts of the second Viscount Towns-
hend, “ditch and hedgework, marling took special time and la-
bor to accomplish, so it was accounted for separately as an
extraordinary expenditure . . . , an acknowledgement of its status
as capital improvement . . . ” [Rosenheim, 1989, p. 127]. The ac-
counts of Guy’s Hospital’s estates did not distinguish repairs
from new buildings, but they distinguished other key items of
capital expenditure. The Abstract dating from 1762 distin-
guished between rates and taxes, buildings and repairs, money
spent on sea walls and river banks, planting woods, allowances
to tenants, and agents’ salaries and fees [Trueman, 1975, p. 522].
We must also look outside the final accounts for evidence of
concern with capital. Until 1864 the Bute accounts made no
distinction between capital and revenue, and no accounts sur-
vive for Bute’s Docks. Nevertheless, Bute knew from various
documents that his Ship Canal cost £222,000 in cash [Napier,
1991, pp. 173, 170]. As Laurence said, before a steward
“engageth in any Work of Consequence relating either to In-
closures, or Architecture, or Draining, &c. [he] should first send
as exact an Estimate as possible, what the same will amount to,
that his Lord may sit down and count the Cost, and make a
deliberate Judgment, whether the Charge will answer his Expec-
tations in the propos’d Benefit . . . ” [1731, p. 78].
Evidence consistent with landlords pursuing the rate of rent
is their tendency to invest more of their rentals in bad times,
and less in good times [Holderness, 1971, p. 178]. Historians
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usually explain this by the fluctuating need of the landlord to
“attract or retain tenants . . . ” [Rule, 1992, p. 60; Turner, Beckett
and Afton, 1996, p. 208; Holderness, 1981, p. 234]. They see the
landlord’s decision to invest heavily in fixed capital as the same
as his decision to allow arrears, take over taxes and repairs, or
to reduce his rent, simply the transfer of “income” [Turner,
Beckett and Afton, 1996, p. 208]. An alternative argument is that
tenants were more reluctant in bad times to undertake fixed
capital investment for which, until the later 19th century, they
typically had no legal security [Squarey, 1877, p. 435]. In good
times, when the farmer found it relatively easy to earn the gen-
eral rate of profit, the landlord persuaded him to make fixed
capital investments. In bad times the landlord could not do this
so easily. To maintain their rents, the landlords had to invest
more in fixed capital. For example, suppose at the necessary
level of fixed capital investment rF = 0.15, KF/ KL = 0.5, and rG =
0.1, then the rate of rent is 17.5% = (0.15 + 0.5[0.15 - 0.1]) x 100.
Suppose bad times arrive and that if the landlord does not invest
in additional fixed capital, rF will fall to 0.12 and his rate of rent
will fall to 13%. Suppose, however, that if the landlord invests
the necessary fixed capital rF only falls to 0.14. If, thereby, the
proportion of capital the farmer provides, KF/KL, falls to (say)
0.25, the rate of rent is 15%. As Mingay says, “enforced expendi-
ture in the difficult years . . . was merely an alternative to unwel-
come reductions in rentals . . . ” [1963, pp. 178-179]. In good
times, the less the landlord invests in fixed capital the higher his
rate of rent, and we expect him to persuade tenants to take more
of the burden. By the same logic, an advantage of leasing mines
instead of direct working was that the landlord minimized his
capital investment [Mingay, 1963, p. 193]. The history of land-
lord investment in agricultural fixed capital supports this model.
Until the reforms of the late 19th century, when a tenant left
the farm his fixtures became the property of the landlord
[Holderness, 1981, p. 233]. In practice the landlord did not often
enforce his rights and farmers generally did invest in fixed capi-
tal [Holderness, 1981, p. 233], possibly a third of the total over
the period 1750-1870 in East Anglia [Holderness, 1972, p. 446],
for example. Nevertheless, reflecting the legal uncertainty, the
conventional wisdom was that the farmer should invest only in
working capital [Currie, 1981, p. 77]. The landlord provided the
fixed capital ‘embodied in the land’ and the farmer provided the
‘working capital’ he could take with him. In practice, however,
this distinction became blurred, tenants often investing in em-
bodied fixed capital. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars,
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1793-1815, when prices and rents increased, “farmers were re-
quired to take more initiatives . . . [and landlords’] outgoings,
except on enclosure, were kept to a minimum . . . ” [Holderness,
1972, p. 441]. In East Anglia, the proportion of landlords’ rents
spent on improvements and repairs fell sharply from 1796 to
1806 [Holderness, 1972, Table 2, p. 439]. However, although the
conventional distinction blurred in the heady days up to 1815, in
the recession that followed farmers saw its wisdom clearly, per-
haps for the first time in a generation. In the recession and for
some years tenants became unwilling to make permanent im-
provements, and landlords became obliged to provide funds for
investment, often in lieu of rent reductions [Currie, 1981, p. 77].
The rate of rent helps to explain broad patterns of landlord
investment. However, to explain why particular landlords
adopted particular strategies we must understand their mentali-
ties. The Dukes of Marlborough, for example, neglected the
buildings on their estate [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 138]. This
neglect might have been the product of a feudal mentality.
Landlords were not inevitably capitalists. As his steward said
after Coke of Norfolk’s death, he could have used the £500,000
for “‘Horse racing or any other Gambling transaction if he had
been so inclined’ . . . .” [quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 154, fn.65].
Coke could have lived in the typically feudal way and focused
solely on consumption. To be capitalists landlords need not nec-
essarily be heavy or consistent investors. Some might attempt to
get the going rate of rent by a policy of minimal investment
[Holderness, 1981, p. 233]. Suppose, for example, that the land-
lord invests fixed capital to the point where rF = 0.15, the rate of
rent is 0.1625 = 0.15 + 0.25 (0.15 - 0.1). If the landlord invests
less, rF = 0.14 and rents are correspondingly lower, then he will
get the same rate of rent so long as the proportion of capital the
farmer provides does not fall below 56.25%, i.e., 0.1625 = 0.14 +
0.5625(0.14 - 0.1). Thus, it is possible that although in 18th
century literature “landowners continue to be represented as
‘big spenders’ and not frugal investors . . . ” [O’Brien and Heath,
1994, p. 53], many were capitalists. From 1750, “many progres-
sive landlords shifted their method of estimating gross income
from the number of rents to the interest charged on capital and
labour annually expended . . . ” [Davidoff and Hall, 1987, p. 204].
In Marx’s terms, many shifted from pursuing feudal rent to the
pursuing the capitalist rate of rent, and imposed this mentality
on their tenants. “This calculation of profitability, enforced by
cost conscious estate agents and bailiffs, influenced farmers. An
Essex man who farmed over 1000 acres saw himself ‘more in the
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nature of a person employing capital than a farmer’ . . . .”
[Davidoff and Hall, 1987, p. 204]. Although capitalist farmers
first created capitalist landlords, from the 1750s it is more likely
it will be the Lord pressing the farmer to become a capitalist,
than the other way round. One of the mechanisms landlords
used to create capitalist mentalities in their tenants was shorten-
ing the length of their leases.
The Length of Leases: Many agricultural experts (for example,
Arthur Young) advocated long leases because they thought secu-
rity of tenure gave the “illusion of ownership” [Wordie, 1982, p.
185] that encouraged the farmer to invest in the farm. An obvi-
ous problem for the landlord, however, was the inability to raise
rents quickly if prices increased, and for the tenant the
landlord’s reluctance to reduce them if prices fell. This argu-
ment weighed heavily with landlords from 1750 as prices and
rents rose, and by 1850 the majority of tenants had yearly
lettings [Holderness, 1981, p. 234; Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 199]. If the tenants were substantial capitalist farmers
(as Young assumed) the balance of incentives could favor a long
lease [Wordie, 1982, p. 185]. If the landlord did not rent to
substantial capitalist farmers willing and able to invest in fixed
capital and bear the risks, the balance of the argument swung
towards short leases. Furthermore, if the capitalist landlord
could not take the capitalist mentality of his tenants for granted
— as Coke of Norfolk, for example, probably could — short
leases could help him impose and sustain it. One reason for
introducing short leases was so that “rack-rented farms could
. . . become subject to market forces . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and
Afton, 1997, p. 199], but another was that they made tenants
more accountable to landlords.
The short lease became an engine of capitalist revolution. A
prominent example was its use on the Leveson-Gower estates.
James Loch, their chief agent from 1812, used short leases com-
bined with landlord investment in fixed capital to hold tenants
accountable for the maximum return on capital. Loch had a
keen interest in capitalist accounting. In 1835 he recommended
that the Earl of Dudley should use “double-entry forms, capital
accounting, and the break-down of accounts to provide specific
information such as net profit on individual concerns, adminis-
trative expenses, debts outstanding, or receipts from invest-
ments . . . ” [Raybould, 1973, p. 231]. Loch’s predecessors from
Thomas Tibbetts in 1722 also insisted on DEB [Wordie, 1982, p.
36]. For the Earl’s mines Loch recommended depreciating the
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capital cost or value for wear and tear. The accountant should
prepare a “capital account”, an “Account of the value of all the
Articles and Machinery, including the Cost or Value of the Pits
themselves at each work should also be taken annually with
such additions or the contrary as the case may have occurred . . .
and a certain sum per cent should be written off yearly on Ac-
count of the loss for Tear and Wear . . . ” [quoted in Raybould,
1973, p. 233]. There seems every reason to think Loch would
have the same attitude towards agricultural fixed capital
[Raybould, 1973, p. 233].
Loch revolutionized the estate’s management structure, ap-
pointing full time specialists in building, surveying, law, ac-
counting, etc [Wordie, 1982, p. 64]. His opposition to long leases
came from his desire to be “free from any troublesome restric-
tions . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 184]. One was a shortage of capital
diverting the tenants away from generating the maximum rate-
of-return. To maximize the returns, to focus on the “unfettered
cultivation of the soil”, the tenants must not only use the most
appropriate techniques, but must increase their working capital
[Wordie, 1982, p. 219]. Loch also encouraged the tenants to
invest their own capital because “by increasing their output
through improved efficiency . . . [they would] get . . . a larger
return from a larger bulk sale . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 225]. Simi-
larly, the landlord’s rate of rent would increase. The major re-
striction faced by Loch, however, was that capitalist improvers
were not universal on the estates. Stimulated by frequent visits
to Coke’s Holkham and other areas of improvement, Loch set
about generalizing best practice capitalist farming throughout
the Leveson-Gower estates [Wordie, 1982, pp. 204-213]. These,
with heavy investment by the landlord, were the carrots. The
stick was the accountability of the tenants for their financial
performance, and at the heart of this was the short lease.
Loch had almost eliminated long leases by 1820 [Wordie,
1982, p. 214]. Short leases provided the legal foundation of his
system of accountability because, while the landlord could do
little if the tenant farmed badly or exploited the land, he could
easily evict and sue for unpaid rent. In practice, most annual
tenants enjoyed security of tenure, and in this sense the differ-
ence with long leases was “insignificant” [Holderness, 1981, p.
234]. However, this supports the argument that short leases
meant tenants were accountable. Accountability works when the
threat of punishment produces the desired behavior. That farm-
ers on yearly lettings were as secure as tenants on long leases
suggests they satisfactorily discharged their accountability.
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“Those who held at will did not dare to exploit their farms for
fear of the watchful agents and the threat of six month’ no-
tice . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, pp. 220-221]. On the contrary, many
tenants had invested heavily in their farms [Wordie, 1982, p.
223]. Despite Loch’s claimed ideal that landlords should invest
in fixed capital, he cajoled many tenants to do this [Wordie,
1982, pp. 218, 222-223, 221]. He clearly offended their capitalist
sensibilities when he “robbed them of what they considered to
be their just reward for improvements by raising rents as soon
as these had been carried out . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 223]. For
Wordie this illustrates “the eternal dilemma, the great di-
chotomy of the whole landlord-tenant system . . . ” [1982, p.
220]. He is right that the landlord and tenant shared a common
interest “up to a point” — for Marx, the point where the tenant
gets the general rate of profit on a large capital, and the landlord
gets the maximum rate of rent. It is questionable, however,
whether the Leveson-Gower experience shows that “thereafter
their interests diverged . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 220]. From the
capitalist viewpoint, charging rent to expropriate the tenants’
returns on their own fixed capital went too far, was ‘unfair’
[Wordie, 1982, pp. 191-192, 225].
Capital Adequacy and the Size of Farms: Many landlords thought
it “dangerously imprudent to let a farm to a tenant who lacked
sufficient capital to stock it and run it properly . . . ” [Mingay,
1975, pp. 48-49]. The landlord had to calculate the necessary
capital to know if the tenant had sufficient. Arthur Young’s cal-
culations in The farmer’s guide in hiring and stocking farms 1770,
illustrates how progressive landlords probably thought about
the problem. Allen says Young’s aim “was to determine how
much a farm was worth, but his calculations ignored most of
the capital costs and so overstated the value . . . ” [1992, p. 183].
In particular, he says Young ignored depreciation [Allen, 1992,
p. 183]. Young’s aim, however, was not to value the farm. It was
to show how it was that “farms are every day hired with much
smaller sums of money than the most considerate persons
would allot for the purpose . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 49].
Young calculates the minimum money capital required by the
farmer of a 400-acre farm over its first three years of operation
[Mingay, 1975, p. 53]. That is, the least amount he can get away
with and expect to survive. As Young’s purpose was to show the
inadequacy of focusing solely on cash, he made no charge for
depreciation. He well understood that capital to finance a few
years’ cash flows would be inadequate because the capital the
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farmer needs to work his farm is not merely the cash outlays
required in the first few years. It includes necessary reserves to
withstand adversity and funds to make investments in fixed
capital [Mingay, 1975, p. 55]. Without sufficient capital, for ex-
ample, a “vein of the finest marl may be under his fields; he can
have nothing to do with it . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 55].
The landlord could display a capitalist mentality by his atti-
tude to the size of farms. Farms were exceptionally large on
Coke’s estates, and grew larger [Parker, 1975; Wade Martins,
1980], but the size of farms in general steadily increased, par-
ticularly from around 1750 [Beckett, 1990; Allen, 1992]. This
trend supports Marx’s view that the capitalist mentality was set-
ting in because large, efficiently run farms produced higher re-
turns on capital and therefore higher rents. How big farms
should be to maximize the rate-of-return on capital depends on
the circumstances. These circumstances — particularly the sup-
ply of farmers with sufficient capital — changed over time
[Holderness, 1981]. The capitalist principle is to choose the size
of farm that gives the highest return on capital. As a steward of
the Marquis of Bath put it in 1794, those “farms are of the most
proper size, which return the most proportional produce at the
least proportional expense . . . ” [quoted in Beckett, 1983, p.
318]. If farms of optimal size produce the highest output per
acre for the least cost per acre, it follows they produce the high-
est profit per acre and therefore the highest rate-of-return on
capital per acre. From the 1730s successive writers argued for
an increase in farm sizes [Beckett, 1983, p. 313]. Beckett thinks
Young was virtually alone in his “doctrinaire beliefs” about the
virtues of large farms; that farms should be big regardless of the
circumstances [1983, pp. 321, 324]. In fact, Young advocated
large farms for strictly capitalist reasons. As Hermann Levy
pointed out, Young’s concern was “looking simply at the great-
est possible profit to be made, or at the purely economic fitness
of things”. It was only “from the latter point of view [that] he
had defended the large farm system on the profitableness of
corn growing . . . ” [quoted in Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57]. Ac-
cording to Young, the size of farms should not be indiscrimi-
nate, but chosen to maximize “profitableness”. Young judged
many farms of his day to be too small whereas others disagreed.
However, this does not make him an isolated doctrinaire. In
Beckett’s view, “the debate went against Young”, but he con-
cedes “the fact that in 1851 a third of the cultivated acreage was
held in farms of 300 acres or more suggests that his views were
not entirely lost on the landowning community . . . ” [1983, p.
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323]. He says that some of Levy’s comments suggest that Young
mellowed in his later years and “became more enamoured of
small holdings . . . ” [Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57]. Levy, how-
ever, does not say Young changed his mind about the economics
of large farms, only that he became concerned about their social
consequences [Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57].
Allen says Young misunderstood the relationship between
the size of a farm and its capital. Allen finds that capital per acre
declined with farm size, and thinks it “remarkable that Young’s
data contradict his belief that large-scale farmers practised a
more capital-intensive agriculture than small-scale farmers . . . ”
[1992, p. 195]. Allen’s interpretation of what Young means by
‘capital intensity’ is debatable. Young does not say that capital
per acre increased with farm size, but that a “considerable
farmer, with a greater proportional wealth than the small occu-
pier, is able to work great improvements in his business . . . ; he
can build, hedge, ditch, plant, plough, harrow, drain, manure,
hoe, weed, and, in a word, execute every operation of the busi-
ness, better and more effectually than a little farmer . . . ”
[Young, quoted in Allen, 1992, p. 190]. The capital employed by
the wealthier farmer is larger and its economic efficiency “bet-
ter” than a smaller capital. “He [the wealthy farmer] also em-
ploys better cattle and uses better implements; he purchases
more manures, and adopts more improvements”. This is
Young’s capital-intensive farmer, one who has better capital and
implements per acre. Having better quality capital is consistent
with needing less capital per acre. For example, larger farms
could use better wagons to cart their produce to market more
cheaply. Young thought the poor state of the roads made “the
expense of carrying out the corn . . . prodigious”. However,
“[s]ome savings may be made . . . by using broadwheeled wag-
ons, for which reason they should ever be used on farms large
enough for 9 or 10 horses . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 158].
Marx had the same view: “in production on a larger scale; the
saving is on the keeping of horses and other production costs,
not by the use of more capital on the same land . . . ” [1981, p.
814].
It is undoubtedly true that “whatever may have been the
case at [Coke’s estates at] Holkham, elsewhere large farms did
not bring in the greatest rents . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 13], but this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent
with large farms producing the maximum rate of rent. For ex-
ample, Nathaniel Kent said, “it is to large estates that we look
for moderation in rents, as they were generally let upon a fair
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and consistent scale . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p.
13]. Kent’s words are consistent with large estates (with large
farms) charging capitalist, that is, “fair and consistent” rents. It
may be true that small farms “were more likely to yield high
rents, pro rata, because they were worked more intensively and
effectively . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 13]. But
why, then did landlords not break up their farms? The answer
may be a limited and diminishing supply of small farmers with
capital to work them, although this varied over time, and limited
administrative resources at the landlords’ disposal to exploit
them. With limited supplies of small farmers with capital, the
only feasible long-term option was the trend towards larger
farms because their “advantages . . . lay in their lower unit costs
rather than their greater output [per acre] . . . ” [Turner, Beckett
and Afton, 1997, p. 13]. In other words, their advantage was
their higher rate-of-return on capital and rate of rent.
CONCLUSION:
MARX’S ‘QUEER’ STORY OF RENT AND
THE AGRICULTURAL ROOTS OF
THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Detailed study of changes in landlords’ accounts and sys-
tems of accountability could allow us to test systematically for
the appearance and spread of the capitalist mentality in this
important class from around 1750. We have seen some evidence
of DEB in estate accounts becoming more common from
around 1750. There is some evidence of capitalist calculations
for enclosure decisions; of calculations to assess the capital ad-
equacy of tenants, to determine rent increases and rebates.
There is evidence of concern for the rate of rent; the length of
leases; and for the size of farms. While we need systematic re-
search to fill in the many gaps left by economic historians, these
phenomena support Marx’s view that the capitalist mentality
became lodged in the collective mind of the landed class from
around 1750. Future research must encompass the farm ac-
counts of the larger landowners and lesser gentry, tenants and
bailiffs’ accounts. Nor must we forget the writings, accounts and
calculations of land stewards from which came many well-
known advocates of improvement in addition to Edward
Laurence and Arthur Young — those such as William Marshall,
Thomas Stone, Nathaniel Kent, and Thomas Davis [Mingay,
1967, p. 27]. Tracing the development of capitalism in agricul-
ture should help to trace its development in industry, Marx’s
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industrial revolution, and the interactions with the agricultural
revolution. Historians disagree about the existence and nature
of any links between the agricultural and industrial revolutions
[Jones, 1974; Clark, 1999]. For Marx, the key link is the replica-
tion in industry of the capitalist mentality and the social rela-
tions of production created by the agricultural revolution. What
follows outlines his theory of the interconnections between
these revolutions, his ‘queer story’ of rent, and calls for account-
ing history research on this neglected question.
Marx argued that increases in absolute rent and not differ-
ential rent underlay the rapid rise of rents in the later 18th
century because, although the productivity of agriculture was
increasing, it was growing at a much slower rate than in manu-
facturing. In his theory, “absolute rent . . .  arises from the fact
that capital is invested in agriculture rather than manufacture; a
rent that is quite independent of differential rent or excess prof-
its which are yielded by capital invested in better land . . . ”
[Marx, 1969b, p. 242]. Today, the neo-classical orthodoxy recog-
nizes only Ricardian differential rent. Ricardo ruled out abso-
lute rent because he assumed the average prices of all commodi-
ties always equaled their labor values. He also assumed that the
organic composition of capital (the ratio of variable capital to
total capital employed) was the same in agriculture and industry
[Marx, 1969b, pp. 129, 244]. Ricardo’s theory of rent, therefore,
effectively ruled out the agricultural revolution and any further
radical development in industry, making a “twofold historical
error . . . ” [Marx, 1969b, p. 244]. Ricardo assumed the produc-
tivity of labor in agriculture and industry were equal, and that
with population growth agriculture’s productivity would fall
[Marx, 1969b, p. 244]. By contrast, in Marx’s theory absolute
rent arose from “the relatively faster development of manufac-
ture (in fact the truly bourgeois branch of industry) as against
agriculture . . . ” [1969, pp. 18-19]. This is Marx’s “queer” story of
rents. It began in the late 17th century when rents increased as
capitalistic manufacturing appeared. From around 1750 real (in-
flation-adjusted) rents began to increase more steeply as the
‘industrial’ revolution gathered momentum as capitalists pur-
sued the real subsumption of labor. Landlords and their advi-
sors agreed with the political economists that all rent was differ-
ential; that real increases arose from agricultural improvement.
Landlords therefore invested or had farmers invest, continually
boosting agricultural productivity in their search for differential
rent. The search continued until, during the last quarter of the
19th century, after a sustained period of high investment, the
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productivity of agriculture caught up with a now stagnating in-
dustry dominated by coal and cotton [Marx. 1969b, p. 110].
Combined with cheap food imports, the rapid increase in labor
productivity in agriculture during the later 19th century caused
absolute rent to fall sharply. “Landlords were frequently disap-
pointed by the way rents did not rise in proportion to the money
invested . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 98]. According to Marx,
landlords were unwittingly reducing absolute rent, undermining
their own privileged position through their zealous commitment
to the capitalist mentality. When rents fell in the later 19th cen-
tury the landlords radically restructured their portfolios out of
land and into stocks and shares [Beckett, 1986]. Having helped
to spread the capitalist mentality throughout society, the land-
lords, “reduced to a mere receptacle, ceased to fulfill any func-
tion in production” [Marx, 1969b, p. 56], and became absorbed
within social capital.
To test Marx’s theory of the industrial revolution we must
investigate farmers’ and landlords’ accounts in conjunction with
those of industrial entrepreneurs [Bryer, 2004a; 2004b]. During
the 18th century, “the distinction between landowners and in-
dustrialists tended inevitably to be somewhat blurred . . . ”
[Mingay, 1963b, p. 199]. Industrial enterprises often “developed
out of the estates themselves, such as coal-mines, iron- and cop-
per-mines, and even ironworks, canals and tar distilleries, some
of which grew to considerable size . . . ” [Pollard, 1965, p. 211].
It was no accident that land stewards “branched out as entrepre-
neurs on their own account and often built up important indus-
trial concerns . . . ” [Mingay, 1967, p. 4]. There are clear links
between estate managers and emerging industrial enterprises
[Pollard, 1965, pp. 25-30]. They had the knowledge, experience,
capital, and many probably had a capitalist mentality. Given a
shared capitalist mentality, it is not “surprising that in these
circumstances that early methods of industrial management
were borrowed from the great estate . . . ” [Mingay, 1967, pp. 4-
5]. Nor is it surprising that by 1750 some management tech-
niques developed on the leading estates “showed many of the
characteristics of the adolescent industrial firms . . . ” [Pollard,
1965, p. 26]. Mepham, for example, finds that industrial depart-
mental cost accounting paralleled development in farm account-
ing: “Arthur Young proposed a farm accounting system in which
there was a ‘departmental’ ledger for each field . . . ” [Mepham,
1988, p. 60]. Young’s tours included some major industrial
firms, and his cost accounting for farmers (e.g., 1797) was thor-
oughly modern, mirroring the development of accounting in the
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industrial revolution [Juchau, 2002, p. 378; Bryer, 2004a].
The limited accounting evidence we have supports Marx’s
view that landlords and industrialists were becoming capitalists
together. Jones asks of the clearly capitalist accounts of Thomas
Lovett (summarized above), “to what extent was this kind of
thinking being paralleled in the developing industries in the
later eighteenth century? . . . ” [1985, p. 72]. His research into
early cost accounting in Wales shows the parallels are striking
[Jones, 1985]. Jones thinks it “perfectly natural for the mid-
eighteenth century to have seen . . . a system of bookkeeping and
accountability based on double entry . . . embraced by . . . land-
lords and industrial and commercial entrepreneurs alike . . . ”
[1985, p. 60]. However, to establish and explain this conver-
gence we must find and explain broad trends in social account-
ability; demonstrate exactly what the “community of interests”
was that arose from the “intermingling of men of commerce and
landowning . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 263]. To do this we must
identify and explain the accounts of many individuals, starting
with the early capitalist farmers that Marx and others [e.g.,
Tawney, 1941, 1954] say began the agricultural revolution
[Bryer, 2004c].
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ACCOUNTING AND THE PURSUIT OF
UTOPIA: THE POSSIBILITY OF
PERFECTION IN PARAGUAY
Abstract: For utopian socialists the capitalist state’s protection and
promotion of property rights is the source of entrenched injustice
that alienates individuals from their fundamentally moral nature.
Substituting cooperative associations for competition as the basis of
economic exchange and social relations would allow justice to be
reasserted and society to operate on moral principles. In the late 19th
century an attempt was made by a small group of idealistic Australian
socialists to put these principles into practice in the jungles of Para-
guay by establishing the utopian colonies of New Australia and
Cosme. An essential ingredient to their vision was a system of ex-
change in which goods and services were valued, following Ricardo
and Marx, according to their labor content or labor value. This re-
quired new forms of accounting to communicate and enhance a set of
values, ideals and permitted behavior which was very different from
that associated with capitalism. Accounting was also to prove critical
to the survival of the colonies beyond their initial establishment by
the legitimacy it afforded the decision to revoke the right of members,
who withdrew, to a share of assets. The accounting system used at
Cosme demonstrated a sophisticated understanding that the contri-
butions of accounting were not dependent on private property.
INTRODUCTION
In July 1893 220 men, women and children under the ban-
ner “Each for all, and all for each” set sail on a converted trans-
port ship the Royal Tar from Sydney, Australia, for the jungles of
Paraguay. They were led by the utopian socialist and labor activ-
ist William Lane,1 who at one time supported the revolutionary
Submitted March 2003
Revised September 2003
Accepted October 2003
1 William Lane, who would lead the new settlers into the Promised
Land, was born in England in 1861, leaving at the age of 15 to work in a variety
of occupations in America. In 1885 he arrived in Australia convinced of the
Acknowledgment: I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for
their helpful comments.
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overthrow of all governments. He sought to establish in Para-
guay “true Social Order as will insure to every citizen security
against want and opportunity to develop to the fullest the facul-
ties evolving in Humanity” [William Lane in Souter, 1968, p.
23]. In their original conception, the communities established
by Lane and his followers lasted little more than a few years, the
utopian idealism that had inspired them to give up everything
and settle in a remote land with little more than good intentions
having dissipated long before the final dissolution of their
utopian colonies New Australia and Cosme. However well-
intentioned and ideologically fortified, communal living was un-
able to withstand the disunity and retreat to self interest pro-
duced by personal enmities and rivalries, borne of the possessive
individualism to which MacIntyre [2000] refers, which are en-
demic to all but the most hallowed human societies. The utopia
that the settlers sought always remained beyond their grasp.
It was during the disintegration of the Paraguayan colonies
that the seemingly incongruous contributions of accounting in
the pursuit of utopia were particularly appreciated. As idealism
slipped away in the last days the concern of members was no
longer the well being of their ‘brothers’ but rather their own
interests. For, “when idealism leaves Utopia, suspicion moves in:
thoughts turn from morality to accountancy, from aspirations to
scanty assets, and sooner or later . . . someone is bound to ask
‘Where did the money go?’” [Souter, 1968, p. 118]. Well before
leaving Australia, the New Australia Co-operative Settlement As-
sociation had recognized that the prosperity, and possibly har-
mony, of the colonies would depend on more than feelings of
injustice of society perpetrated and perpetuated by modern capitalism. As a
successful journalist in Queensland he became actively involved in the Austra-
lian labor movement, playing a central role in the founding of the Australian
Labour Federation and establishing the labor newspapers The Boomerang and
The Worker [Miller 1980, p. 9; John Lane, Daily Mail, 17 February 1930; Ross
1935, pp. 25-31]. This, as Gallhofer and Haslam’s [2003] study of Henry Hyde
Cameron has shown, was a common strategy of labor activists in the late 19th
century. While Lane’s beliefs about the causes of society’s inequities recognized
the work of Marx and Engels, his idealistic remedies owed much to the writings
of Edward Bellamy. He was also attracted to the Icarian Community Villages
established in Illinois by the followers of Etiene Cabet. The other great influence
on Lane’s life was his mother’s puritanical religious convictions [Australian Na-
tional Library, MS3205; John Lane, Daily Mail, 17 February 1930; Ross, 1935, p.
165]. Wilding refers to Lane’s utopian beliefs as “mystical, religious commu-
nism” [Miller, 1980, Introduction, p. 10]. Ashton [1941, pp. 127-137], who had
met Lane in 1895, also was impressed with the strong religious and utopian
veins which ran through his beliefs.
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kinship between members but also upon detailed accountings
and sound management practices. Holyoake, a contemporary of
Lane, in his classic study of cooperative movements warned that
idealism was not sufficient to guarantee the success of utopian
communities; they would also need to maintain a “business
watchfulness” [1906, p. 401].
As a response to the social abuses of industrialism perpe-
trated in the name of capitalist efficiency, 19th century utopians
sought to replace a social system determined by property rights
with a communalistic conception of society: cooperation not
competition would be the basis of social and economic rela-
tions. Their mission was to free society of the injustices and
oppression permitted for the benefit of property and to provide
the circumstances which would allow the essential moral nature
of individuals to be released. The laws of the capitalist state
were condemned for the way in which they were used to secure
for:
capital the exploitation and monopoly of the wealth
produced. Magistrature, police, army, public instruc-
tion, finance, all serve one God- capital; all have but one
object - to facilitate the exploitation of the worker by
the capitalist. (Laws) rob the producer (i.e. labour) of a
part of what he has created . . . [Kropotkin in Capouya
and Tonkins, 1975, p. 37].
Although all utopian programs, with the exception of mod-
ern libertarianism,2 have had the same essential aims of a peace-
ful and cooperative existence in which none shall live in want,
utopias are highly individualistic creations, reflecting the differ-
ing historical contexts in which they are imagined. Utopians
have differed primarily in the extent to which private property is
tolerated and common ownership is promoted. In his book The
Voyage to Icaria the utopian socialist Cabet, for example, de-
manded for his utopia absolute equality and the holding of all
property in common, while the French utopians Fourier and
Saint-Simon allowed for differences in compensation according
to the varying capacities of individuals [Laidler, 1968, p. 113].
The relationship between accounting, property and struc-
2 In Nozick’s [1974] libertarian capitalist utopia, and that of Hayek [2002],
there would be almost no interference with the right to private property. Both
Nozick and Hayek portray capitalism in terms of utopian naturalism where the
ownership of private property and capitalist markets are entirely consistent with
the underlying natural order of society; they could be neither created nor ulti-
mately suppressed by human intervention [Zadek, 1993, p. 23].
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tures of power and influence in the modern capitalist state has
long been a preoccupation of critical accounting historians
[Burchell et al., 1980; Miller, 1990; Loft, 1986]. The ability of
accounting to be used for the purposes of economic, social and
political oppression is now well recognized in the critical ac-
counting literature. Gallhofer and Haslam [1991, p. 488] refer to
the “ideological consequences” of accounting and the way in
which “prevalent accountings displace alternative accountings
which might transform the consciousness of many social actors
and perhaps contribute to a challenging of the capitalist system
of power relations. . . . They can steer the perception of what is
and is not deemed important in society” [Gallhofer and Haslam,
1991, p. 492]. Bryer’s [1991] identification of the way in which
accounting reports were used to manipulate ownership of early
British railways is a particularly good example of how account-
ing can be used to maintain entrenched power structures.
Foucauldian researchers also have demonstrated the ability of
accounting to be harnessed by powerful elites to discipline and
control behavior in subtle and, ultimately, unrealized ways
[Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Loft, 1986; Armstrong, 1987, 1991;
Stewart, 1992; Miller and O’Leary, 1987, p. 243]. Gallhofer and
Haslam [1991, pp. 487-488], who favor the insights available
from Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory,
refer to the way in which “the institution of accountancy prac-
tice in capitalist society has come to be viewed as an ideological
state apparatus, helping the hegemony of the capitalist State to
reproduce the political structure”. Modes of discipline within
capitalist societies become normalized and absorbed into the
fabric of social institutions and individual identity to such an
extent that they become virtually undetectable. Chomsky [1969,
p. 19] has also referred to the way in which the values and
interests of ruling capitalist elites become unconsciously assimi-
lated and protected by the state to the point where the identity
of the state becomes indistinguishable from the interests of
these elites. For Engels [1935, p. 67] the modern state, irrespec-
tive of its form, “is essentially a capitalist machine”.
As important as it has been for critical accounting scholars
to recognize the repressive effects of accounting, notably its
complicity in sustaining the edifice of capitalism, Gallhofer and
Haslam [2003, p. 100] remind us that “[a]ccounting practice
always has some emancipatory dimensions . . . ” [see also pp. x,
66]. Too often, they warn, an overly myopic concern for the
repressive possibilities and actualities of accounting has resulted
in the concealment of this emancipatory potential. They refer to
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accounting occupying a continuum between repressive and
emancipatory possibilities, thereby recognizing that the identity
of accounting is not immutable and fixed. Most importantly for
this paper, they suggest that the position accounting might oc-
cupy along this continuum will be determined by its historical
context: its mutable identity “can be variously envisioned by
society” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003, pp. x, 101]. As easily as it
serves the interests of the status quo in capitalist relations, so
accounting can be harnessed by radical forces to emancipate.
Despite the alleged dependence between accounting, espe-
cially in its double entry form, and capitalism [Sombart, 1913,
1919; Yamey, 1949, 1964], accounting practices have been indis-
pensable also to utopian societies established in numerous loca-
tions throughout the late 19th century. Accounting practices, as
this paper will confirm and as numerous studies of accounting
in mediaeval monasteries and American religious communes
have exposed [Denholm-Young, 1933; Searle and Ross, 1967;
Stone, 1962; Flesher and Flesher, 1979], have served equally well
societies where cooperation as the means of emancipation has
been the defining principle of social organization, the antithesis
of capitalist competition and possessive individualism.
Through an examination of 19th century utopian socialist
conceptions of society, which have yet to establish a significant
presence in the accounting history literature,3 this paper seeks to
explore the fundamental nature of accounting as it pertains to
private property [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991; Cooper and
Sherer, 1984]. Thereby it recognizes Gallhofer and Haslam’s
[2003, p. 104] suggestion that more studies are needed to ex-
plore the emancipatory contributions of accounting and its “in-
terface with the activities of radical political movements . . . ” It
also follows Richardson’s [1987, p. 351] injunction to demystify
accounting and extends the work of Jacobs and Kemp who
3 Flesher and Flesher’s [1979] examination of the Harmonists of Indiana,
who sought to establish an ideal religious society in the early 1800s, provides a
brief introduction to religious utopian movements. Additional insights into the
accounting procedures of religious communities which were also motivated by
an idealistic religious conception of society, such as the Shakers and the Quak-
ers, can be found in Kresier and Dare [1986], Faircloth [1988] and Fuglister and
Bloom [1991]. None of these organizations, however, was a utopian socialist
response to the alienation of labor produced by industrial capitalism of the late
19th century. Gallhofer and Haslam [2003] have examined the use of accounting
in the latter decades of the 19th century by the British social activists Henry
Hyde Cameron and Annie Besant to promote the interests of labor. Neither
Cameron of Besant was the inspiration for the establishment of socialist com-
munities.
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sought to “achieve a deeper understanding of the nature of
accounting” by challenging “the assumption that accounting is
inevitable and therefore a universal good” [2002, p. 150]. Con-
trary to their findings, an examination of accounting in the uto-
pian colony of Cosme in Paraguay suggests that, where an orga-
nized social unit is concerned, the essential nature of accounting
may be indeed that of a universal good. Accounting in a state of
utopia can be conceived as the ultimate, limiting test of
accounting’s credentials as a universal social good.
The first sections of the paper provide an overview of uto-
pian beliefs and their striking cardinal consistency from the
early and highly influential manifesto of Plato to Sir Thomas
More and 19th century anarchists and socialists. When, as 19th
century utopians anticipated, competition and private property
are no longer the basis of society, then trust and justice would
permeate society as a result of the moral life which cooperation
and mutual regard profess to release. Of particular relevance for
this paper is the primacy accorded in utopian and socialist writ-
ings to labor as the enduring source of the value of all goods and
services, most often identified with the labor theory of value
popularized by Ricardo and Marx. In subsequent sections, the
paper interrogates accounting’s ambivalent relationship with
virtue [Francis, 1990] by examining the practice of accounting
in the communal experiment at the colony of Cosme established
in Paraguay in the late 19th century by William Lane and the
New Australia Co-operative Settlement Association. Two forms
of accounting practiced at Cosme are of particular interest: la-
bor value accounting, whereby products arising within Cosme
were valued according to the labor time devoted to their produc-
tion, and withdrawal accounting. These sections rely upon the
writings of participants in the Cosme experiment and the news-
letters of the New Australia Co-operative Settlement Association,
New Australia and Cosme Monthly, both of which were produced
in Paraguay.4
THE UTOPIAN VISION: COOPERATION AND JUSTICE
To describe something or someone as utopian is invariably
an accusation of irrelevance, of detachment from reality, of
unattainability and doom, for no utopias have been enduringly
4 Both New Australia and Cosme Monthly are accessible in their original
form at the National Library of Australia and the NSW State Library. These
provide the most authoritative sources of information about the management
and activities of the New Australia and Cosme colonies.
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successful [see, for example, Engels, 1935, p. 36; Graham, 1912].
The utopian’s dream of a paradise on earth in which all can
have the opportunity of achieving their potential, in which want
and privation are banished and in which mutual benevolence
governs all relations is seen by critics as the ultimate human
folly [Wooldridge, 1902, p. 11; Zadek, 1993, p. 4; Collens, 1876,
p. 15]. Most detractors take exception to the utopian’s generous
and optimistic appreciation of human nature which allows for
individuals, independent of any form of coercion, to act honor-
ably and morally. Utopia may be ideal for ideal people but not
for the ‘passionate’ and imperfect [Narveson, 1996, p. 195];
Tuchman, 1966, p. 69; Buchanan, 1978, pp. ix, 3, 37].
The word ‘utopia’ was famously coined in 1516 by the En-
glish cleric and martyr Sir Thomas More in his book Concerning
the Best State of a Commonwealth and the New Island of Utopia,
widely known as simply Utopia. More’s new word was a clever
play on two Greek words, outopos, meaning no place, and
eutopia, a happy or fortunate place of perfection [More, 1999,
p.xi]. That utopia existed ‘nowhere’ endowed it with possibilities
denied societies constrained by the realities of their earthly ex-
istence. William Morris’ influential utopian book Letters from
Nowhere [1891] also recognized this association between the
blessings of utopia and its essentially ethereal nature. Utopias
enabled the expression of potentialities and possibilities of es-
cape. More’s utopia promised “a new set of habits, a fresh scale
of values, a different net of relationships and institutions . . . ”
[Mumford, 1974, p. 21]. It was to be a society in which conflicts
would be unable to find root, a society in which benevolent
cooperation and justice would replace destructive and divisive
competition which sees individuals come together only out of
selfishness and greed [Marx, 1971, p. 155; Wooldridge, 1971, p.
13; Holyoake, 1906, p. 343]. No longer would workers in More’s
utopia be compelled to be each others rivals in order to secure a
dignified existence for themselves and their families. Instead of
a meager, insulting sustenance everyone would be assured ac-
cess to whatever they required. Nothing was refused amidst the
plenty of Utopia [More, 1999, Book II, p. 56]. All things were
treated as common property, for “wherever you have private
property, and money is the measure of all things, it is hardly
ever possible for a commonwealth to be governed justly or hap-
pily . . . ” [More, 1999, Book I, p. 38].
Utopians sought to re-enter Eden and to claim the birth-
right promised to all by God. They did not regard human beings
with the gloomy pessimism of Hobbes who disputed that the
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utopians’ desire to return to a ‘state of nature’, the world before
political societies were established, would provide the antidote
for the evils of society. Hobbes [1968] saw in the state of nature
only barbarism, fear and dissention, not the cooperation and
virtue of the utopian. According to the utopians, happiness, the
aim of all individuals, would be secured when the well being of
the collective became the concern of each in the pursuit of “il-
limitable human perfectability”5 [Engels, 1935, p. 39; Collens,
1876, p. 2]. Even Adam Smith’s enthusiasm for the virtues of the
market did not prevent him from appreciating the role played by
selfless acts in human motivation. He observed that “[h]owever
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, even
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing
it” [Smith, 1759, p. 9].
Sir Thomas More may have provided a literary model and a
new word to describe the aspirations of those seeking a world of
virtue and brotherhood but he is only one of a long line of
writers, each with their own prescriptions for a heaven on earth.
“From the remotest time”, reminded William Lane, there have
been “universal longings for perfection . . . (which) differ only in
their nature and place of application, all being born in the heart
of our common humanity which yearns instinctively for what-
ever helps to happiness” [William Lane in Cosme Monthly, Au-
gust 1897, p. 1]. Despite the great variety of utopias, utopian
writings have been essentially invariable in their ultimate goals
and idealistic conception of human nature. The utopian ideal of
a just society was for Orwell [quoted in Kumar, 1987, p. 2]
5 In many utopias, including that of Sir Thomas More and the utopian com-
munities of William Lane in Paraguay, divine peace and justice would only be
achieved by a strong central authority with the power to oversee all aspects of
society. In H.G. Wells’ ‘modern utopia’ [1905, p. xv; see also Mumford, 1974, p.
4] the central authority had the power to insist on knowing the location of every
individual at all times. There would be in More’s utopia “no hiding places; no
spots for secret meeting . . . (T)hey live in full view of all . . . ” [More, 1999, Book
II, p. 60]. To the sceptical critics of utopia, Wells’ prescription sounded like a
license for totalitarian tyranny, the opportunity for society to become the very
opposite to that which was envisaged. Utopians in reply have reminded their
detractors that the liberation of the essential goodness of individuals in utopia
would ensure that all decisions would be made in the interests of all, and not a
privileged elite. This would prevent the system of government required to bring
about utopia from degenerating to the level which had always afflicted societies.
See also Zadek [1993, p. 117].
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something which “seems to haunt human imagination ineradi-
cably and in all ages, whether it is called the Kingdom of
Heaven or the classless society”. Hetzler [1965, pp. 99-120] sug-
gests that a utopian heritage in western thought can be traced
back for over 24 centuries to Plato and his Republic. Indeed,
scholars suggest that all utopias since Plato have been but varia-
tions of the model provided by Plato, possibly with the exception
of that portrayed in the teachings of Jesus [Bauman, 1976, p.
18]. In classical Greece these included Aristotle’s Politics,
Homer’s Odyssey and Hesiod’s Works and Days in which men
“lived as if they were gods, their hearts free from all sorrow and
without hard work or pain” [Hesiod quoted in Kumar, 1987, p.
3; Genovese, 1983, pp. 9-28].6
Arcadian idylls are also a prolific feature of writing in the
18th and 19th centuries. Rousseau [1952], in his Dissertation on
the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind, saw a
natural, innate compassion in each person, present when hu-
mankind lived in a state of nature, which had been corrupted
by humankind living in a state of society. Society had “made
man wicked . . . ” [Rousseau, 1952, p. 348]. Robert Owen is pos-
sibly the best known 19th century utopian who was prepared to
put his beliefs into practice with his communal settlements at
New Lanark in Scotland and New Harmony in America
[Manuel and Manuel, 1979, pp. 676-693; Engels, 1935, p. 42].
Amongst the more influential 19th century utopian works were
those of H.G. Wells, William Morris, Etienne Cabet and Edward
6 A utopian heritage is a pronounced feature of Jewish and Christian reli-
gions with the Hebrew prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Jeremiah, teaching in
the 7th and 8th centuries B.C., the harbingers of the Christian preoccupation
with the perfectibility of flawed humankind and the heavenly reward of the
redeemed. Holiness, whereby one aspired to a spiritual life in conformity with
the teachings of God and in which the destructive deceptions of this earthly life
were cast off, was the ultimate manifestation of the aspirational ideal. Then the
true, God-like nature of humankind present at Creation would be reasserted.
“The eyes of the blind shall be opened and the ears of the deaf shall be un-
stopped” [Isaiah 35: 5-6]. “Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war anymore” [Isaiah 2: 4]. Jesus’ teachings confirmed the ideal-
istic message of the prophets but also provided the practical prescriptions neces-
sary to achieve redemption and enter the presence of God. It is in Jesus’ teach-
ing, suggests Hetzler [1965, p. 70], that utopianism reaches its summit. Later
Christian writers, such as Augustine in his City of God, envisaged an ideal society
which was held together by bonds of brotherly love, where the absence of private
property meant that greed and the threats to the soul associated with property
would be banished.
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Bellamy. Bellamy’s novel Looking Backward [1887] was espe-
cially influential in the late 19th century,7 inspiring utopian
movements in America, Britain and Australia. Most importantly
for this paper, Looking Backward was to have a seminal influ-
ence on William Lane, the founder of the Australian colonies in
Paraguay. Looking Backward has the central character, Julian
West, falling asleep in 1887 to awaken 113 years later in 2000.
Instead of the grime and decay of Boston in the late 19th cen-
tury, West is confronted with a new Boston in which there are
no politicians, no corruption, no riches or poverty, in which
peace reigns and all production and distribution of goods is
based upon equality and cooperation [Bellamy, 1887, p. 39,
chapters IX, X]. There is no money, no shops, only central
stores for each district from which anyone can take whatever
they need. The amount each individual received depended
solely on a “person’s humanity. The basis of his claim is the fact
that he is a man” [Bellamy, 1887, p. 55]. This, the focal message
of the book, was the touchstone of utopian beliefs and of the
Australian utopian socialist William Lane’s vision for a fair so-
ciety.
UTOPIANISM AND SOCIALISM’S
LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE
Utopian movements in the 19th century found expression
in a number of ways, most notably as cooperative societies and
through anarchism and socialism. William Lane [Miller, 1892,
pp. 112-113] praised “the Anarchist ideal . . . (as) the noblest of
all human ends. . . . Anarchical Communism, that is men work-
ing as mates and sharing with one another of their own free
will, is the highest form of socialism. . . . [I]t is the only form of
Socialism possible among true socialists”. Kamenka [1987, pp.
69, 70] and Engels [1935, p. 43] refer to anarchism as the pre-
7 Hetzler [1965, p. 227] refers to Looking Backward as having an “unprec-
edented vogue in the nineties . . . ”, while Wilding describes it as “an immensely
influential work for the labour movement . . . ” [Miller 1980, p. 37]. After Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, written by Harriet Beecher Stowe, Bellamy’s book was the largest
selling 19th century novel in the United States, selling more than one million
copies. Beilharz [1992, p. 5] describes Looking Backward as “(a)fter Owen the
greatest event in English-speaking utopias of the nineteenth century”. Among
the books inspired by Bellamy were Bird’s Looking Forward: A Dream of the
United States of Americas in 1999, Vinton’s Looking Further Backward, Geissler’s
Looking Beyond and, most significantly for utopian literature, News from No-
where by William Morris.
75
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2004, Vol. 31, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2004
67Funnell: Accounting and the Pursuit of Utopia
decessor to socialism and socialism as the continuation of an
older utopian tradition. Socialism’s utopian lineage was recog-
nized by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, and
Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Although socialism
and anarchism each took a very different stance towards the
state, both were utopian prescriptions for society in which the
competition and selfish individualism of capitalism would be
replaced by co-operation and the interests of the collective. In-
stead of justice, accused the anarchist Kropotkin [1927, pp. 36,
55], markets and the capitalist state had brought “forth chaos;
instead of prosperity, poverty and insecurity; instead of recon-
ciled interests, war; a perpetual war of the exploiter against the
worker”.
According to utopian socialists, all wealth is derived from
the application of labor to land. Without labor nothing would be
created and life would not be possible. Labor, therefore, was the
true value of all that was produced [Collens, 1876, p. iii; see also
Hodgskin in Hodgson, 1982, p. 111]. “The moment man . . .
bestowed labor on anything, he created value, price, and owner-
ship. . . . Labor is the real measure of the exchangeable value of
all commodities and services” [Collens, 1876, pp. 21, 58; Marx,
1971, pp. 7, 11]. Both Adam Smith and David Ricardo had ar-
gued that the amount of labor devoted to products was the pri-
mary source of their ‘exchangeable value’, as opposed to their
‘value in use’ [Ricardo, 1911, p. 5; Smith, 1776, Book I, chapter
5]. For example, should just two products be available, deer and
fish, “the comparative value of the fish and the game would be
entirely regulated by the quantity of labour realised in each. . . .
If more or less labour were required in the production of . . .
(one) commodity . . . this will immediately occasion an alter-
ation in its relative value” [Ricardo, 1911, pp. 15, 18; also Marx,
1971, p. 5]. Later, in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx also con-
cluded that “there is no exchange of products- but there is the
exchange of the labour which co-operated in production”
[quoted in Meek, 1956, pp. 145-146; Smith 1776, Book I, chapter
5]. Locke professed similar views with his labor theory of prop-
erty which accorded each individual the right to whatever he/she
removed from the state of nature if it was ‘mixed’ with their
labor [Locke, 1884, Book II, Chapter V, section 27]. Accordingly,
labor alone gave value and provided the sole grounds for owner-
ship of property [Marx, 1971, p. 7].
The exchange value of commodities, according to Marx
[1971, pp. 5, 149, 167], bore no relation to their use-value. In-
stead, exchange value was determined by the “labour-time so-
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cially necessary” for producing a commodity.8 In turn, the value
of ‘labor-power’, or the physical effort expended over a period of
time to produce a commodity, was determined ultimately by the
minimum cost of ensuring that the laborer is maintained in a fit
state to work [Marx, 1971, pp. 151, 152]. Any difference between
the value of labor-power and the exchange value of a commodity
constituted surplus-value, the creation of which is the sole aim
of capitalist production and the source of labor’s alienation
[Marx, 1971, p. 517; Arthur, 1986, p. 7]. Thus, if workers labor
for 12 hours a day but only six hours are necessary to ensure
labor’s bare subsistence, in other words the labor-power neces-
sary for labor to reproduce “its own value”, the difference of six
hours for which the worker is not paid is the ‘surplus value’
which is appropriated by the capitalist [Marx, 1971, p. 191;
Whitaker, 1968, p. 65; Meek, 1956, p. 183]. By paying the worker
the minimum possible for their day’s effort capitalists fraudu-
lently deprive labor of its just share of productive efforts with
the result that the product of labor “constitutes the debt of the
capitalist to the producer, which he never pays; and it is this
fraudulent denial which causes the poverty of the labourer, the
luxury of idleness, and the inequality of conditions” [Proudhon
in Woodcock, 1971, p. 105].
For utopian socialists there was no difference between the
use value created by labor and the exchange value of a commod-
ity. Thus, there was no surplus value; labor should receive the
entire value of the product created.9 The results of production
would be made available to all according to their needs with
each form of labor, irrespective of its ‘talent and genius’, having
equal value and entitled to the same reward [Kropotkin, 1927, p.
59; see similar views of Godwin and Proudhon in Nursey-Bray,
1992, p. xv]. When all members of the community wanted to
contribute to the well being of society there was no need to
provide the incentive of greater gain for greater effort as prom-
ised by capitalism. An economy built upon socialist mutuality
would ensure a society in which justice predominated and har-
mony was the norm. “To understand Socialism”, wrote William
Lane under his nom de plume John Miller [1892, Preface], “is to
8 One reviewer of this paper noted that, while this had been Marx’s belief in
the first two volumes of Capital, in the third volume he moved his position by
relaxing the assumption that exchange value is determined solely by socially
necessary labor.
9 This position can be contrasted with Marx’s scientific socialism in which
any surplus from production would accrue to society, not to individuals.
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endeavour to lead a better life, to regret the vileness of our
present ways, to seek ill for none, to desire truth and purity and
honesty, to despise this selfish civilisation and to comprehend
what living might be”.
The predominantly socialist Australian labor movement in
the late 19th century suffered no misty-eyed illusions about the
intentions of capitalist elites and the consequences of capital-
ism. The impoverished lives of the majority of Australian work-
ers and the violent resistance of capitalists to any moves to im-
prove working conditions ensured that the movement was
securely embedded in the class antagonisms of Marx and Engels
[see especially Ross, 1935 and Svensen, 1989]. Unlike Marxian
socialists, utopian socialists within the Australian labor move-
ment renounced all forms of violence. A class struggle was not a
necessary prelude to the achievement of their goals; they had
abolished class distinctions.10 Unlike Marx, they were not inter-
ested in liberating a particular class “but all humanity at once”
[Engels, 1935, p. 33]. Instead of forcefully deposing existing po-
litical structures, utopian socialists sought a fresh start beyond
the grasp of existing social handicaps [New Australia, Vol. 1, No.
1, November 1892, p. 2]. The social perfection sought by Will-
iam Lane, which would ensure that “men and women can work
as mates, each for all and all for each . . . ” [New Australia, Vol.
1, No. 1, November 1892, p. 1], would only be possible if condi-
tions were provided to allow new habits, new beliefs and new
attitudes to develop beyond the influence of the old ways and
understandings of a competitive and diseased society [William
Lane in Ross, 1935, p. 179; Souter, 1968, p. 24; New Australia,
Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1892 and Vol. 1, No. 7, 29 April 1893].
THE PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN PRACTICE:
THE NEW AUSTRALIA AND COSME SETTLEMENTS
The gaoling in 1891 of 12 shearers who had been part of a
nationwide protest against the indifference of their government
during a savage economic recession finally convinced Lane that
his vision of a society based upon cooperation and mateship
10 Utopians and socialists parted ways early in the 19th century when Marx
and Engels rejected the preoccupation of utopians with the essential moral na-
ture of individuals and the social inclusiveness which was essential to the uto-
pian mission. Engels referred to them as having “crude theories” [Engels, 1935,
pp. 36, 44]. Despite efforts by Marx and Engels to eliminate utopianism as a
competitor, Beilharz [1992, p. 7; see also Geoghegan, 1987] argues that utopian
images still abound throughout Capital and the Communist Manifesto.
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would never be possible within Australia11 without the revolu-
tion advocated by Marx [see Miller, 1892, Introduction, pp. 13-
14; Ross, 1935, pp. 165, 187-189; Whitehead, 1997, pp. 53-57;
Svensen, 1989]. Capitalists in Australia had demonstrated that
they would not be hindered in their efforts to isolate each
worker to ensure that they would succumb to the will of the
capitalist [Marx, 1971, p. 285]. Accordingly, the New Australia
Co-operative Settlement Association, which was formed in the
late 1880s by William Lane and like-minded labor activists to
attract, transport and settle people in a new community, began
to search for suitable places well away from Australia. As one of
the least populated areas of the world that abounded in fertile
land, South America first attracted the attention of Lane and his
followers at the New Australia Co-operative Settlement Associa-
tion as the place to establish:
true Social Order as will insure to every citizen security
against want and opportunity to develop to the fullest
the faculties evolving in Humanity. Therefore, . . . (i)t is
desirable and imperative that by a community wherein
all labour in common for the common good actual
proof shall be given that under conditions that render it
impossible for one to tyrannize over another, and
which declare the first duty of each to be the well-being
of all and the sole duty of all to be the well-being of
each, men and women can live in comfort, happiness,
intelligence and orderliness unknown in a society when
none can be sure today that they or their children will
not starve tomorrow [William Lane in Souter, 1968, p.
23].
Accordingly, emissaries were dispatched in 1891 to Argen-
tina to obtain land for the new settlement. When the Australians
were unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Argentinean
Government for good quality, easily accessible land, Paraguay
offered to provide the quality land that they sought.12 The New
Australia settlers may have been idealistic in their aspirations
but they were also very aware that the success of their venture
would depend upon their ability to be economically self-
11 An application for land from the NSW Government to establish a utopian
community was initially approved by the Minister of Lands but this was over-
turned by cabinet which was suspicious of any movement which sought to
establish a rival economic system [Ross, 1935, p. 166].
12 For details of these negotiations and the eventual settlement in Paraguay
see Souter’s [1968] authoritative account.
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supporting from the very beginning. Paraguay’s comfortable cli-
mate, rich soils and varied agricultural produce promised to
give the settlers the conditions necessary to ensure the survival
of their community. “Found splendid land in Paraguay well wa-
tered and timbered”, assured Lane’s scouts in an extensive re-
port on the natural and political merits of Paraguay; there were
also good markets in Buenos Aires and Montevideo [New Aus-
tralia, Vol. 1, No. 4, 18 February 1893, p. 2, also Vol. 1, No. 6, 8
April 1893; Souter, 1968, p. 44]. Thus, the Paraguayan
Government’s offer of 463,100 acres of land near the Tebicuary
River was readily accepted. Unfortunately, even in the jungles of
Paraguay the settlers were to learn that the interests and inhibi-
tions of capitalism could not be escaped entirely, eventually un-
dermining their utopian socialist ideals.
Before the settlers boarded the Royal Tar in Sydney dis-
agreements and controversy erupted between members of the
prospective New Australia colony over the adequacy of prepara-
tions and Lane’s management skills13 [see Whitehead, 1997, pp.
197-200; Souter, 1968, pp. 85-91; Ross, 1935, p. 201; Bulletin, 17
June, 1893]. Thus, when the first colony of New Australia was
established in 1893 in Paraguay the seeds of its disintegration
had already been sown, eventually provoking the departure from
New Australia in early 1894 of Lane, with Harry Taylor and 57
men, women and children to establish a new settlement named
Cosme, 100 kilometers south.14 Later, one colonist at New Aus-
tralia concluded that the cooperative experiment had failed be-
cause “we ran up against ourselves . . . However workable com-
munism may be for angels, we were not suited to it”15 [quoted in
13 All male members had to contribute £60: a preliminary £10 payment and
then a further £50, which was potentially refundable. Women and children went
free [New Australia, Vol.1, No.1, November 1892, p. 4]. In Sydney some mem-
bers who changed their mind about leaving Australia had discovered that their
payments had not been paid into a Savings Trust Account as promised. Instead,
the money had been used to purchase and outfit the Royal Tar, thereby contra-
dicting the Association’s assurances that an “expert accountant superintends the
Association’s books” [William Lane in Ross, 1935, p. 195]. Matters were not
improved when one of the officers Lane had entrusted with the application
monies disappeared at the height of the furor and before an audit could be
carried out [Souter, 1968, p. 118]. During the voyage when the group split into
two rival camps, one loyal to Lane, Lane at one stage felt compelled to offer his
resignation as their leader. This, however, did not resolve matters beyond the
duration of the voyage.
14 Cosme took its name from the Paso Cosme ford on the Tebicuary river.
15 Like many strong-minded visionaries, Lane was a charismatic figure who
would brook no opposition and was known to be intolerant of criticism. After
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Souter, 1968, p. 138; Australian National Library, MS3205]. As
New Australia began to collapse after the departure of Lane,
individualism reasserted itself over ideals when all land was di-
vided between those remaining. Mary Gilmore, who had stayed
behind in New Australia and later became an iconic Australian
literary figure, described how “the idea of communism is practi-
cally dead and the well doing financially of the colony is the one
thing. ‘What will pay best?’ is the idea” [Mary Gilmore in Souter,
1968, p. 188].
The aim in establishing Cosme, as it had been at New Aus-
tralia, was to “reduce the chaos of the outer world to strictest
order, and by thorough systematising to prevent the waste of
labor16 and the misplacement of goods which continually occurs
under the competitive no-system” [Harry Taylor quoted in
Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 95; see also “What Cosme Works
For”, Cosme Monthly, February 1897]. The only qualifications
for entry to the Elysian fields of Cosme were a commitment to
the principles of the community, surrender to the community of
any private property and a ‘white skin’.17 Irrespective of whether
a member had contributed property or the amount of property
surrendered, which in some circumstances might be returned,
all were treated as equals. The only time that the amount of
property contributed might have any relevance was when a
member of the community wished to withdraw [see below]. All
the failure of the New Australia settlements he was to be accused by his enemies
of being dictatorial, power mad and a religious fanatic; accusations which he
strongly denied [New Australia, Vol. 1, No. 2, 19 December 1892; Australian
National Library, MS3205; Ross, 1935, pp. 223,250]. One dissenting member of
the New Australia settlements in May 1898 criticized Lane as “a madman . . . , a
knave seized with the madness of ambition, and for that he will barter truth,
justice and the whole world . . . ” [quoted in Souter, 1968, p. 181; Graham, 1912,
p. 22]. Indeed, Lane’s alleged lust for power and his religious obsession were
seen at the time as the Scylla and Charybdis against which the New Australia
settlements floundered [Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 9]. For a highly critical
and derisive portrayal of William Lane and the colonies of New Australia and
Cosme see Graham [1912]. Lane also had his staunch supporters, for whom
Lane could do little wrong. Harry Taylor, who was with Lane from the beginning
of the New Australia movement, described Lane as “a grand man . . . , the more I
know him the more I love him” [Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 9; also Ross,
1935].
16 The spelling ‘labor’ was adopted in 19th century Australia by movements
representing the wage earner. To this day this is the spelling used by the Austra-
lian Labor Party.
17 Reflecting the Australians’ British heritage, the Australian Co-operative
Settlement Movement was unapologetically racist: there was no place in their
utopia for the native population.
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land and the implements necessary for its cultivation were
owned by the community and its bounty shared amongst all
members. The only hope for society, had warned Sir Thomas
More [1999, Book II, p. 39], was the elimination of private own-
ership of the means of production. William Lane and the New
Australia Co-operative Settlement Association did not reject
capital of itself, only the way it was owned and used for the
benefit of a few. Those who labored the least under capitalism
were the ones who gained the most from the exertions of those
who contribute the sweat of their brow [New Australia, Vol. 1,
No. 1, 1892, pp. 1, 2; Wooldridge 1902, p. 17],
The utopian credentials and aspirations of Cosme were con-
firmed by William Lane’s brother, John, for whom “the life
within reach of our outstretched hands (at Cosme) is the heaven
of which William Morris dreamed and Sir Thomas More saw
afar off” [Cosme Monthly, October 1900, p. 1]. Very quickly the
new settlers at Cosme established a thriving, viable community
where “the right way of living is to be a man and not a beast; to
live for others and not for one’s self . . . ” [Cosme Monthly, Janu-
ary 1897; see also John Lane in Ross, 1935, pp. 264-265]. So
productive were they initially that Taylor felt compelled to re-
mind the settlers that Cosme’s aim was “the development of her
own home resources primarily for their immediate use and last-
ing comfort” and only then should they take advantage of oppor-
tunities to sell excess products on local markets [Harry Taylor in
Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 88]. As early as 1894 Harry
Taylor was boasting that as a result of “a strong desire to seek
the public good above all other things…” the members of Cosme
were already wealthier than similar English-speaking workers
[Harry Taylor in Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 89]. Through-
out Harry Taylor’s correspondence from Cosme18 [see Gobbett
and Saunders for further examples] the importance to the com-
munity of strong economic foundations and sound management
practices anchored in the technologies of accounting are obvi-
ous with repeated references to ‘yearly balance sheets’, ‘market-
able products’, ‘profitable’ activities, products that ‘pay well’ and
‘financial position’.
18 Taylor’s letters from Cosme were intended for recruitment purposes rather
than to serve as statements of accountability. Taylor sought to make it clear to
potential settlers that they were not throwing away their money on some wild
scheme which was doomed to failure and that Cosme was financially well man-
aged.
82
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss1/9
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200474
Production was arranged around three departments: the
Garden Department, which was responsible for all activities as-
sociated with growing a large range of fruit, vegetables and
trees; the Stock Department which managed the animals of the
community; and the Stores Department, which was responsible
for receiving the produce of the other two departments, storing
it, issuing it to members and selling any surplus on local mar-
kets19 [Cosme Monthly, December 1894, January 1897]. In addi-
tion to agricultural products, numerous artifacts produced at
Cosme were sold on markets in Paraguay, England and Austra-
lia [for a catalogue of products see Cosme Monthly, November
1898]. This would have been anathema to Bellamy for whom all
buying and selling were inconsistent with mutual love and a
strong sense of community. These activities were “an education
in self-seeking at the expense of others . . . ” [Bellamy, 1887, p.
53]. For the colonists at Cosme reliance upon external markets
was but a temporary expedient which would soon be replaced
by exchanges based solely on labor value.
ACCOUNTING IN PARADISE
Labor Value Accounting: Throughout Cosme’s brief existence
both money and labor were used as measures of value, although
it was only ‘a question of time’ the colonists believed before
everything was placed on a labor value basis. There were, as in
Bellamy’s Boston in the year 2000, to be no internal exchanges
between individuals of “the various things needful to life and
comfort” [Bellamy, 1887, p. 52]. All needs at Cosme were to be
met from a central communal store. Consequently, with no in-
ternal exchanges of goods there was no need for money as an
internal medium of exchange. Instead, a system of credits, repli-
cating that advocated by Bellamy, provided the means by which
the needs of each member could be met in a fair and equitable
manner [Bellamy, 1887, p. 52; Wooldridge, 1902, p. 244]. ‘Inside
credits’ were provided for goods produced within Cosme and
19 The administrative and work arrangements for Cosme and New Australia,
whereby the community was administered by an elected Director with the sup-
port of a Board of Superintendents, bore a striking resemblance to those sug-
gested by Sir Thomas More and Edward Bellamy [More, 1999, Book II, pp. 49,
51; Bellamy, 1887]. Cosme’s constitution also provided for members of the com-
munity who transgressed against the governing principles of the community,
including a total abstinence from alcohol, to be banished [Cosme Monthly, Sep-
tember 1896].
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‘outside credits’ for articles purchased on local markets. Al-
though the credits at Cosme had dollar values, as in Bellamy’s
utopia only the word dollar had been kept “but not the sub-
stance. The term . . . answers to no real thing, but merely serves
as an algebraical symbol for comparing the values of products
with one another” [Bellamy, 1887, p. 53]. Thus, the dollar value
assigned to internal credits at Cosme was not a measure of the
monetary value of the goods taken from the central stores,
rather it corresponded to a value of the labor content of goods
and services [see below]. Each member received the same cred-
its, for all labor at Cosme had the same value, irrespective of
levels of skill and experience.20 Inside credits for adults were $10
(Paraguayan dollars21) per month, children over 12 years $7 a
month and children under 12 years $5 per month. Outside cred-
its were $1.50 per month for women and $1.10 for men. Chil-
dren were allowed $0.75 [Cosme Monthly, June 1895].
Each member kept a record of their credits on a credit card
in the form of a chequerboard; inside credits on one side and
outside credits on the other, a system which again was remark-
ably similar to that advocated by Bellamy in Looking Backward
[1887, pp. 52-53], by Collens [1876, p. 65] in his Eden of Labor
and the labor notes used by Robert Owen [Engels, 1935, p. 43].
Whenever produce was taken from the communal store the
number of squares representing the dollar amount assigned to
the purchase would be struck out on the credit card. At the end
of the month any balance of inside credits, which were meant
solely to facilitate daily living, was erased with outside credits
allowed to accumulate from month to month, until late 1898
when the practice was discontinued [Cosme Monthly, September
1898]. Credit cards were a means of facilitating management of
Cosme’s oftentimes meager resources, not a precaution to pre-
vent abuse, for in the utopia of Cosme, as in Bellamy’s Boston of
2000 A.D. and More’s Utopia, when mutual regard governed all
aspects of life none would seek to advantage themselves at the
expense of others. The well being of each was in direct propor-
tion to the well being of all, unlike capitalism “which made the
20 Originally, the working week was four and a half days, eight hours each
day with any work above the minimum credited to the worker. This was in-
creased in May 1898 to five and a half days a week [Cosme Monthly, May 1898].
Following the example of Sir Thomas More’s Utopia, no one was to “exhaust
himself with endless toil . . . as if he were a beast of burden” [More, 1999, p. 51].
21 All dollar amounts refer to the Paraguayan dollar.
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interests of every individual antagonistic to those of every
other . . . ” [Bellamy, 1887, p. 54].
The successful operation of Cosme’s new economy based on
labor value depended upon an accurate accounting of labor
time, not for the purpose of determining entitlements of each
member but to manage production and distribution. This re-
quired new forms of accounting for management planning and
decision making; accounting which embodied the core principle
of a community of interests upon which Cosme was founded
and upon which its existence depended. Accounting at Cosme
would be harnessed in the interests of labor instead of capital.
In a society premised on cooperation rather than competition,
where justice was no longer defined in terms of property rights
and in which the value of goods and services was determined on
the basis of their labor content rather than the capitalist’s ‘value
in exchange’, the “most vexing problem”, according to Tuchman
[1966, p. 73], was “the question of an accounting of the value of
goods and services”. At Cosme however, their innovative system
of accounting for the value of products on the basis of labor
value or labor time presented few problems, mainly because the
colony always remained very small, the number of people at
Cosme never exceeding 131, and the considerable business expe-
rience of some of the members [Ross, 1935, p. 311; Cosme
Monthly, December 1896].
Although most of the settlers at Cosme had little or no edu-
cation, and none had been to university [Australian National
Library MS3205], William Lane, amongst others, had gained
considerable business experience when he operated The Worker
and Boomerang newspapers [Beckingham, 1993, p. 7]. One early
member, John Sibbald, had been a qualified accountant in
Adelaide [Ross, 1935, p. 186]. Appreciating the essential contri-
butions that rational management practices would make to the
success of their colony, these business habits were not left be-
hind in Australia by Lane and his lieutenants. Accounting in
particular was accorded at all times throughout Cosme’s exist-
ence a prominent presence in the management of Cosme’s fi-
nances and its operations and in fulfilling accountability or
stewardship obligations, both to Cosme’s members and to sup-
porters in Australia. Thus, reflecting the array of accounting
information maintained by the colonists, from the first days of
Cosme weekly reports of work completed were provided to the
community with monthly financial reports published from July
1895 in Cosme Monthly. The monthly accounts also incorpo-
rated statements of working time lost to illness, a record of the
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nature of the illness, the labor hours each person worked, the
activities on which each was engaged, the proportion of total
work devoted to each activity and the distribution of produce to
the members [see for example, Cosme Monthly, November
1895]. As a preliminary step to the substitution of labor values
for money as the measure of all economic values, in October
1896 the colony commenced the practice of auditing and report-
ing the labor value of the colony’s main administrative depart-
ments, as shown in Figure 1 below, in order “that labor values of
village products can be definitely established and that a correct
relationship between labor and cash credits can in the future be
established…” [Cosme Monthly, October 1896]. From 1897, as
Figure 2(B) in the following section demonstrates, labor valua-
tions also appeared in the annual reports as an alternative mea-
sure of the value of some assets [Cosme Monthly, May 1897].
Eventually all assets were to be valued in this manner.
FIGURE 1
Community Labor Time, October 1896
(Four Weeks to 31 October 1896)
Agriculture (farm, orchards, gardens) 403 days 21/2 hours
Building (sawing, carpentry, smith) 241 days 51/2 hours
Stock (dairy, piggery) 171 days 4 hours
Miscellaneous 214 days 2 hours
1030 days 6 hours
Accumulated holidays 982 days
Source: Cosme Monthly, October 1896.
Given the numerous natural threats to the survival of the
colony and its dependence essentially on the labor of its mem-
bers, it is not surprising that a keen interest was taken in their
labors and that a detailed accounting was made. However, the
labor accounts were more than reckonings of accomplishments.
Rather, they were also a cogent, visible expression of the beliefs
that sustained each member by giving recognition, both sym-
bolically and for practical purposes, to the contributions of la-
bor. Labor accounting was an ever-present reminder of the prin-
ciples upon which the colony was founded. Accounting for labor
value, as measured in time expended, provided the means to
meld diverse contributions, all of which were valued equally and
according to the common metric of time. Recognizing some
labor as more valuable than others, and, therefore deserving of
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the higher reward favored by Ricardo [1911, p. 11] would be
meaningless in a community where all had the same entitle-
ments and where individual well-being was entirely dependent
upon the well-being of the collective [Cosme Monthly, May
1896].
Whenever products were bought or sold on external mar-
kets the idealists at Cosme were compelled to resort to the use of
money and to be governed by monetary values, a state of affairs
which they believed would soon be remedied once their success
was known to the world which would then eagerly follow their
example. They were also forced to use monetary valuations
whenever a member decided to leave the colony, for Cosme’s
original constitution provided for a payment in Paraguayan dol-
lars to each member to help them settle outside the colony.
Accounting for the valuations necessary in determining pay-
ments to members when they withdrew from the community,
however, was to prove especially problematic with the choice of
valuation methods at one stage threatening the very existence of
the colony [see Taylor’s comments in Gobbett and Saunders,
1995, p. 95; Cosme Monthly, February 1899].
Withdrawal Accounting: Should members wish to leave the com-
munity at Cosme, in the early years it was possible for them to
take a share of the wealth that they had helped create [Cosme
Monthly, May 1896]. The maximum withdrawal share was accu-
mulated over a period of ten years; a one tenth share for each
year at Cosme. At the same time, each year each member lost
one tenth of the amount of capital that they had contributed
upon entry to Cosme. This meant that, after ten years, payment
to a member at the time of withdrawal, known as the ‘with-
drawal-share’, would be determined solely on the basis of their
standing as a member of the Cosme community [Taylor in
Gobbett and Saunders, 1995, p. 94]. Thus, both entry to the
colony and withdrawal required detailed accounting records.
The experience of the Harmonists in the early 1800s would seem
to indicate that amongst utopian movements, whether secular
or religious, payment of withdrawal shares was a common prac-
tice [see Flesher and Flesher, 1979].
In addition to an allowance for the time spent with the
community, to a maximum of ten years, the withdrawal-share
was based upon two further components: a share in ‘movables’,
assets which included tools and products available for daily con-
sumption, and a share in the “working value of improvements”.
Land was not to be valued for the purposes of determining with-
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drawal-shares. Indeed, apart from a record of the original cost
of the land shown in the annual accounts for the first three
years, no attempt was made to determine the realizable value of
the land. From 1897 onwards land did not appear in the annual
accounts, mainly to ensure that its presence in the accounts
could not be construed as meaning that land value was to form
part of the determination of the withdrawal-share [Cosme
Monthly, May 1899]. From the establishment of Cosme land was
treated as an indivisible asset of the community, not an asset of
its individual members; it was the basis of its survival and the
embodiment of an enduring commitment by the resident mem-
bers. Therefore, both for ideological and practical reasons land
was not available for distribution. To act otherwise was to be-
tray the commitment of those remaining and to admit compro-
mise in the colony’s mission. “In land itself is our nation’s
wealth, as the wealth of all communities . . . ; in the land which
has absorbed our labor and holds fast thereto” [William Lane in
Cosme Monthly, June 1899].
Accounting for the withdrawal of members was based upon
asset valuations expressed in Paraguayan dollars, excluding
land, principally found in the annual reports of Cosme. The
main part of the annual accounting reports consisted of a ‘Cash
Balance Sheet’, or cash statement, and a ‘Statement of Liabili-
ties and Assets’. Two annual reports are provided in Figure 2,
the first from May 1895 which shows land in the Statement of
Liabilities and Assets. In the second set of accounts, from May
1897, of which only the Statement of Liabilities and Assets is
reproduced, land does not appear and the labor value of some
assets is provided.
While the form and purposes served by the Cash Balance
Sheet changed little over the life of the community, a major, and
highly original, innovation in the Statement of Liabilities and
Assets was forced upon the community in 1898. For the first
three years of Cosme’s existence the valuations used for deter-
mining the withdrawal-share were based upon the replacement
cost of movables and improvements, which included buildings.
Mostly this meant that in remote Paraguay the high cost of
replacing farm implements and supplies peculiar to western ag-
ricultural practices tended to inflate values adopted for with-
drawal-shares, to the advantage of members leaving. While ever
the number of withdrawals was small in number this did not
pose any great difficulties and was not a threat to the commu-
nity. When, however, the numbers leaving rose steeply in 1896
and 1897 and recruitment drives in Australia and Britain to
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FIGURE 2
Annual Financial Reports
(A) May 1895
Annual Cash Balance Sheet, May 1895
Cash Received Cash Paid
To: Initial Contributions $13,739.97 By: Land a/c $4,119.40
Received from Australia  3,731.85 Sustenance a/c  4,100.73
Received from members  348.50 Stock a/c 3,998.37
Sales  390.75 Tools a/c 1,045.45
$18,211.07 Transport a/c 726.65
Organising 1,150.00
Medical 505.11
Cables 461.63
Management 459.98
Refunds 150.00
Miscellaneous 870.25
Cash in hand 573.30
$18,211.07
Statement of Liabilities and Assets, May 1895
Dr. Liabilities Cr. Assets
Bills Payable (land) 9,000.00 Land valuation (original
cost) 12,000.00
New Australia (tools) 750.00 Capital valuation (tools,
improvements) 16,812.00
Interest on bills 382.20 Accounts due 89.50
Accounts due 692.25 Cash in hand 573.30
Capital to balance 18,650.35
$29,474.80 $29,474.80
Source: Cosme Monthly, May 1895.
Continued on next page
22 English recruits tended to find the rigors of Cosme particularly difficult,
most leaving after a very short time [Cosme Monthly, May 1898]. John Lane,
William Lane’s brother and fellow colonist, wrote how “the primitive housing
and surrounding hot climate . . . insect pests, rough and unaccustomed work . . .
all combined to make most of the newcomers dissatisfied with Cosme life and to
soon leave it” [Australian National Library MS3205].
replace them were proving of only moderate success,22 the Di-
rector and the Board of Superintendents realized that the future
of the community was being compromised, not only by the de-
clining membership base but also by the method of valuation
used in the accounts. The trauma for those remaining, when
members left who had been close friends and comrades in a
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(B) May 1897
Statement of Liabilities and Assets, May 1897
Dr. Liabilities  $ c Cr. Assets  $ c  $ c
To: Outstanding By: Capital
To: accounts  128 00 Valuations of
movables
 Members Allowances  155 89 Standing Crops 3,113 00
 Cosme Central Board  607 25 Live Stock 6,154 00
 Cosme members  4,960 25 Goods in Stock 5,471 00
 Balance 14,507 64 Implements 4,916 00
19,654 00
By: Bonns due
on coffee  303 05
By: Cash  401 98
Note: The fixtures
which are valued
on a labor basis
only, are:
Clearings 6,556 days
Buildings 1,816 days
Orchards 2,384 days
Sundry  664 days
Improvements
(day is 8 hours)
Total 11,420
days
20,359 03 20,359 03
Source: Cosme Monthly, May 1897.
FIGURE 2  (Continued)
courageous venture, was being compounded financially by the
accounting valuations chosen to determine the withdrawal-
share. The use of replacement costs to value assets was rapidly
destroying the colony’s means of survival by forcing it to borrow
to meet its obligations to its departing members. The valuation
method would have to change. Thus, in the 1898 annual ac-
counts, contained in Figure 3 below, two sets of valuations were
provided for the colony’s assets: one based upon realizable
value, the new basis for determining withdrawal-shares, and one
using replacement cost. The two valuations were deemed neces-
sary “for the getting of an intelligible idea of the true industrial
position of the colony” [Cosme Monthly, May 1899].
The dual system of valuation indicated a sophisticated
awareness of the consequences of accounting measurements,
that they were indeed not just numbers for recording purposes;
they were matters of immediate import. The use of realizable
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values exposed the vulnerability of the colony’s finances and
confronted its members with the reality of their continued de-
pendence on markets. “[R]ealizable values so reduces the esti-
mated value of assets that they are not enough to meet general
liabilities which have increased . . . This increase in liabilities
almost absorbs assets even at replacement valuation” [Cosme
Monthly, May 1899, see also February 1899]. Thus, the move to
realizable or selling values for the colony’s assets allowed the
colony to be put on a “sounder financial footing and to safe-
guard it as far as possible against the risk of becoming bank-
rupt . . . ” [Cosme Monthly, February 1899]. The effect of using
realizable values was to reduce the amount claimable by with-
drawing members. In the case of tools and goods in stock, as
Figure 3 shows, the difference between the realizable value and
replacement cost was glaring. This recognized that some of the
assets of the colony, in particular their tools and other imple-
ments of production, had very little value to the native popula-
tion on the local markets. The colony was unable to sell any
tools to raise money other than at a “crushing loss” [Cosme
Monthly, February 1899]. In contrast, these assets were of great
value to the ability of the colony to sustain itself and to provide
for new adherents.
FIGURE 3
Annual Statement of Liabilities and Assets, May 1898
Liabilities Assets on Realizable Assets on
Amount Replacement Amount
To Outstanding 1,617.50 Crops 312.59 Crops 1,512.50
Accounts
To Cosme 3,408.30 Live stock 4,168.00 Live stock 5,770.00
Central Board
For Cosme 5,950.00 Goods in 2,172.00 Goods in 4,259.00
Central Board stock stock
To Cosme 1,933.75 Harness 230.00 Harness  653.00
members
Total Liabilities 12,909.55 Tools 755.00 Tools 3,128.00
To Balance 2,806.99 Cash 394.04 Cash  394.04
Replacement
Account
Total Reali-
15,716.54 zable  Assets 8,331.54 15,716.54
Debit Balance
Against
Liabilities 4,578.01
Source: Cosme Monthly, May 1898.
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Use of realizable value for the purpose of calculating with-
drawal-share helped to stem the hemorrhaging of Cosme’s asset
base but in the midst of an ever-dwindling membership it
proved insufficient of itself. On one occasion in 1899 Cosme’s
financial position had become so desperate as a result of the
obligation to pay withdrawal-shares that it was forced to sell
some of its land. Ultimately, the expectation that members had a
right on leaving the colony to a payment and the system by
which this payment had been calculated were finally abandoned
in January 1899 [Cosme Monthly, January 1899]. Paying with-
drawal-shares as a right, irrespective of circumstances, could
not be sustained. No longer did members have a claim against
the property of Cosme, while all entry payments were to be
regarded as ‘gifts to the Commonwealth’. The Director and the
Board of Superintendents could make payments at their discre-
tion to departing members up to $100, without reference to the
previous valuation formula for assets or member contributions.
The changes had the unanimous support of the remaining true
believers for whom “Communistic feeling, reluctance to being
classified apart even in the account books . . . operated to induce
members to forgo credits and to gift them to the community”
[Cosme Monthly, February 1899]. Unfortunately, as membership
numbers continued to drop Cosme’s financial condition further
deteriorated, forcing them in 1903 to increase their overdraft by
a further $6,000 and to apply to the Banco Aricola in Paraguay
for a $20,000 loan, adding further to the colony’s already
$10,249 debt to the bank [Souter, 1968, p. 197]. The accounting
expertise available to the colony was augmented at this time
with the arrival of Ernest Kell, a Scotsman, who was a qualified
auditor and accountant.23 In apparent recognition of the value of
his skills to the colony at this critical time, and unlike the condi-
tions imposed on other new members, Kell was immediately
granted full membership of the colony [Cosme Monthly, Decem-
ber 1902].
As the colony moved towards its final days in 1909, William
Lane having left in August 1899 to live in New Zealand, the
concern of the remaining nine men, five women and their chil-
dren became increasingly one of their own financial survival as
the ownership of Cosme’s land was transferred to individual
members. One member wrote that “the colossal question of ma-
23 Until 1898 only men elected to the main governing committees of Cosme
could act as auditors. Thereafter until its last days, any male member of Cosme
could be an auditor [Cosme Monthly, July 1898].
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terial interest now absorbing the attention of many of our mem-
bers in what may be termed the ‘land steal’ . . . ” [quoted in
Souter, 1968, p. 212]. The “unthinkable had happened. They
were no loner communists or colonists, but individualists, small
independent farmers . . . ” [Whitehead, 1997, p. 375].
DISCUSSION: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
ACCOUNTING TO UTOPIAN JUSTICE
At all stages of Lane’s utopian enterprise, formation, devel-
opment and dissolution, accounting was fundamental to
Cosme’s ability to survive and prosper. This contradicted the
stance taken by more extreme forms of utopianism which had
no place for accounting in their earthly paradise. Malatesta [see
Tuchman, 1966, pp. 75-76, 87], for example, saw the very exist-
ence of accounting as a denial of the inherent morality and
virtue of individuals, thereby stigmatizing it as a tool of capital-
ist oppressors and beyond redemption. Malatesta and others ar-
gued that moral, free individuals who worked enthusiastically
for the common good in return would be free to take whatever
they needed from communal stores without the need for ac-
counting to monitor entitlement relativities between individuals.
Accounting as a technology of entitlement would offend the
moral basis upon which society would operate. When the shack-
les of the capitalist state were removed, and the competitive
forces of the market no longer the arbiters of entitlements, each
individual could be relied upon to take only that which they
were entitled, both on the basis of need and in proportion to the
contributions of their labor. When everyone was able to live a
moral, outward-regarding life, instead of one characterized by
possessive individualism [MacIntyre, 2000], each would feel se-
cure in the knowledge that his/her well being would be guaran-
teed.
Although accounting, as a technology used to verify, record
and enhance the entitlements associated with property owner-
ship, may have been essential to capitalism, not all utopians saw
its essential nature as capitalist and, therefore, devoid of virtue.
“The practice of accounting”, note Gallhofer and Haslam [2003,
p. 3], need not be “doomed to the status of an evil to be rid of”.
Instead, accounting was a “mutable phenomenon, which inter-
relates with the broader socio-political and economic context in
which it operates” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991, p. 487], what-
ever that may be. Accounting could as easily assist societies
premised on cooperation to promote the well-being of each indi-
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vidual as it had similarly ensured the efficiency of capitalist
enterprises in their pursuit of profits: accounting “has no neces-
sary class belongingness . . . ” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003, p.
x]. Rather than accounting being treated by the New Australia
Co-operative settlers as an irredeemable accomplice in
capitalism’s degradations of the individual, it has been shown
that accounting was accepted as necessary to the restoration of
conditions conducive to the recovery of lost virtue. Accounting,
as suggested by Francis [1990], could serve virtue as easily as it
could serve the necessary selfishness of capitalists. Accounting
can “come to float relatively free of its socio-political constitu-
tion and signify different things for interpreters and users in
different contexts with different effects” [Gallhofer and Haslam,
2003, p. 101].
Without extensive property ownership and the desire to
hoard, where individuals do not seek to gain advantage over
others and to provide for themselves assurances of well-being
through ‘destructive’ competition, accounting was not needed to
adjudicate between competing entitlement claims or to protect
from the deceptions of those who had claims on one’s property
or those against whose property one had claims. The ascen-
dancy of moral principles in social relations meant that account-
ing would not be required to compensate for this lack of virtue
endemic to capitalism. In contrast to capitalism’s bleak moral
pessimism and selfishness, to accept the utopian’s appreciation
of human nature contradicts the mutual suspicions, moral defi-
ciencies and uncertainty upon which much of the need for ac-
counting rests in a capitalist society. Accounting did not have to
be used as an implement of power and domination to sustain
inequality and entrenched privilege, to deny opportunities for
redemption, to impoverish the existence of many and to dis-
credit rivals to capitalism [see for example, Bryer, 2000, p. 133;
Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Miller, 1990, p. 315]. As a means of
mediating relations between people, and thereby shaping conse-
quent material conditions in the community [Francis, 1990, p. 7;
Miller, 1990, p. 316; Arnold, 1991, p. 121], accounting could
serve labor in the pursuit of emancipation when “a progressive
community comes to control accounting rather than be con-
trolled by it . . . ” [Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003, p. 7, see also p.
102].
A refusal by most utopians to condemn accounting indi-
cated a belief that the fundamental nature of accounting was
instrumental and that the political or moral identity it could
assume, that is at which point it operated along the continuum
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identified by Gallhofer and Haslam [2003, p. 100], depended
upon the context. Utopians preferred to make moral judgments
about the practices in which accounting was enlisted, not about
accounting. This was also obvious in the communities estab-
lished by the Quakers, Shakers and the Harmonists in the early
1800s in America who relied upon sophisticated systems of ac-
counting [Flesher and Flesher, 1979; Faircloth, 1988; Fuglister
and Bloom, 1991; Kresier and Dare, 1986]. To the utopians at
Cosme the virtue of accounting was determined by the uses
permitted by the social, legal and economic frameworks in
which it operated. Accounting could be used to communicate a
very different “set of values, of ideals, of expected behavior, of
what is approved and disapproved” from those associated with
capitalism [Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 448; see also
Mouritsen in Quattrone, 2000, p. 134]. In addition to suggesting
that accounting can play a highly influential role in institution-
alizing particular, privileged values and beliefs, this description
of accounting by Roberts and Scapens also leads to the possibil-
ity that these values and beliefs may not be possible without the
assistance of accounting. Certainly, as this paper has demon-
strated, this was the case at Cosme. Bryer, following Marx, rec-
ognizes that each form of production will have its own type of
accounting [Bryer, 1999, p. 555; 2000, pp. 141, 142]. Under capi-
talism, political and social life had become consumed by the
instrumental rationality which accounting made possible and
upon which markets and property entitlements depended, deny-
ing accounting opportunities to be enlisted in moral pursuits.
However, if a measure of justice is used which does not involve
property, such as that proposed at Cosme, then the contribu-
tions and importance of accounting also will be transformed.
After all, the relevance of accounting to a society depends upon
the aims of that society. Thus, if society is organized around the
principles of self interest, competition and a social compact
which has as its primary goal protecting the sanctity of private
property [Locke, 1884], then the purposes which accounting
might serve will be very different from a society in which the
emphasis is on cooperation and community.
CONCLUSION
If the state primarily serves the interests of property, then
while ever individuals are able to enjoy and deal with their
property in a manner which they believe is in their best inter-
ests, without trespassing on the coincident rights of others, soci-
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ety is regarded as just. According to this interpretation, justice is
entirely dependent upon the recognition and defense of rights to
property which have been acquired according to principles of
law agreed to by society. For utopians, however, there can be no
possibility of virtue and, therefore, no justice and no content-
ment in a society in which all social and economic relations are
determined by the rights arising from private property. Those
without property are forced to live in a state of oppressive resig-
nation, stultified in their desire for a dignified life which is free
from want and fear by their subservience to capital.
William Lane and the New Australia Co-operative Settle-
ment Association believed that the only way out of labor’s con-
demned state was to establish a new form of society in which
brotherhood and mutual regard for the well being of each other
were the principles which would determine the nature of social
and economic relations, not property. Lane and his followers
sought a society in which virtue and selflessness is prized above
all else and where all members of society have the same innate
rights and their contributions are regarded as of equal impor-
tance. The society that they established at New Australia and
Cosme in Paraguay was to be devoid of the private interests
which would separate and divide workers from each other. Ac-
cordingly, all means of production were owned by the commu-
nity as were the results of their labors. Following Marx and
Bellamy, the economies of the Paraguayan colonies were based
upon labor value. Eventually there would be no need for any
exchanges of commodities and services for all production would
be available to each member of the colonies according to their
particular needs. The success of this new economic paradigm
was still dependent upon rational management practices; not to
regulate entitlements and to compensate for base human mo-
tives which predispose individuals to pursue ruthlessly their
own interests but to ensure order and system.
At Cosme, accounting practices which had been trans-
planted from capitalism proved no less adaptable and essential
to the success of an economy in which all production intended
for internal use was valued in terms of its labor content. The use
of accounting at Cosme indicated that its essential nature was
not exclusively that of a technology of entitlement and deter-
mined by the oppressive exigencies of capitalism. Instead, ac-
counting was removed from the realm of the individual to that
of society. Accounting became the simulacrum of a new set
of social relations in which property entitlements had no part
but in which labor freely given without any expectation of a
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coincident return determined the emancipated well-being of all.
This provided the opportunity for accounting to become a moral
practice, a means by which the settlers could retrieve the virtue
and justice that the selfish individualism of capitalism had al-
ways denied them.
From the inception of Cosme, accounting was used as a
measure of the success of the beliefs and the strength of the
commitment of the settlers. Labor value accounting in particu-
lar performed both this symbolic or ideological function and, for
a community mostly dependent upon its own collective efforts
for survival, a critical stewardship function. The malleable ideo-
logical attributes of accounting were particularly evident in the
last days of the colony when the large number of departures
from Cosme forced a greater reliance upon monetary valuations
as the means to protect the colony’s resources and to ensure its
survival. Ultimately, in the bewilderment of decay and disillu-
sionment and in the search for material certainty, what mat-
tered most was the ability of accounting to adjudicate between
competing property claims. With the pursuit of virtue through
communality no longer the goal, the selfishness of individualism
determined entirely the instrumentality of accounting.
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Abstract: In 1797 the Prime Minister of Great Britain announced a
substantial increase in the stamp duty on newspapers. This increase,
and indeed the tax itself, has been variously represented as an attack
on press freedom and an act of suppression of the working classes.
This paper reconsiders these representations by reference to primary
sources and concludes that the increases in stamp duty were part of a
revenue raising exercise in which taxes on a number of luxury items
were increased, including newspapers which were not at the time
viewed as being necessities.
INTRODUCTION
This paper, which is one of a series of contributions tracing
the introduction, development and ultimate demise of the news-
paper stamp duty, seeks to extend the work of a small number of
scholars who examine taxation history, as a key branch of ac-
counting, in its social and institutional context.1 It responds to
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1 Lamb [2002] for example, examines seven income tax disputes over the
nature of depreciation against the backdrop of prevailing social and political
tensions. She notes that there is little taxation research which places practices in
their social and institutional contexts. Ezzamel [2002, p. 18] examines the rela-
tionship between accounting and taxation in the context of Ancient Egypt and
notes that such study “can help clarify the nature and range of roles played by
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the call for the accounting academy to embrace taxation re-
search [Lamb and Lymer, 1999]. Lamb and Lymer argue that
understandings of accounting will be enriched by more taxation
research. The limited amount of work which has been published
relating taxation to accounting has concerned income tax. Lamb
[2001], for example, examines the process of, and social context
for, mid 19th century income taxation of profits and the associ-
ated accounting and processes of accountability. Other histori-
cal work dealing with income tax includes Edwards [1976],
Samson [1985], Kozub [1983], Cataldo [1995], Kern [2000] and
Walsh [2001].
Income tax is, however, only one form of fiscal imposition
that impacts on accounting practices. Prior to the introduction
of income tax in England during the Napoleonic wars, other
forms of taxation were prevalent and are worthy of study. Stud-
ies of consumption taxes in a historical context, such as Crum
[1982], Wells and Flesher [1999], Jose and Moore [1998] reveal
this importance. Monem [1999] documents the political process
that led to the imposition of a gold tax in Australia and seeks to
illustrate that the political environment of an industry is inter-
twined with its economic environment. In a study of the role of
taxation in governing West African colonies, Bush and Maltby
[2003], by reference to Hopkins [1999], note that taxation is
fundamental to colonial rule, but nevertheless remains an “un-
fashionable” research topic. Our contribution to this small but
growing body of taxation research demonstrates the place of
taxation in the broader social, political and economic environ-
ment as an institutional feature that has implications for ac-
counting. Taxation entails issues of accountability; by the tax-
payer to the revenue authority and by the revenue authority to
the state. As Schumpeter [1954, p. 6] noted, fiscal history is an
essential part of general history and an “enormous influence on
the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which
the needs of the state necessitates and from the use to which its
results are put.” This paper seeks to extend current knowledge
about the differences between pre-modern and modern taxation
systems and practices.
In addition, the paper attempts to increase our understand-
ing of a period which has received limited attention in account-
ing and tax history; a pre-modern period of transition from feu-
dalism to capitalism in which profits and income were not yet
accounting practices, not only in ancient economies, but more generally, and
enhance our appreciation of the context-dependent functioning of accounting”.
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systematically taxed. The period examined here presents an en-
vironment of heavy government expenditure and shifting pat-
terns of government finance; the culmination of a century of
movement from taxing wealth to taxing consumption, and
broadening the tax base to service the national debt. According
to Brewer [1989], Britain was able to pursue its hegemonic mili-
tary ambitions during the 18th century as a result of radical
increases in taxation, the development of public debt on a mas-
sive scale and the growth of public administration. While
Dickson’s [1967] seminal account of the growth of public credit
in Britain firmly establishes the key contribution of borrowing
to the expansion of the English state, Brewer’s view is that he
underestimates the importance of taxation to the financial revo-
lution [1989, p. 90].
The stamp duty on newspapers was introduced in Great
Britain in 1712 amid considerable controversy and speculation
that it would lead to the demise of a burgeoning press, only
recently freed from licensing restrictions and rapidly establish-
ing itself as a powerful social and political force. The historiog-
raphy of the newspaper stamp is colored, however, by the per-
spective from which it is written. It has largely been viewed as
an adjunct to media history, with a sole focus on its impact on
newspaper production and distribution. Enticing contemporary
pronouncements by luminaries such as Addison, Swift and
Defoe,2 castigating the introduction of the tax, have been seized
upon by historians keen to demonstrate the deviousness of the
government in using a tax to suppress the press.
We have shown elsewhere [Sadler and Oats, 2002] that con-
trol of the press was not, however, the prime purpose of the
newspaper stamp duty. Rather, its introduction was part of a
huge revenue raising exercise to fund the War of Spanish
2 According to Addison, in issue No 445 of the Spectator in 1712, “I am afraid
that few of our weekly historians, who are men that, above all others, delight in
war, will be able to subsist under the weight of a stamp and an approaching
peace” [Bond, 1965, pp. 62-63]. On August 7th 1712 Swift wrote in his Journal to
Stella [1712, pp. 553-554]:
Do you know, that Grubstreet is dead and gone last week; No more
Ghosts or Murders now for Love or Money. I plyed it pretty close the
last Fortnight, and publisht at least 7 penny Papers of my own, besides
some of other Peoples. But now, every single half Sheet pays a
halfpenny to the Qu—.The Observator is fallen; the Medleys are
jumbled together with the Flying Post; the Examiner is deadly sick; the
Spectator keeps up, and doubles its price. I know not how long it will
hold. Have you seen the red Stamp the Papers are marqued with.
Methinks it is worth a halfpenny the stamping it.
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Succession.3 The tax was one of many new taxes introduced at
the time including taxes on soap, candles, leather and playing
cards.
The historiography of the newspaper stamp duty is also col-
ored by the campaign for its abolition. The campaign gathered
pace during the radical movement of the 1830s and was vitriolic.
The newspaper stamp was branded as a tax on knowledge de-
signed to keep the working class in ignorance. It was substan-
tially reduced in 1836 and abolished in 1855 following a Select
Committee enquiry into its operation. An element of conflation
has led to the newspaper stamp being viewed as a tax on knowl-
edge throughout the period of its existence.4 We seek here to
demonstrate that this was not the dominant view during the
18th century, and, as late as the 1790s, the tax on newspapers
was perceived in the same light as taxes on other luxury items.
When first introduced in 1712 the tax was primarily in-
tended as a revenue raiser with censorship as a subsidiary, but
not unintended, by-product. This is true also for the subsequent
increases made to the tax during the 18th century. Certainly the
focus of the tax changed in the 19th century, when it was known
more justifiably as a “tax on knowledge”,5 but to describe it thus
for the 18th century overstates the censorship motive during
that period.
Perhaps one of the reasons for overemphasizing the role of
censorship has been the tendency of many commentators to
view the tax in isolation, in the context only of its effect on
newspapers, rather than in the broader context of the political,
3 In the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) England and the Nether-
lands joined to support the claim of the Archduke Charles of Austria to the
Spanish throne. England’s involvement was mainly to prevent a union between
France and Spain. The war ended with the Treaty of Utrecht on terms that were
very favourable for England.
4 For example, in a detailed study of the critical years of the repeal move-
ment, 1830-36, Weiner [1969, p. 3] notes “Although the statute was designed
principally to place a curb on newspapers; revenue considerations being second-
ary . . . ” and further “This slave mark [referring to Richard Carlile’s description of
1831] . . . restricted the circulation of most newspapers to upper income groups
. . . In the midst of such concomitants to industrial change as rising literacy, and
accelerating cultural expectations, a restrictive policy of this nature was short
sighted”.
5 For references to the stamp duties as being “taxes on knowledge” see, for
example, Public Records Office (PRO) IR 56/9: “The Memorial of the Newspaper
Stamp Abolition Committee”, dated November 1850, and also PRO IR 56/19,
letter from Treasury Chambers dated August 1854.
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economic and social conditions prevailing at the time [for
example, Dagnall, 1994, Ch. 5]. Another reason is that some
commentators have their own interests to promote in taking a
particular position, and later writers have perpetuated these
ideas. This is especially so in the case of C. D. Collett. Collett
was a Chartist, and at the forefront of the movement to abolish
the stamp duty on newspapers and advertisements. He was sec-
retary of the “Newspaper Stamp Abolition Committee” (later to
become “The Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowl-
edge”) formed in 1849 [Collet, 1899, pp. 89-90]. Collet wrote
about the tax and the movement to abolish it in the History of
the Taxes on Knowledge and is cited by Maynard Salmon [1923].
Maynard Salmon adopted Collet’s view that the tax was always
about censorship.
In this re-evaluation of the newspaper stamp duty at the
mid-point of its existence, we present two alternative frame-
works for analyzing the tax. We demonstrate that quite different
interpretations of events are possible depending on the perspec-
tive from which the analysis is made. The specific event which
forms the basis of our discussion is an increase in the stamp
duty on newspapers which occurred in 1797. Our re-evaluation
includes an examination of the secondary commentaries on the
issue as well as analysis of primary documents including the
statutes concerned, the discussions in parliament as the legisla-
tion was considered, and records of State Trials.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we outline the specific formulation of the newspa-
per stamp duty and briefly outline the major developments with
respect to the stamp duty that took place from its introduction
in 1712 to the beginning of the 1790s. We then present two
alternative frameworks. The first examines the prevailing eco-
nomic conditions and structure of the tax system at the time.
The second examines the prevailing conditions with respect to
the press, its power and the measures taken by the state to bring
it under control. Both frameworks are described in the context
of the contemporaneous social and political background. We
then detail the 1797 increase in the newspaper stamp duty. In
the conclusion we speculate that it is the first of these frame-
works that provides a more appropriate basis for analyzing the
tax in the late 18th century, and that representations of the tax
solely as a mechanism for controlling the press are misguided.
Similarly it is argued that representations of the stamp duty at
this time as being an attempt to oppress the working classes are
also misguided.
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THE STAMP DUTY ON NEWSPAPERS
The stamp duty on newspapers was introduced in the main
as a means of raising revenue to fund the war of Spanish Suc-
cession. The duty as originally levied in 1712 was at the follow-
ing rates [10 Anne c.19, I]:
For pamphlets and papers up to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1/2d per copy
half a sheet
For pamphlets and papers more than . . . . . . . . . . 1d per copy
half a sheet but not more than one sheet
For papers and pamphlets more than . . . . . . . . . . 2s per sheet
one sheet, but not more than six sheets on one copy
Octavo (or 12 sheets Quarto, or 20
sheets Folio)
In the case of pamphlets and papers of one sheet or less, the
paper on which they were printed had to be stamped before
printing. Upon payment of the required amount of stamp duty,
the blank paper was embossed with a red stamp, ornately en-
graved with the rose and thistle emblem of Queen Anne. In this
way, newspapers were easily identified as having had the duty
paid. Harsh penalties were imposed for printing newspapers on
unstamped paper. Pamphlets between one and seven sheets did
not require pre-stamping, but had to be registered within
specified time limits under pain of penalty of £20. Pamphlets
comprising more than six sheets were not subjected to the
stamp duty [10 Anne c.19, CI, III, IV, V, XI, XII].6 It would
appear then that an objective of these legislative provisions was
the suppression of small and cheap publications [Thomas, 1916,
p. 262].
Newspaper publishers were quick to exploit the distinction
based on the number of pages. Several increased the size of
their publications to more than one sheet and less than six, one
sheet and a half was sufficient, thus classifying themselves as
pamphlets and reducing the total amount of duty payable. This
loophole was not closed until 1725. It was then made clear that
the stamp duty must apply to every sheet or half sheet of paper
“on which any journal, mercury, or other news-paper what-
soever, shall be printed” and “such journals, mercuries and
news-papers . . . shall not for the future be deemed or taken as
6 A stamp duty on advertisements was included in this Act, but the focus of
this paper is solely on the newspaper stamp duty.
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pamphlets” [11 Geo I c.8, XIII, XIV]. After this initial period
of resistance, newspapers were generally produced on a half
sheet of paper which, folded in half, presented four pages of
news.
A document written in 1727 describes the procedure for
stamping in the following terms:
The Stamp Office is kept No 9 and No 10 in Lincolns
Inn [sic]; and the Office Hours, as required by Act of
Parliament, are from Nine ‘till Twelve of the Clock in
the Forenoon, and from Two ‘till Five of the Clock in
the Afternoon, every Day except Sundays and Holy-
Days.
To get anything Stampt, you muft go to the Receiver’s
Clerk, No 9, the Ground-Room on the Right Hand,
where the Warrant muft be made out, with the Perfon’s
Name on the Top, the Day of the Month, and Date of
the Year, and Underneath, what Goods are to be
Stamped, muft be wrote down in Words at Length, and
the Sum Total in Figures. When the Warrant is Signed
by the Receiver, take it to the Comptroller in the next
Office, to Enter and Sign them. Take the warrant and
Goods down Stairs in the fame Office to be Stamped,
and Tell over the Goods, after Stamped, before you take
them away.
. . . For News Papers and Pamphlets you may pay the
Money as aforefaid: Then carry the Warrant and Pam-
phlet to the Regifter, and then to the Receiver and
Comptroller [Anon., 1727].
Here we see traces of nascent bureaucratic processes. As the
volume of newspapers requiring stamped paper increased, so
did the Stamp Office organization in terms of staff, regulations
and procedures requiring documentation. The documentation of
these procedures and processes contributed towards embedding
the duty in the framework of the tax system and added to subse-
quent difficulties in removing or changing it.
An increase in the stamp duty occurred in 1757 to raise
funds for the Seven Years War (1756-1753).7 The rate of duty on
newspapers of one half sheet was increased by a halfpenny [30
Geo II c.19], and consequently stood at one penny per half sheet
7 In the Seven Years War England and Prussia were allies against France,
Austria, and Russia. During this war England fought mainly at sea, and in the
North American and Indian colonies.
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or full sheet without distinction.8 The rate of duty was again
increased in 1776 by an additional halfpenny, this increase pre-
cipitated by the American War of Independence [16 Geo III
c.34]. The duty on newspapers now stood at one penny
halfpenny for a sheet or a half sheet.
Further amendments in 1789, this time not as a result of a
war, increased the tax and addressed some further avoidance
practices [29 Geo III c.50]. The Prime Minister, William Pitt,
was compelled to repeal his tax on shops and so sought to re-
coup the lost revenue by the extra tax on newspapers [Dowell,
1888, p. 355]. The rate of duty on newspapers was increased by
a further halfpenny. On the eve of the war with revolutionary
France, therefore, the stamp duty stood at two pence per sheet
or half sheet. The various increases in the stamp duty on news-
papers during the 18th century caused controversy, but the tax
itself had become embedded in the fabric of state revenue rais-
ing. By 1790 the newspaper stamp was an accepted form of
taxation. Heated debates over the tax were about the amount of
the increases and not about repealing it altogether.
A Decade of Tumult: The 1790s was a decade of drama and
change in Europe, with profound consequences for the coun-
tries involved. The events that had the most impact were the
French Revolution and the subsequent Revolutionary and Napo-
leonic Wars. The French Revolution began in 1789 and was
initially greeted with enthusiasm and optimism by those in Brit-
ain who imagined the outcome would be similar to that follow-
ing the Glorious Revolution of 1688.9 The enthusiasm was short-
lived as the revolution in France descended into massacre and
bloodshed, and the revolutionaries began to encourage the citi-
zens of other countries to follow suit. In early 1792 France and
8 Interestingly it was due to the necessity of raising funds for the Seven
Years War that the English Parliament attempted to impose the newspaper
stamp tax on the American colonists. The duty, imposed by 5 Geo III c. 12, was
repealed less than twelve months later by 6 Geo III, c. 11 (dated 1 May 1766).
The repeal followed violent resistance to the tax by the American colonists.
9 In late 1688 James II was forced to flee from England. His daughter, Mary,
and son in law, William of Orange, the ruler of the Netherlands, were invited to
rule England, which they did as William III and Mary II. William and Mary
agreed to reign over England subject to the Bill of Rights 1688, the provisions of
which finally established the sovereignty of Parliament. The Glorious Revolution
signifies the peaceful transition of power from monarch to Parliament, com-
pared with the bloodshed of the Civil War (1642-1646) and the beheading of
Charles I in 1649.
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Austria went to war with each other, with Prussia joining Aus-
tria a few months later [O’Gorman, 1997].
William Pitt, who became Prime Minister in 1783, had tried
to remain neutral in the face of “harshly divergent attitudes
towards the Revolution . . . expressed on the Opposition benches
in Parliament by Charles James Fox and Edmund Burke”
[O’Gorman, 1989, p. 30]. Pitt remained uninvolved in the Euro-
pean conflict until his hand was forced in February 1793 when
France declared war on Britain, a war that continued intermit-
tently until 1815. At the outset Britain was not ready for war,
and it took years to build up its forces, especially the army. The
early years went well for the revolutionary army of France, with
victories which forced its continental European opponents into
surrender. By 1797 only Britain remained at war with France. In
1797 two naval victories for Britain against France and its allies
diminished the likelihood of an invasion, but British naval muti-
nies in the same year ensured that the situation remained pre-
carious [O’Gorman, 1997, pp. 234-235]. This was also a time of
financial crisis. Pitt had been forced to float large loans for the
government in 1795, 1796 and 1797 [Neal, 1990, p. 185] and the
advent of the paper pound10 signaled further instability [ibid, p.
222].
It was in this context that, in 1797, a further increase in the
rate of stamp duty on newspapers was imposed by the govern-
ment. What follows in the next two sections are alternative
frameworks for analyzing this increase in stamp duty on news-
papers. First we consider the prevailing financial and economic
conditions vis a vis the tax system of the late 18th century. We
will then examine the prevailing conditions vis a vis the freedom
of the press in the wake of the French Revolution. Both discus-
sions are located in the context of contemporary social and po-
litical events.
RAISING REVENUE
The economic impact of war is to increase government ex-
penditure. According to O’Brien [1989, pp. 176-177], the Revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic Wars were the most expensive yet for
Britain. In today’s terms the 20 years of war cost about £1,039
10 The ‘paper pound’ refers to the restriction placed on the convertibility of
Bank of England notes into gold bullion or coin. It persisted until 1821 and Neal
[1990, p. 22] considers it provides a link between the French Revolution and the
British Industrial Revolution.
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million. The amount required from year to year varied, but
O’Brien estimates that for 1793 to 1797, in the early stages of the
conflict, funding the war cost in the region of £22 million per
annum [ibid.]. The national debt increased from £243 million in
1793 to £745 million in 1815 [Checkland, 1983, p. 23] and dur-
ing the same period the government raised in excess of £1,500
million in loans and taxes [Emsley, 1989, p. 213]. Brewer [1989]
charts the spikes in the national debt from the late 17th to the
late 18th centuries. The peaks generally coincided with periods
of war and the plateaus, or what was sometimes a minor trough,
coincided with periods of peace. Each war left the national debt
at a significantly higher level than the last, so the periods of
stability at best reduced the level of debt marginally or held the
level at the status quo.11
The financing of military activity through the national debt,
serviced by taxation revenue was firmly entrenched by the
middle of the 18th century. The nature of the tax system used to
raise funds to finance the debt had altered considerably during
the previous century. For many years prior to the Civil War in
England (1642-1646),12 the mainstay of Sovereign revenue-
raising comprised land tax and customs duties. Various at-
tempts to introduce poll taxes proved extremely unpopular and
were short lived. There was no clear policy in relation to taxa-
tion and in particular no clear view as to whether the poor
should be taxed. Yet, the prevailing ideology was that that it was
the obligation of every citizen to pay tax, be they rich or poor.
According to Hobbes:
For the impositions that are laid on the people by the
sovereign power, are nothing else but the wages, due to
them that hold the public sword, to defend private men
in the exercise of their several trades, and callings. See-
ing then that the benefit that every one receiveth
thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear
to poor and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth
them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man
11 The national debt increased from nothing in the reign of Charles II to £823
million at the accession of George IV in 1820.
12 The Civil War was a power struggle between the King, Charles I, and
parliament in which parliament was eventually victorious. The King’s supporters
were known as Royalists or Cavaliers, and parliamentary supporters were
known as Roundheads, Puritans or Parliament men. In 1646 the Royalist army
surrendered and the King handed himself over to the Scots, who had fought on
the side of parliament.
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oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who
have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only
for their own persons, but for many more. Which con-
sidered, the equality of imposition consisteth rather in
the equality of that which is consumed than of the
riches of the persons that consume same [1651, p. 181].
This sentiment paved the way for the imposition of taxes on
a variety of goods and services that impacted on the poor as well
as the propertied classes [Kennedy, 1913].
Excise duties first appeared on the English tax landscape in
1643, introduced by one of the Puritan leaders, Pym. Excise
duties are essentially taxes on goods, levied by reference to their
volume or ad valorem. At the time excise duties were viewed as
being a more robust source of revenue than the various forms of
direct taxation that had been attempted from time to time, but
they were not well received [Kennedy, 1913]. The excise duties
introduced under the Commonwealth included taxes on a num-
ber of manufactured items, but were abandoned at the Restora-
tion in 1660.13 Excise was an extremely unpopular form of taxa-
tion and while subject to the exigencies of the war with France
after the Glorious Revolution, it was initially found impractical
to re-impose the duties. During the second half of the 17th cen-
tury, taxes were imposed on hearths (1665), houses (1696) hack-
ney coaches (1694) and at various times on salt, coal, leather,
malt and glass. In 1695 a tax on marriages, births and burials
came into force, a return to more direct taxation to supplement
the other existing forms of tax.14 While censorious rhetoric gen-
erally accompanied the introduction of these new exactions in
relation to their “harmful and inequitable effects,” the “precur-
sors of Adam Smith realised that the incidence of a tax is logi-
cally indeterminate” [O’Brien, 1988, p. 10].
It was during the reign of William III (1689-1702) that taxes
on manufacturers by way of excise were re-introduced for short
terms to fund the interest on the national debt. By the time
of the War of Spanish Succession at the start of the 18th cen-
tury, the public mood had changed somewhat, facilitating the
13 The Commonwealth was the eleven year period following the execution of
Charles I in 1649 during which there was no monarch in England, and the
country was governed by the Roundhead (Parliamentarian) leader Oliver
Cromwell until his death in 1658, then his son Richard who was ousted in 1659.
In 1660 the eldest son Charles I was recalled from exile and became king of
England as Charles II – this was the Restoration of the monarchy.
14 For a discussion of this particular tax see Sabine [1971].
112
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss1/9
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2004104
imposition of excise duties and stamp duties on a wide range of
manufactured goods [Dowell, 1888]. What followed throughout
the 18th century was a period of considerable inventiveness in
extending the excise to a wide variety of goods - not only to
luxury goods to which customs duties traditionally applied, but
also to necessities.
Excise duties were seen as being easy to administer, apply-
ing as they did to a relatively small number of producers or
traders who could be readily monitored. The true incidence of
the tax, however, fell on the consumers “gradually and insensi-
bly” [Kennedy, 1913, p. 61]. Although meeting with some resis-
tance at the outset, since they exposed citizens to a new tax,
excise duties had slowly gained support over the course of the
17th century, largely on distributive grounds. The respected
Tory economist of the late 17th century, Charles Davenant, rec-
ommended excise duties as an appropriate source of govern-
ment funds, noting their success as a fiscal instrument in other
states, especially Holland and France. He argued “Excises seem
the most proper Ways and Means to support the Government in
a long War, because they would lye equally upon the whole, and
produce great sums, proportionable to the great Wants of the
Public” [Davenant, 1695, p. 120].
Davenant also advocated funding methods that would not
adversely affect trade nor “create disaffection to the govern-
ment”. In analyzing the effectiveness of excises as a revenue
raising measure, he noted [1695, p. 124] that Venice and Hol-
land, “two jealous commonwealths, have not thought excises
dangerous to liberty”. He did concede that enforcement might
prove more difficult in a large country with inefficient adminis-
tration and further recommended confining taxes to “bulky”
items, not easily hidden, as an aid to enforcement. As to which
commodities should be subject to excise duties, Davenant rec-
ommended taxing luxury goods so as to affect the poor least.
The Introduction of Stamp Duties: Stamp duties were first intro-
duced into England in 1694 in “An Act for granting to their
Majesties several duties upon vellum, parchment and paper, for
four years, towards carrying on the war against France” [5&6
Will & Mary c. 21]. Stamp duties are not strictly a form of excise
in the modern sense, but are effectively the same when imposed
on goods. They had been in force in Holland since 1624, and
adopted by France in 1651 but subsequently fell into abeyance.
Under Colbert, Finance Minister for Louis XIV in 1671-1673,
when stamp duties were reinstated in France they contributed to
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the revolt in Bretagne [Dowell, 1888]. Liability for the stamp
duties arose not on the vellum, parchment and paper per se, but
when official matters, listed in the Act, were inscribed thereon.
Unlike Holland and France, where the government had a mo-
nopoly over the supply of stamped paper, in England taxpayers
were permitted to supply their own paper for stamping as re-
quired.
Excise duties were under the control of the Commissioners
for Excise, a government department separate from that which
administered customs duty. Land tax, the primary form of direct
taxation, was essentially administered at the local level, with the
assessment and collection in the hands of local Land Tax Com-
missioners.
The Stamp Office was constituted as a separate revenue de-
partment and was at first located in Lincoln’s Inn, London un-
der the control of the Commissioner of Stamp Duties.15 The
initial application of stamp duties was to legal documents, how-
ever its extension into the realm of excise duties occurred in
1711, when stamp duty was imposed on almanacs [9 Anne c.23].
The Commissioners of Stamp Duties came under the adminis-
trative jurisdiction of the Lord High Treasurer of Great Britain.
Monies collected were passed to the Receiver General of Stamp
Duties who was required to keep separate accounts of the vari-
ous duties and to pass the monies to the Exchequer.
Direct taxes on wealth and manifestations of income were
accepted with some reluctance because they were administered
by country gentlemen without bureaucratic interference. In con-
sequence, they were ripe for manipulation and their proportion-
ate contribution to total revenue declined throughout the 18th
century. Land tax had been increased to 4s, which was consid-
ered to be its natural limit [Dowell, 1888], and so the govern-
ment had to seek increases in revenue elsewhere. Statesmen
looked for taxes that were not only acceptable, but also unavoid-
able, feasible to administer and which minimized the damage to
the economy [O’Brien, 1989, p. 169]. Fraud was commonplace,
and was easier to perpetrate with some categories of excise du-
ties than others. Stamp duties were considered more difficult to
evade.
Over the course of the 18th century, there was, therefore, a
clear shift in the balance of taxation from direct taxes on wealth,
most notably land, to taxes on consumption in the form of a
15 For a discussion of the operation of the Stamp Office from its inception
see Dagnall [1994].
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variety of excise and stamp duties as well as various assessed
taxes on luxury items [O’Brien, 1989]. This shift also entailed a
transition from locally administered taxes to centralized admin-
istration spread over a number of separate departments.
In Brewer’s view [1989, pp. 128-129] the structure and ad-
ministration of England’s tax system was central to her fiscal
superiority during the 18th century when compared with conti-
nental Europe and France in particular. England did not need
revenue guards to patrol internal borders as, unlike France, it
was not subdivided into fiscal regions for consumption tax pur-
poses. Control of an increasing proportion of revenue raising
was centered in Whitehall where the Treasury Board kept full
accounts of total government revenue and expenditure; and the
tax system was not only centralized, but it was also generally
uniform in its legal incidence.
Income tax was not introduced until 1799, which marked
the beginnings of a reversal of the trend towards consumption
taxes as the mainstay of revenue. The indirect taxes affected the
poor more than the rich, particularly the excise duties on essen-
tials. Any proposed increase had to be balanced with the limit-
ing effect of the ability of the poor to pay for the goods, and the
likelihood of rioting if the impost was seen as too onerous
[Checkland, 1983, p. 24]. The American Revolution had made
patently clear that taxing powers were circumscribed [O’Brien,
1989, p. 166].
By the end of the 18th century, the government’s formula-
tion of tax policy (such as it was at the time) paid considerable
heed to the work of Adam Smith who vigorously opposed taxes
on wealth and income which entailed intolerable inquisition by
the state to assess.16 As a second best, he advocated consump-
tion taxes, although was careful to distinguish between taxes on
necessities and those on luxuries, the latter being preferred. By
necessities, Adam Smith meant not only those necessary for
support of life, but also those which custom dictate it indecent
for creditable persons to be without [1776, p. 383].17 This is not
to say that the distinction between necessities and superfluities
16 Smith said: “An inquisition into every man’s private circumstances, and an
inquisition which, in order to accommodate the tax to them, watched over the
fluctuations of his fortunes, would be a source of such continual and endless
vexation as no people could support” [1776, p. 373].
17 Smith said specifically: “It must always be remembered that it is the luxu-
rious and not the necessary expense of the inferior ranks of people that ought
ever to be taxed” [1776, p. 391].
115
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2004, Vol. 31, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2004
107Oats and Sadler: Political Suppression or Revenue Raising?
was clear cut, it remained normative and as a consequence did
not “perturb contemporaries unduly” [O’Brien, 1988, p. 12]. In
this Adam Smith echoed the sentiments expressed by others a
century earlier such as Davenant (infra). At the time of writing
his Wealth of Nations, Smith noted that only four necessaries
were subject to tax in Great Britain, specifically salt, leather,
soap and candles. Newspapers were clearly not considered to be
such an item.
By 1792-3, the structure of and receipts from the tax system
was as follows [Dowell, 1888, pp. 207-208]:18
III. Direct taxes £ ‘000
Land tax 2,000
Houses and establishments 1,300
Property insured from fire 185
Property sold at auction 75
Post horses, coaches, hackney coaches 277
III. Taxes on articles of consumption
(a) eatables:
salt 377
sugar 1,316
(b) drinks:
Beer 2,224
Malt 1,203
Hops 151
Wine 1,016
Spirits 1,532
Tea 650
(c) Tobacco 567
(d) Articles not Eatables, Drinks or Tobacco:
Coals exported and coastwise 700
Raw and thrown silk 300
Iron, bars 150
Hemp (rough) 103
Muslins 118
Calicoes 96
18 The classification of the taxes shown is Dowell’s and is not necessarily a
reflection of modern classifications, nor of the way in which the government at
the time presented the information in the accounts. Their analysis therefore
demands caution, not only in terms of Dowell’s classification but also their
source in the government accounts. Whilst the bureaucracy of the Treasury was
sophisticated by European standards, the accuracy of the account keeping can-
not be assured.
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(e) Manufactures:
Candles 256
Leather 281
Soap 403
Printed goods 265
Newspapers 140
Glass 183
Bricks and tiles 128
III. Stamp Duties
Bills and notes 156
Receipts 48
Consolidated duties 748
When Pitt became Prime Minister in December 1783, he
faced a serious debt crisis. He brought to office a reputation as a
sound financial manager with a good understanding of taxes
and debt management and proceeded to institute a number of
reforms which brought additional funds into the Exchequer. In-
deed, Sabine notes that when war was declared in 1793 and the
need for increased revenue became acute, Pitt indulged in a
“frenzy of fiscal experiment and improvisation” [1966, p. 20].
Much of the increased revenue can be attributed to the growth
in the volume of goods and services which were brought into the
taxation net [O’Brien, 1989, p. 175; O’Brien and Hunt, 1993, p.
163]. By shifting the balance of tax exaction to consumption
taxes, the government was able to reap the benefits of the
growth in conspicuous consumption associated with the rise of
the middling classes.
The 1797 increase in newspaper stamp duty (discussed
later) can be evaluated against this backdrop of a government
desperate to raise more revenue but unwilling to extend direct
taxation further. The alternative lens through which to examine
the increase in stamp duty is that of the government’s policy on
control of the press. In the next section we examine the
government’s attitude towards press freedom and the non-fiscal
measures adopted to contain it.
CURTAILING PRESS FREEDOM
The social and political conditions in Britain during the
1790s were volatile. The centenary of the Glorious Revolution
was celebrated in 1788, and a renewed vigor for constitutional
reform followed. The French Revolution, welcomed by radical
societies, further energized the movement for parliamentary re-
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form [O’Gorman, 1997, p. 242; Dickinson, 1977, pp. 232, 236].19
Fox Bourne [1887, p. 242] describes the start of the French
Revolution as setting “Europe in a flame from which more than
sparks fell upon England”.
The first part of Paine’s Rights of Man was published in
1791, followed by the second part in 1792. In early 1792 the
London Corresponding Society (the LCS) was formed. The LCS,
led by Thomas Hardy, a shoemaker, was one of the better
known reform societies of the era and supported the theories of
Paine [O’Gorman, 1997, p. 243; Parssinen, 1973, pp. 510-511].
Another reform society was the Society for Constitutional Infor-
mation (the SCI). The SCI had branches across England, one of
the largest being the Sheffield branch with over 2,000 members
in 1792. Later that year over 5,000 SCI supporters in Sheffield
celebrated the victory of the revolutionary French forces at
Valmy. Norwich was another city that embraced reform in the
1790s. At the same time patriotic and loyalist groups flourished,
countering the radical fervor. In the early 1790s Edmund Burke
published Reflections on the Revolution in France, in which he
criticized the French Revolution and “very warmly attacked” the
reform societies in England, including the SCI [Towers, 1790, p.
91]. “[I]t was . . . the continuing competition between radical
and patriotic societies which was to dominate popular politics
for over 30 years after 1789” [O’Gorman, 1997, pp. 242-243].
The Sedition and Treason Trials: Not unnaturally the growth of
the reform movement was watched with growing concern by the
government and two proclamations were issued in 1792 urging
“magistrates to be watchful of seditious literature and to stamp
out riot and agitation” [O’Gorman, 1997, p. 245]. In 1792 Paine’s
A Letter Addressed to the Addressers of the Late Proclamation ex-
pressed the view that “The right [to alter government], and the
exercise of that right appertains to the Nation only, and the
proper means is by a National Convention, elected for the pur-
pose, by all the people” [Parssinen, 1973, p. 511]. During 1792
and 1793 a series of reform Conventions were held in Scotland.
The third Convention took place during October, November and
December of 1793. This “illegal assembly . . . had first called
itself the General Convention of the Friends of the People, and
19 The authors note Beedell’s criticism of the “revisionist argument against
the ‘whig’ view of history” represented in Dickinson’s book but refer to it in
general without expressing an opinion as to the accuracy of either view [Beedell,
1993, p. 800].
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. . . afterwards took the name of the British Convention of the
Delegates of the People, associated to obtain Universal Suffrage
and Annual Parliaments” [Howell and Howell, 1817, col. 814].
As a result of their activities connected with this Convention,
Maurice Margarot and Joseph Gerrald of the LCS and William
Skirving, a Scot, were arrested, tried in early 1794 in Edinburgh
for sedition, convicted and sentenced to 14 years transportation
[Howell and Howell, 1817, col. 391-602; 603-778; 803-1012].
This was not the worst fate that could befall the radicals.
For their activities connected with organizing and publicizing a
Convention in Scotland in March 1794, Robert Watt and David
Downie were tried in Edinburgh for treason [Howell and
Howell, 1817, col. 1167-1404; Howell and Howell, 1818a, col. 1-
200]. The indictments for both were identical and included, inter
alia, the following charges: they organized a convention “for the
purpose of assuming to themselves, at such meeting, the powers
of government and legislation over this kingdom . . . and of sub-
verting and altering the rule and government” and they “com-
posed, printed, published and dispersed certain malicious,
wicked, and treasonable papers, and addresses” [Howell and
Howell, 1817, col. 1186-1187]. Both were convicted and sen-
tenced to death, and executed in October 1794.
In 1793 LCS member Joseph Gerrald wrote a pamphlet
called A Convention the Only Means of Saving Us From Ruin,
and in January 1794 the LCS held a meeting at which a number
of resolutions were passed. One of these resolutions was initi-
ated at the suggestion of John Thelwall, radical lecturer, poet
and pamphleteer. The resolution promoted the idea of a “Gen-
eral Convention of the People”. A few months later the LCS
circulated a letter among the various reform societies inviting
them to join a “British Convention”. Some expressed reluctance
to attend, but others, in particular the Sheffield Constitutional
Society, were keen to be involved and a joint committee of the
LCS and the SCI was set up in secret to organize it. Fearing that
such a Convention might result in an “anti-Parliament”, the gov-
ernment was forced to act and in May 1794 suspended Habeas
Corpus. The leading reformers, including Thomas Hardy, John
Thelwall and John Horne Tooke, a founder of the SCI, were
arrested and charged with treason. In October, November and
December 1794 their respective treason trials took place at the
Old Bailey [Howell and Howell, 1818a, col. 200-1384; Howell
and Howell, 1818b, col. 1-748; Howell and Howell, 1818b, col.
748]. As the defendants were charged under the same statutory
provisions as those convicted of treason in Scotland earlier in
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the year, the government must have been reasonably confident
of further convictions. The Act in question, dating back to Ed-
ward III, said treason took place “when a man doth compass or
imagine the death of our lord the king” [Barrell, 1992, p. 122].
From this the prosecution would argue that any threat to order
and stability, in other words a threat to the authority of the king,
would oblige the king to resist which might result in his death –
thus the defendant would be guilty of “constructive treason”.
This was so regardless of whether there was any actual evidence
of an intention to kill the king. In a surprising result Thelwall,
Hardy, and Horne Tooke, represented by the Whig lawyer Tho-
mas Erskine, were found not guilty [Howell and Howell, 1818a,
col. 1384; Howell and Howell, 1818b, col. 743, 748]. In Horne
Tooke’s case the jury took only eight minutes to reach their
verdict. Clearly then, the courts, or rather the jury system, could
not be relied upon to enforce the law in the manner envisaged
by the government. Further legislative measures were necessary
to bolster the state’s control over the reform movement whose
inflammatory views were disseminated through the press. To
silence one would have the effect of silencing the other.
The Treason and Sedition Acts: During 1795 the LCS organized
several public meetings in London where crowds gathered to
hear radical speakers advocate political reform. One such meet-
ing, in October 1795 in Copenhagen Fields, is said to have
brought together 100,000 people. Government concern about
radical activity heightened, and the result was the enactment in
December 1795 of two pieces of legislation with the aim of
stamping out radicalism [Dickinson, 1995, p. 248; O’Gorman,
1997, p. 246]. The Treason Act provided that: “if any person or
persons whatsoever . . . shall . . . compass, imagine, invent, de-
vise, or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending
to death or destruction, maim, or wounding, imprisonment or
restraint, of the person of . . . the King . . . in order, by force or
constraint, to compel him . . . to change his . . . measures or
counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon, or to
intimidate, or overawe, both houses, or either house of parlia-
ment; being legally convicted thereoef shall be deemed . . . to be
a traitor . . . and shall suffer pain of death” [36 Geo III c.7,
Preamble].20 Thus treason was now even more clearly defined by
20 The long title is “An act for the safety and preservation of his Majesty’s
person and government against treasonable and seditious practices and at-
tempts”.
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statute to include any criticism of government or king.
The Seditious Meetings Act required advance notice to be
published of any meetings of more than 50 people [36 Geo III
c.8, Preamble].21 The Act also provided, with no reference to
qualifying numbers in this instance, that all venues (including
fields) had to be licensed where reformist type meetings were
held “for the purpose of raising or collecting money” [ibid]. The
latter section applied to such venues whether they were to be
used for the purpose of reformist meetings alone, or whether
they were used for other purposes where an admittance fee was
payable [36 Geo III c.8, XII]. Beedell [1993, p. 811] comments
that the LCS was the main target of the two Acts of 1795.
Seditious Libel: Another tactic of the government to silence criti-
cism was to prosecute authors, printers and publishers for sedi-
tious libel, a common law crime. Seditious libel became notori-
ous during the 18th century as a means of censorship, and it
had a very direct effect on authors, printers, and publishers. The
notoriety set in at the beginning of the century with the case of
R v Tutchin in 1704 when Chief Justice Holt held that: “If people
should not be called to account for possessing the people with
an ill opinion of the government, no government can subsist.
For it is very necessary for all governments that the people
should have a good opinion of it” [Howell, 1812, col. 1128]. This
approach covered anything negative said about the government,
and removed from the jury any decision as to whether or not the
statement was in fact seditious. In the first place all the jury had
to do was to determine whether or not the defendant had pub-
lished the material in question, “published” having a wide mean-
ing including circulating and selling.
Secondly, the jury had to decide whether or not the pub-
lished words meant what the prosecution said they meant, the
prosecution having already decided that the meaning, however
innocuous, was seditious based on the broad formulation in
Tutchin [Lubasz, 1958, p. 454; Siebert, 1965, pp. 381-382]. This
approach was further honed in favor of the prosecution in the
middle of the century, particularly by the Solicitor-General Will-
iam Murray, who in respect of the case of R v Owen (1752) said:
“The question is, whether the jury are satisfied that the defen-
dant Owen published the pamphlet? The rest follows of course.
21 The long title is “An act for the effectually preventing seditious meetings
and assemblies”.
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If the fact is proved, the libel proves itself, sedition, disturbance
&c” [Howell, vol. XVIII 1813, col. 1222]. In that case the jury, in
complete disregard of the direction from the presiding judge
(Chief Justice Lee), brought in a verdict of not guilty. When
Murray, later Lord Mansfield, became Chief Justice he was able
to put his assessment of the law of seditious libel as a direction
to the jury from the bench, with varying success as most juries
remained rebellious. The situation was not resolved until Fox’s
Libel Act was passed in 1792. This was “An act to remove doubts
respecting the functions of juries in cases of libel” and contained
the wording, “the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general
verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter . . . and
shall not be required or directed . . . to find the defendant or
defendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication . . . of
the paper charged to be a libel” [32 Geo III c.60, Preamble].
During the 1790s Pitt frequently resorted to seditious libel
as a blunt instrument against the reform movement. Fox’s Libel
Act made little apparent difference to Pitt’s enthusiasm for the
action, and it was used against radical speakers as well as those
in any way involved in the distribution of radical publications.
Handing out an anti-war handbill led to a conviction and three
months imprisonment for a Leicester schoolmaster. A bill-
sticker for the LCS was also prosecuted, as were the printers and
proprietors of various newspapers and pamphlets, and a num-
ber of radical speakers [Emsley, 1981, pp. 157-158]. One printer,
Daniel Isaac Eaton, was prosecuted several times in 1793, the
first time for having published Paine’s Second Part of the Rights
of Man and the second time for publishing Paine’s Letter Ad-
dressed to the Addressers. While he was found guilty of “publish-
ing”, the jury would not say whether the material was libelous
so he escaped sentencing. Later that year he started publishing a
weekly radical pamphlet originally called Hog’s Wash; or a
Salmagundy for Swine, but then known as Politics for the People.
At the end of 1793 Eaton was charged again for two articles, one
written by Thelwall, published in Politics for the People. Eaton
was acquitted at his trial in February 1794 [Howell and Howell,
1817, col. 1013-1054]. Eaton was unstoppable; he published ac-
counts of his trials, he published materials for the LCS, he pub-
lished controversial pamphlets, and he continued publishing
Politics of the People. Although Eaton went underground follow-
ing two convictions in 1796 for publishing seditious writings, his
work continued. In 1797 it seemed he would be prosecuted
again, for publishing Paine’s Age of Reason, but this time he fled
to Philadelphia [McCue, 1978, p. 43].
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The government was hard pressed from all sides, Harvest
failures in 1794 and 1795 caused serious food shortages in 1795
and 1796, which in turn led to widespread rioting [Emsley,
1989, p. 212]. The naval mutinies that took place in 1797 have
already been mentioned. What the government was not to know
at the time, however, was that its tactics against the reform
movement were effective, and after 1795 radicalism went under-
ground and largely declined. Although Hardy, Thelwall and
Horne Tooke had been acquitted in 1794, Hardy then left the
LCS, and political activity, and the trials put the LCS in a great
deal of debt [O’Gorman, 1997, pp. 246-248; Parssinen, 1973, p.
514.]. The enactment in 1795 of the Treason Act and the Sedi-
tious Meetings Act marked the end of all but the most persistent
of the radical publications, and the end of the large public meet-
ings.
Propaganda, Both Radical and Loyal: As for newspapers, by 1792
the press in England had already established itself as a method
of communicating news and information to all classes of citi-
zens. One of the reasons for increasing the newspaper stamp
duty in 1789 was apparently Pitt’s desire to hinder the press in
this regard [Fox Bourne, 1887, p. 244]. Types of publications
included newspapers, pamphlets (some of which were really
small books), ballad sheets and cartoons [Black, 2002, p. 179].22
Through these media, George III and his government had been
openly criticized for their policies during the American crisis,
and later the press, and in particular the radical press, informed
the population about developments in the French Revolution
[Dickinson, 1995, p. 88]. Across England radical newspapers
proliferated in the early 1790s, such as the Manchester Herald,
the Sheffield Register, The Cabinet (produced in Norwich), the
Leicester Herald, and the Derby Mercury. Pamphlets were also
produced in profusion, the most influential of which was Paine’s
Rights of Man which had great popular appeal. William
Godwin’s 1793 publication Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
was influential among a more intellectual readership [ibid., pp.
241-242].
However, the propaganda did not only emanate from the
radicals. As well as Reflections on the Revolution in France
(1790) Edmund Burke criticized the French Revolution in
Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796). Arthur Young was similarly
22 For an example of such a cartoon, aptly directed in this instance at the
newspaper tax, see Adams [1993, p. 348].
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concerned about the effects of the French Revolution in The
Example of France, A Warning to Britain (1793). The loyal asso-
ciations put their pro-government views equally forcefully in
pamphlets and in newspapers such as The True Briton, The
Oracle and The Sun. The Cheap Repository Tracts (1795-98) writ-
ten by the loyalist Hannah More had a huge circulation
[Dickinson, 1977, p. 291; O’Gorman, 1997, p. 245]. The govern-
ment itself funded and circulated pamphlets, for example the
£175 to a Portsmouth printer for 22,000 copies of Strictures on
Thomas Paine’s Works and Character in the early 1790s, and the
£20 in 1793 to William Waldegrave for “printing songs for the
Fleet” [Aspinall, 1949, p. 153].23
Black [2002, p. 178] makes the noteworthy point that the
“pursuit of profit” by newspapers should not be overlooked, and
“[i]t was crucial to the press that politics was profitable: the
public was willing to pay for political news, speculation and
discussion and this both set the parameters for newspaper de-
velopment and helped provide its dynamic”. Factors affecting
profitability were those already mentioned, such as prosecutions
for seditious libel with the associated legal fees and fines if con-
victed, and increases in the cost of production including any rise
in the stamp duties payable.
Regulation of Newspapers: Further impositions on the printing
industry and on the Stamp Office were soon to follow. In 1798
legislation was enacted “for preventing the mischiefs arising
from the printing and publishing newspapers and papers of a
like nature, by persons not known, and for regulating the print-
ing and publication of such papers in other respects” [38 Geo III
c.78]. The Newspaper Regulation Act [Parliamentary History,
Vol. 34, 1798, col. 1485-1486], prevented the printing or publish-
ing of “newspapers or other papers containing public news or
intelligence or serving the purpose of a newspaper” without
prior delivery of an affidavit or affirmation to the commission-
ers of stamps. The affidavit or affirmation was to specify the
“real and true names, additions, descriptions, and places of
abode of all and every person or persons, who is and are
intended to be the printer or printers, publisher or publishers,
of the newspaper or other paper”. Proprietors were also to
be named, together with their ownership shares in the news-
papers and details of the title of the newspaper and the place of
23 The quote, cited by Aspinall, is from PRO H.O. 42/49.
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printing [38 Geo III c.78, Preamble, II]. Further affidavits or
affirmations were required whenever a change of abode oc-
curred or at the request of the commissioners of stamps. Where
papers were published in the absence of an affidavit or affirma-
tion, a penalty of £100 could be imposed on each occasion. The
penalty for false or imperfect affidavits or affirmations was set
as equivalent to that for willful and corrupt perjury [ibid., VII,
VIII].
In addition to notifying the commissioners of stamps, news-
papers were also required to contain “the true and real names”
and places of abode of the printer(s) and publisher(s) and the
place of printing, failure to do so attracting a penalty of £100
[ibid., X]. With effect from 1 July 1798, the printer or publisher
of every newspaper or like paper was required to deliver to the
commissioners of stamps, within six days, a signed copy of the
paper. The penalty for failure to do so was also £100 [ibid.,
XVII]. Interestingly, the commissioners of stamps were required
to pay the “ordinary” price for the paper.
The Newspaper Regulation Act also imposed penalties for
publication of unstamped newspapers, being £20 for every paper
not duly stamped [ibid., XVIII]. A £20 penalty also applied to
persons in possession of an unstamped paper, and sending an
unstamped paper overseas attracted a £100 penalty [ibid., XIX,
XX]. A further penalty, a hefty £500, applied where “any person,
during the continuance of the present war, shall knowingly and
wilfully, directly or indirectly, send or carry, or endeavour to
send or carry, or cause or procure to be sent or carried or do or
cause to be done, or be in any manner concerned in doing or
causing to be done, any act whatever, for or towards the sending
or carrying, or for or towards the causing and procuring to be
sent or carried, or with intent that the same should be sent or
carried, any newspaper, or other such paper . . . whether printed
upon paper stamped or not stamped, out of Great Britain into
France, Spain, or any other country not being in amity with his
Majesty, at the time of such act done or permitted to be done”
[ibid., XXI]. Any person possessing a newspaper with the inten-
tion of sending it to hostile countries could be summoned and
examined by a justice of the peace to ascertain whether they had
accomplices [ibid., XXII].
Another section dealt with the perceived threat of publica-
tion of invective allegedly having been published abroad: “And
whereas matters tending to excite hatred and contempt of the
person of his Majesty, and of the constitution and govern-
ment established in these kingdoms, are frequently published in
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newspapers or other papers, under colour of having been copied
from foreign newspapers”. Any persons printing or publishing in
England (not the whole of Great Britain) any such matter not
having previously been published overseas, was, on conviction,
to be committed to prison for between six and twelve months.
The onus of proof was on the defendant, a reversal of normal
criminal procedure [ibid., XXIV]. Finally, restrictions were
placed on the provision of stamped paper [ibid., XXVI].
The focus of the Newspaper Regulation Act, 1798 represents
a particularly interesting development, in that while it did not
affect the assessment and collection of stamp duties, it imposed
additional administrative requirements on a government depart-
ment in order to achieve aims totally unrelated to revenue col-
lection. According to Collett, “The object of these securities was
not to bring a number of the opponents of the Government to
utter grief, but to suppress all expression of discontent. Any man
who carried on printing or publishing for a livelihood was actu-
ally at the mercy of the Commissioners of Stamps, when they
chose to exert their powers” [1899, p. 14]. Unsurprisingly the
Commons debate on this legislation was acrimonious. Com-
menting on the expected negative outcome of the legislation, Mr
Jeckell said “This bill would make men of property and respon-
sibility retire from newspapers altogether, and they would then
fall into the hands of men of desperate fortune and low charac-
ter. The consequence would be an increase in stead of a diminu-
tion of the licentiousness of the press.” The Attorney General, on
the other hand, stressed that his object “was not to infringe on
the liberty of the press, but to restore it” [Parliamentary History,
Vol. 34, 1798, col. 1482].
The intention of the Act was to prevent writers and publish-
ers evading the law by remaining anonymous. This point was
made by Mr Ryder in the debate on the second reading of the
Bill: “The proprietors of newspapers were always answerable by
law; and this was only to compel them to come forward, and
abide the event of a fair trial in a court of justice” [Parliamentary
History, Vol. 34, 1798, col.1487]. It would seem that the law the
proprietors were avoiding was not so much the payment of
stamp duty on the material they were printing, although pre-
venting tax evasion would undoubtedly have been a factor be-
hind the provisions, but was more to do with the law of sedi-
tious libel, and perhaps even sedition. In terms of the censorship
effects, Sir Francis Burdett made the following rather profound
comment from the Opposition benches during the second read-
ing debate: “A direct, open, violent attack upon the liberty of the
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press, even in the actual servile condition of the public mind,
might possibly rouse some degree of energy and spirit to oppose
it; but this measure saps and undermines; and from not wearing
the garb of violence, like the silent lapse of time, is so much the
more certain in its effect” [Parliamentary History, Vol. 34, 1798,
col. 1486]. Aspinall comments on the unfairness of imprisoning
newspaper proprietors for publishing material about which they
may have known nothing. He cites the case of one Perry, propri-
etor of the Morning Chronicle, who was fined £50 and spent
three months in prison for a libel in an article which had been
included in the paper without his knowledge [Aspinall, 1949, p.
38]. If censorship by stealth was a by-product of the stamp duty
on newspapers, these regulations were also equally censorship
in their effect.
In 1799 an act was passed with the primary objective of
suppressing the activities of societies such as the LCS, which,
amongst others, was named specifically [39 Geo III, c.79].24 The
Act reinforced the Seditious Meetings Act of 1795 by providing
that “Every place of lecturing, debating, or reading, for the pur-
pose of raising money, to be deemed disorderly, unless previ-
ously licensed”. This included every place where pamphlets,
newspapers and other publications were read, such as coffee
houses. The penalty was £20 for each offence [ibid., XV]. Every
place licensed for the sale of alcohol was deemed to be licensed
also for the reading of books, pamphlets and other publications,
but would lose the license if one of the proscribed societies held
a meeting there [ibid., XIV, XXI].25
One of the principal thrusts of the 1799 Act was to restrict
publications emanating from such societies. Now the onus was
put on printers, and every person who owned a printing press,
to give notice to the local clerk of the peace who, in turn, would
issue a certificate costing one shilling. The clerk of the peace
was then required to file the notice and send a copy to the
Secretary of State. The penalty for using an uncertified printing
press was £20 [ibid., XXIII]. These provisions applied the same
penalty for those carrying on business as letter founders, and
those who made or sold types for printing, or printing presses.
These persons also had to keep an account in writing of anyone
to whom letter types for printing, or printing presses, were sold.
24 The long title is “An act for the more effectual suppression of societies
established for seditious and treasonable purposes; and for better preventing
treasonable and seditious practices”.
25 See also Aspinall [1949, pp. 39-40].
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These accounts were to be produced for any justice of the peace
on demand [ibid., XXV, XXVI]. The name and address of the
printer had to be printed on “any paper or book whatsoever”
produced (regardless of whether it was to be sold or given
away), and in addition, the printer had to keep a copy of every
such publication and to write on it the name and address of the
person who had employed them to print it. This went further
than the 1798 Act which applied only to newspapers. The pen-
alty for non-compliance was £20 [ibid., XXVII, XXIX]. Anyone
selling, giving away (or even merely leaving exposed to public
view) a printed paper without the name and address of the
printer on it, or a carrying fictitious name and address, was to
be taken before a justice to determine whether they had
breached the Act.
It was against the tumultuous background outlined above
that the various statutes relating to the press were passed in the
late 1790s, starting with the increase in 1797 of the stamp duty
on newspapers. Seen together with the range of overt attacks on
press freedom in the form of the trials for seditious libel and
newspaper regulation legislation, the increase in the newspaper
stamp duty logically forms part of this thrust. Certainly this is
the way it has been portrayed in various historical studies of the
press.
THE 1797 INCREASES IN NEWSPAPER STAMP DUTY
As part of the 1797 budget, the Prime Minister, Pitt, an-
nounced a number of tax increases. During the Commons de-
bate in April 1797, Pitt, who was also Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, expressed his anxiety over the selection of appropriate
objects for taxation. He said, “In the confidence, however, which
I have in the resources of the nation, I am not without anxiety,
as to the choice which I may make of fit objects of further
taxation. In the selection of those objects, I have been activated
by the desire of making them fall as lightly as possible on the
great sources of national industry and on the lower orders of
people” [Parliamentary History, Vol. 33, 1797, col. 423].26 Pitt
targeted stamp duties generally as being preferable as a source
26 It must be noted that reliance on published accounts of parliamentary
speeches at this time is hazardous. While reporters were allowed access to the
debates, they were not allowed to write anything down, and relays of reporters
attended parliament and then later wrote their recollections for publication.
Ministers were often also allowed access to their speeches prior to publication
for judicious editing. See Barker [2000, p. 91] for some examples.
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of taxation on the basis that they were “easily raised, widely
diffused”, and “pressed little against any one particular class,
especially the lower orders of society, and at the same time . . .
was ample, was safely and expeditiously collected at a small
expense” [ibid., col. 432]. In this he was echoing the views of a
number of eminent commentators including Davenant and
Adam Smith as noted earlier. He proposed the greatest increase
to apply to consolidated stamp duties, that is those applicable to
a range of different instruments and which had not been in-
creased for some years, but also proposed an increase in the
newspaper stamp duty, anticipating “a great deal of discussion
out of doors” on this issue [ibid., col. 433].
For Pitt newspapers were to be considered as an item of
luxury, and the newspaper stamp duty might “fairly be con-
verted into an additional source of revenue without hurting the
proprietors or editors, and without any oppression to the com-
munity” [ibid., col. 433-434]. The stamp duty on newspapers at
the time was two pence, and most papers had an issue price of
four pence. The increase proposed by Pitt, which was eventually
imposed [37 Geo III c.90, II, III], was one penny halfpenny. This
he suggested would produce £114,000 per annum in additional
revenue. Bearing in mind that the original duty was one penny
for a sheet of paper, increased by one halfpenny in 1757 and
another one halfpenny in 1789, this increase was substantial in
relation to the price of newspapers which could be expected to
increase to sixpence halfpenny.
Pitt was concerned, however, that “the public should derive
all the advantage of an addition to the price” [ibid] and so of-
fered a discount to those newspapers sold for sixpence or less
which only increased the price by the amount of the duty [37
Geo III c.90, XXXIII]. If priced at more than sixpence and the
proprietors could satisfy the commissioners of stamps that the
paper had been sold for more than four pence halfpenny for at
least three months before the passing of this Act, the discount
still applied, providing the increase was no more than the duty
[ibid., XXXIV]. The discount, set at 16%, was also available to
those paying £10 or more in duty at any one time [ibid., XXXV].
The old discount of 4% was still available to those who failed to
keep their price at sixpence or below [ibid., XXXVII]. The old
discount was introduced in 1789 to compensate proprietors for
no longer being able to return unsold papers and receive a re-
fund of the duty, a provision which was being abused [29 Geo
III c.50, VII, VIII]. The amount was arbitrary, to represent lost
or damaged papers.
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The Opposition, as was usually the case, interpreted the
increase in stamp duty on newspapers as an attack on press
freedom. Mr Sheridan described the taxes as “frivolous and
vexatious” and predicted that they would “prove oppressive and
unproductive” [Parliamentary History, Vol. 33, 1797, col. 441].
He regarded the tax on newspapers “as a vital blow struck at the
liberty of the press . . . by putting the information conveyed in
them at a price beyond the reach of the majority of the public”
[ibid.]. While the government justified the tax as being on an
item of luxury, Sheridan scathingly retorted: “was the dismal
catalogue of miseries which they now contained a luxury to
those by whom they were read?” He further said that the tax
would have the effect of destroying cheap publications “for the
instruction or information of the public”, implying that this was
an ulterior motive of the government. Despite the Opposition’s
protests, the legislation was passed and the stamp duty on news-
papers was raised to three pence halfpenny per half sheet or
sheet. The pamphlet duty remained unchanged at two shillings.
Other luxury items were targeted in the same Act [37 Geo
III, c.90]. Duties on gold and silver plate, either imported or
made in Great Britain, were increased. The management of
these duties was at the same time imposed on the commissioner
of stamp duties, thereby adding to the burdens of this office [37
Geo III c.90, XVI, XVII, XVIII]. The stamp duties on certain
deeds were also increased. These included, for example, bonds,
bills of lading, passports, copies of wills and copies of deeds
[ibid., Preamble]. Further examples of raising taxes on luxury
items can be seen in 35 Geo III c.10 (passed in March 1795)
which increased the duty on foreign wine and fortified wine, 35
Geo III c.12 (passed in March 1795) which increased the duty on
foreign spirits, 35 Geo III c.13 (passed in March 1795) which
increased the duty on tea, coffee and cocoa nuts (for chocolate)
and 37 Geo III c.14 (passed in December 1796) which increased
the duties on auctions, bricks, cocoa nuts, British and foreign
spirits and tea (again).
Aside from Opposition rhetoric which castigated the in-
crease in newspaper stamp duty as infringing the freedom of the
press, no mention was made in the parliamentary debates of this
being in any way a motivation for the increase. On the contrary,
the stated aim of the Prime Minister was to raise additional
funds without imposing additional burdens on the poor. Yet the
portrayal of the increase in the stamp duty as being part of an
overt attack on press freedom is consistently argued in many
histories of the press.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
It can be seen from the foregoing account of the economic,
social and political events of the 1790s that the government was
besieged with difficulties, some of which threatened to destabi-
lize the very nature of British society. The dissemination of anti-
government propaganda by radicals and the activities of radical
societies were the focus of the destabilization. It was natural
that as a means of self-protection, and to preserve the political
system as it was, the government should seek to curtail what it
considered as the excesses of the reform movement. At the same
time an expensive war was being fought, with the concomitant
need for revenue raising. In relation to curbing the excesses of
radicalism, including the dissemination of propaganda, this pa-
per has demonstrated that there were many ways in which this
was achieved in the 1790s. These varied from the trials and
subsequent execution of radicals for treason, to trials for sedi-
tion and seditious libel. Even when recalcitrant juries refused to
convict, the effect was to increase the concern of the govern-
ment about the hold the radicals had on society. Another way to
curb radical opposition was by statute, and a raft of legislation
passed during the 1790s attempted to kill off the reform move-
ment.
Of the situation after the 1799 Act Collet [1899, p. 16] said:
“the Newspaper Stamp had now been imposed for eighty seven
years, and Parliament had come to consider every printer as the
raw material of a traitor”. In fact the newspaper stamp had
nothing to do with the 1799 Act, and it is misleading of Collet to
marry the two in the same sentence. It is noteworthy from this
comment, and the earlier one with respect to the 1798 Act, that
Collet apparently amalgamated the newspaper stamp duty and
the two later Acts. Although he had a lot to say about the 1798
and 1799 legislation, he is unusually silent on the specifics of the
1797 increases in newspaper stamp duty. To roll the three stat-
utes together as Collet does, supports his argument that the
newspaper stamp was foremost a censorship mechanism.
As noted earlier, Collet, as Secretary of the Association for
the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge, had his own agenda. At
the start of his chapter entitled “The Newspaper Stamp”, Collet
made a brief reference to the economic reasons behind the in-
troduction of the duty in 1712, but the remainder of the chapter
concentrates solely on the censorship aspects [1899, pp. 8-23]. A
reading of the three statutes, however, shows clearly that the
focus of the 1797 Act was entirely different from the later two.
131
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2004, Vol. 31, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2004
123Oats and Sadler: Political Suppression or Revenue Raising?
The newspaper stamp duty increase was just one of many in-
creases in stamp duty included in the 1797 Act, among many
other tax increases in that same year. The overriding impression
is that the function of that Act was to raise revenue, whereas the
function of the later two Acts was to “prevent the mischiefs
arising from the printing and publishing newspapers” and “for
the better preventing treasonable and seditious practices” [38
Geo III c.78; 39 Geo III, c.79].
Brewer [1989, p. 72] suggests that the view of 18th century
administration as corrupt and inept was initiated by 19th cen-
tury reformers who misrepresented the extent of corruption in
the interests of a reform campaign. We argue similarly that the
view of the newspaper stamp duty as an abhorrent tax on knowl-
edge was initiated by the campaign for its abolition and perpetu-
ated by subsequent historians. Collet’s comments on the late
1790s, are quoted by Maynard Salmon in her chapter entitled
“Taxes on Knowledge”. Maynard Salmon [1923, p. 187] made no
comment about the need for Parliament to raise revenue to fund
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Maynard Salmon’s
views are clearly biased as her work is tellingly entitled, and her
sympathies lie with the press. Holmes [1967, p. 32] and Will-
iams [1948, p. 553] comment respectively, “ . . . the imposition of
a stamp duty of a penny a sheet in 1712 underlined official
concern at the enormous potential power of the pen in a divided
society” and “The intention of the Act was the suppression of
libels”. Smith [1979, p. 58] says “All official efforts to control the
press centred upon special taxes which began with the Stamp
Act of 1712, designed to curb production and confine circula-
tions while providing revenue for further government activity in
the press.”27 Seibert [1952, p. 309] says that it appears that the
principle objective was the control of “licentious schismatical
and scandalous publications” and further that by diminishing
profitability, publishers would be more “amenable to ministerial
control” [1952, p. 312]. Even the eminent sociologist Jurgen
Habermas, in his analysis of the public sphere, refers to the
British newspaper stamp duty as a tax on knowledge [1989, p.
59, fn 7].
This is not to say that all historians accept without question
the predominance of the censorship motive for the newspaper
stamp duty. Wiles [1965, p. 18], for example, offers a different
perspective:
27 See also Fox Bourne [1887, pp. 80-81]; Cranfield [1962, p. 39] and Dagnall
[1994, p. 30].
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It is easy to exaggerate the blighting effects of the Act
for laying several Duties upon all Sope and Paper . . .
and upon certain printed Papers, Pamphlets, and Ad-
vertisements . . . Those who have deplored the
government’s lack of wisdom and foresight in imposing
what they call a “tax on knowledge” have said nothing
about the equally discouraging consequences of the tax
on washing. It is still commonly asserted that the tax
was imposed in order to suppress adverse criticism of
the government; but surely the main intention was to
raise money. A government does not stamp out libel by
making people pay a little more for their newspapers,
any more than it stops people from smoking tobacco or
drinking beer by taxing these commodities.
Certainly in the 1790s, the tax on newspapers was a minor
vehicle compared with the other means of censorship for the
government. Nonetheless, the conclusion seems inescapable that
the stamp duty was used to some extent as a supplementary
mechanism for placing fetters on the liberty of the press, and
certainly this is the interpretation that the Opposition benches
placed on the increases. However, it is a mistake, in some in-
stances perhaps a deliberate mistake, for later commentators to
conclude that this was the only reason for increases in stamp
duty. It must be remembered (just as was the case when the
newspaper taxes were first introduced in 1712) that this was
also a period of enormous revenue needs to fund military activ-
ity. The tax was one of many introduced or increased over the
course of the wars and it is equally possible that the main moti-
vation for the increases in 1797 were purely fiscal. This is par-
ticularly evidenced by Pitt’s acknowledged sympathy for the
views of Adam Smith and his desire that the 1797 increase in
newspaper stamp duty might “fairly be converted into an addi-
tional source of revenue without hurting the proprietors or edi-
tors, and without any oppression to the community” [Parliamen-
tary History, Vol. 33, 1797, col. 433-434]. That this was not
entirely political rhetoric was demonstrated by the discount in
the legislation to keep the price of newspapers stable.
In analyzing this specific instance of an increase in tax dur-
ing the period immediately before the introduction of income
tax, we have highlighted the importance of contextual analysis
coupled with use of primary sources to illuminate contemporary
discourse. This methodology has enabled us to establish that
there was more than one motive behind the increase in the
newspaper stamp tax in 1797. In addition, we have shown that
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the desire to impose censorship on the press, often assumed to
be the main factor behind the increase, may in fact have been
subsidiary to another more urgent need at the time - revenue
raising.
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Abstract: Britain forbade her 18th-century American colonies to set
up mints, and sent no supplies of her own coins. In consequence, the
colonies were without any official money. Account books of the per-
iod reveal how traders fared in this unusual situation. They show that
the lack of money was a severe handicap that hindered and distorted
trade, but that the colonists to some extent overcame it with the aid
of ingenious ledger entries. These culminated in payment by credit
transfers in the books of third parties. Such transactions lead to a
discussion of the nature of money.
INTRODUCTION
The 18th century account books of Britain’s overseas colo-
nies are immensely interesting because they depict societies that
had no official money. Britain forbade her colonies to set up
their own mints; and British coins brought in by new colonists
were soon sent home to pay for imports. A good selection of
account books — of city merchants and country store-keepers —
has been preserved by university libraries, historical societies,
etc., on the east coast of North America, and at British universi-
ties.1 This article is based on a survey of such books, whose wide
provenance seems to make them reliable evidence.
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1 William and Mary College (N. Boog’s Ledger), Maryland Historical Society
(Ridgeley’s Ledger), New York Historical Society (Wendell’s Ledger), New York
Public Library (Harvey’s and Fowle’s Ledgers), Yale Library (Peck’s Ledger and
Lyman’s Journal), Rhode Island Historical Society (Jenkins’ Daybook and
Brown’s Ledger), the Essex Institute (Stratton’s and Parker’s Ledgers), Harvard
Business School (the Henchman Journals and Ledgers, and the Hancock Jour-
nals); some West Indian accounts are to be found in British universities —
Pinney’s Ledger at Bristol, and the Nevis Ledger at the London School of Eco-
nomics.
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The accounts show that the lack of official coins was a se-
vere handicap, but that the colonists yet managed to carry on
lively trade. To help with this, they enlisted some ingenious ac-
counting devices — and indeed (as we shall see) used account-
ing entries as a semi-substitute for money. This article sets out
in some detail the methods that the colonists used to make pay-
ments and give barter flexibility.
Despite the lack of official coin, the word ‘cash’ appears not
infrequently in the accounts. The article describes the various
forms that ‘cash’ may have taken.
The standard histories of North America have accepted that
the money shortage was real and acute. But recent works have
questioned that view. In a brief digression, this article looks at
the rival arguments, and concludes that the account books sup-
port the older histories.
Study of this subject must lead on to speculation about the
nature of money. How should we define it, and can bartered
goods sometimes be deemed money?
HISTORIANS’ DISPUTE OVER MONEY SHORTAGE
Historians long accepted that the colonies were troubled by
a shortage of money. Thus they quoted 18th century colonial
writers who told of “a universal want of money” [Davis, 1900, p.
60]; “coin did not circulate more than six months before it was
gathered up and remitted to England”; at times, the scarcity was
“almost incredible. . . . were the country people ever so willing,
nay were it to redeem their lives, they cannot now raise money”
[Nettels, 1934, pp. 13, 206].
But recently scholars have begun to question this tradi-
tional view of shortage, and to suggest that it may be exagger-
ated. Their arguments, which tend perhaps to be based more on
general reasoning than contemporary evidence, run somewhat
as follows. As the world’s money stock could move without
undue restrictions, the colonies must have had their share; mar-
ket forces would equalize prices and exchange rates every-
where; the colonists’ shortages were sporadic (Perkins, 1988, p.
165). The colonies’ 18th century statistics show that the velocity
of money was not much lower than in Britain, so the quantity
of money must have been adequate [McCusker, 1979 p. 336].
The New Englanders could offset most of their deficit on cur-
rent account with bullion got from trade with the West Indies,
and with earnings from freight and the sale of their ships; any
balance was probably covered by Britain’s remittances for the
139
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2004, Vol. 31, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2004
131Baxter: Observations on Money, Barter and Bookkeeping
upkeep of her military forces [Walton and Shepherd, 1979, p.
104].
As we shall see, the account books — faithful records of
day-to-day transactions — would seem strongly to endorse the
older historians’ views. Until at least the end of the 18th century,
the accounts tell of innumerable transactions whose nature ap-
pears to have been dictated by lack of money.
CASH
The account books have occasional entries for ‘cash’. Unfor-
tunately they tell us little about the nature of the ‘cash’. The
word did sometimes mean coins. During the 18th century, these
would in all the British colonies be of foreign origin. Thus Aus-
tralia used rupees, guilders, and Spanish dollars [Parker, 1982,
p. 48]. When the wife of a new governor at Cape Town went
shopping in 1797 she found herself handling Spanish dollars,
star pagodas (small gold coins from India), and Dutch money
[Barnard Papers, 1797, Cape Town Library]. The North Ameri-
cans made much use of silver dollars (minted in the Spanish
colonies, and obtained from lucrative trade with the West
Indies), as well as French and Portuguese coins [Middleton,
1992, p. 238]; and till about 1720, American ports eagerly wel-
comed coins from pirates, who plied as far afield as the Red Sea
[Davis, 1900, p. 87].
But ‘cash’ could also mean paper money, in whose use the
American colonies became daring pioneers soon after 1700.
Hard-pressed local governments uttered ‘bills of credit’, to be
redeemed when the year’s taxes had been collected. In time the
redemption period was stretched, and issues were made ‘pro-
miscuously’ [Davis, 1900, p. 264]. The bills were increasingly
used by private persons as means of payment; “cash here is
wholly in current bills of the province or a few Lyons dollars”
[quoted in Matson, 1998, p. 162].
The account books do not mention banks (which seemingly
did not exist in North America till the end of the 18th century).
So ‘cash’ could not mean bank deposits.
THE SHILLING
The colonists’ nominal money was a province’s shilling. But,
as there were hardly any shilling coins [Nettels, 1934, p. 204],
the shilling was a curious semi-abstraction. (Perhaps it can be
likened to Britain’s defunct guinea that was still used sometimes
as unit of value till about 1970.) Despite its shadowy nature, the
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colonists used the shilling when valuing goods, etc.; accounts
were in consequence kept in £. s. d.
When he received foreign coins, a merchant would value
them in terms of shillings (having first weighed the many defec-
tive ones on special scales [McCusker and Menard, 1979, p.
338]). The exchange rate varied with market conditions; the
dollar’s shilling price soared when provincial bills were issued
wholesale [Davis, 1900, p. 258].
THE BOOKKEEPING
The typical colonial trader kept only the bare minimum of
accounts needed by a business, that is, records of debts due to
and by him. His accounts usually consisted of an untidy ‘waste
book’, a journal, and a ledger with the traditional debit and
credit layout, and columns for the £, the shilling, and pence. But
he was apt to make entries in these books only when credit was
given. He then scribbled down the facts in the waste; later he
translated them into debits and credits in his journal, analyzing
complexities such as joint ventures, payment by a mix of means
(‘For 1⁄2 money & 1⁄2 goods’), etc.
But the colonists’ journals give a treacherous picture of the
ledger. They duly record a purchase of goods with a debit to
‘merchandise’ and a credit to the supplier; but the ledger may
have no entry in a merchandise account. Similarly they record a
sale with a debit to the buyer and a credit to merchandise — but
again there may be no merchandise entry. They record cash
payments in personal accounts but not in a cash account.
By the mid-18th century, many textbooks on accounting
were being published in Britain [Bywater, 1982, p. 148] and
some of them reached America [Kreiser, 1976, p. 77]. The colo-
nists readily absorbed the chapters on personal accounts, but
often decided that the rest did not suit their conditions. Typi-
cally they did not keep accounts for assets (save perhaps their
many joint ventures), or for income and expenses. They inter-
mingled accounts in local currency with others (for British sup-
pliers) in sterling. They did not balance off their accounts each
year. They felt no need for a profit and loss account or balance
sheet. In short, they got by with personal accounts and a slip-
shod system of single entry.
There were no doubt exceptions to the norm just described.
Thus a surviving statement from Virginia shows profit being
calculated — by comparison of opening and closing net assets
(debtors being valued at only half their value because of default
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risk) [Voke, 1926, p. 10]. Annual reports might be issued where
a firm had many owners; the ‘subscribers’ to a Williamsburg
store got two balance sheets, one for the accounts kept in ster-
ling, the other for local currency accounts [Coleman, 1974, p.
32].
The colonists’ failure to keep a cash account is perhaps at
first sight surprising. But as ‘cash’ was a bewildering medley of
foreign coins, tradesmen’s tokens, and bills of different prov-
inces and issues, aggregation would have been almost impos-
sible; to follow the textbook’s prim instructions, a trader would
have needed separate cash accounts for Spanish dollars, Portu-
guese moidores, Rhode Island bills, tobacco notes, etc.
A trader’s indifference to income figures supports Yamey’s
view that Sombart erred in ascribing the capitalist’s success to
help from accounting [Yamey, 1949, p. 36]. Many colonial capi-
talists achieved notable success with little need for ‘scientific
book-keeping’.
Because a merchant’s records show only credit transactions,
they give an incomplete view of his trade. Non-credit transac-
tions could have involved more cash than the ledgers suggest.
Some evidence is given by the records bequeathed to us by a
Connecticut store-keeper who analyzed his sales — as some 10%
‘truck’ (presumably crude barter), 60% credit, and 30% cash; so
credit here far outweighs cash [Yale Library, Stanton MSS.].
BARTER WITH CREDIT
Crude barter was still fairly common on the colonies’ fron-
tiers [Middleton, 1992, p. 238]. But the account books suggest
that city merchants seldom engaged in it. Barter brings high
transaction costs — search costs (seeking buyers, advertising
etc.), and transfer costs (moving clumsy goods, brokerage, etc.)
[Melitz, 1974, p. 57].
Mankind has found two ways to lessen these costs. The first
is use of credit. X hands over goods to Y, on the understanding
that Y will pay later. This makes barter vastly more feasible.
Credit dealings become easier if they can be proved by
records. Medieval merchants noted them on tallies [Roberts,
1956, p. 75]. The colonists made much use of account books, in
which they duly recorded credit purchases and sales. And the
account books were not only records of amounts owing; they
also became a means of payment. With little or no use of coins,
the colonist might be able — as we shall see — to settle even
complex debt with the aid of his ledger.
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Two-way Trade: ‘Bookkeeping barter’ provided an obvious form
of credit; X from time to time bought from Y, and Y likewise
bought from X (e.g. Henchman of Boston sells Bradley of Con-
necticut books, needles, Jews harps, etc., and Bradley over four
years pays with a trickle of quills, rye, and pork [Henchman,
Ledger B, p. 104, Harvard Business School]. Each man kept an
account for the other. Lengthy credit, based on face-to-face
trust, was usual; in a small community, a trader would have a
shrewd idea of his neighbors’ reliability and circumstances.
Nowadays most personal accounts are for either suppliers
or customers; an account shows goods, etc., on one side and
money on the other. In the colonists’ accounts, both sides may
show goods, with cash featuring rarely.
The accounts achieved the status of evidence when there
were legal disputes. In this respect, the colonies digressed from
English common law, which held that ‘shopbooks’ could not be
admitted as evidence. Such strict rules were brushed aside by
local colonial courts, where even the judge might have no legal
training; a party’s ledger was admitted as evidence when accom-
panied by his oath [Wootton, 2000, p. 26].
Triangular Payment: But debtor Y might not stock anything that
creditor X wanted. Then (the ledgers show) the pair could turn
to triangular dealings. Y gives X a note addressed to shopkeeper
Z, asking the latter to let X have goods worth £-; so X is satis-
fied, and Y pays with a debit to his account in Z’s ledger (see for
instance Hancock note, British Museum addl. 38 808). There
might be a somewhat different scenario: Y is owed a balance by
Z, who cannot settle (perhaps because of remoteness), so Y
sends X to collect payment. Thus a Boston merchant credits
Noble (of New York) with: “By so much ordered by Mr. Hazzard
to balance £44.11.9”, and debits Hazzard (also of New York)
with “To so much ordered to balance Mr. Nobles account - £44.
11. 9” [Henchman Ledger B, p. 152].
Triangular deals might be arranged verbally, or with the aid
of a note not unlike the modern cheque in shape. Large num-
bers of these notes have survived [see, for example, Hancock
MSS, Harvard Business School]. Perhaps they were almost as
commonplace as today’s cheques. They obviously played a sig-
nificant role in business, and should be prominent in our stud-
ies. The colonists used also bills of exchange, but mainly to pay
their overseas suppliers [Middleton, 1992, p. 238].
Triangular transactions were common in late medieval Eu-
rope [de Roover, 1944, p. 382]. Records of such credit transfers
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(kept by either of the parties) would in time evolve into two
accounting entries. This must surely help to explain how double
entry originated and came into common use. The transactions
thus seem of immense importance in the history of accounting.
Transferable Notes: A triangle could assume a more complex
shape when the note was made transferable — “please pay X or
order £- in pork” [Hancock MSS, 20 3]. Such notes might pass
through several hands, their worth depending on the drawer’s
reputation [Kreiser, 1976, p. 77], and must have acted as an
extra supply of money. Colonial courts decided (again in conflict
with English common law) that debt held by one person could
be assigned to another [Wootton, 2000, p. 26].
INTERMEDIATES
The second way in which mankind has moved on from
crude barter is by use of intermediates. A trader with type A
goods wants to exchange them for type B, whose owner will not
accept them; but a third trader will take them if allowed to pay
in type C goods; if these goods are popular and widely accept-
able, the original trader can sell his A for them, and then use
them (sooner or later) as payment for his desired purchases. C is
thus a most helpful intermediate, accepted not for its own sake
but because other persons take it readily. Its use greatly reduces
transaction costs. The American colonies used goods as interme-
diates. So these performed some functions of money, and may
properly be called commodity money.
COMMODITY MONEY
The colonial account books show that all types of traders
made much use of commodity money. There are innumerable
examples of debts being paid with goods such as tobacco, mo-
lasses, and flax; pork and beef were particular favorites. These
commodities were traded widely in the market; provinces and
towns might take them as tax payment at published rates, and
they were sometimes legal tender [Nettels, 1934, p. 209].
But commodity money must have been an inconvenient
form of intermediary. It was often bulky and heavy, and so costs
of transport and storage might eat away its value. Some types
(notably beef) were apt to deteriorate [Middleton, 1992, p. 238].
The goods’ quality and shilling value had to be agreed by the two
parties (disputes being settled by arbitrators such as church-
wardens [Nettels, 1934, p. 211]. If there was a glut of (say)
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wheat, its value dropped, and creditors suffered; if there was a
bad harvest, its value rose, and debtors suffered [Nettels, 1934,
p. 211]. And debtors were prone to palm off their worst prod-
ucts, so that (as Gresham warns) circulating money might be of
poor quality [Nussbaum, 1957, p. 4].
Perhaps a city merchant could hardly distinguish between
commodity money (which he planned to pass on with perhaps
little or no gain or loss) and his main stock-in-trade. When for
instance his country customers settled their accounts by sending
him wheat, presumably this was commodity money if he in-
tended it for creditors, but stock-in-trade if he loaded it on his
ships in hope of profitable sale in the ‘sugar islands’. As with
cash, the colonists seldom recorded commodity money in asset
accounts. A trader’s textbooks told him to debit receipts of each
type of goods to a separate account [Mair, 1793, p. 134]; but he
sensibly decided it was pointless to keep records of transient
holdings of beef, pelts, etc.
BOOK TRANSFERS
An important type of intermediary is illustrated in the led-
ger of a Trinidad planter:
D. Morgan
To so much discounted with
J. A. Jacob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . £x
J. A. Jacob
By your assumpsit to D. Morgan . . . £x
[Trinidad Ledger, London School of Economics]. ‘To discount’
was to deduct or offset. An ‘assumpsit’ was ‘a taking upon one-
self’.
Here the story probably is that Morgan was pressed for
payment by Jacob, but lacked cash. The ledger owner Z had
dealings with both men. Morgan asked him to intervene with a
transfer from his Jacob account to his Morgan account. If the
transfer were arranged with a written note, it would run some-
what as:
Z. Please pay to your humble servant or
discount with J. A. Jacob £-.
D. Morgan
Thus the ledger keeper acted like the modern banker who is
presented with a cheque. Debt was settled by book entries, with
no other assets changing hands.
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Such book transfers appear fairly often in the ledgers. A
Colonial town may apparently be viewed as a place without
banks, but where merchants — perhaps for no reason save to
maintain friendly relations — acted like bankers by switching
credit in their accounts. Book credit thus acted as an intermedi-
ary. It was an obvious precursor of today’s great intermediary,
money, in such forms as bank credit.
MINOR PAYMENTS
We can only speculate on how debt was remembered by
people outside the ledger-keeping class. Perhaps shopkeepers
kept a slate for each debtor, and promissory notes were com-
mon. Wages could be paid with ‘shop notes’: employer Y would
give laborer X an order for goods from shopkeeper Z. (If Y and
Z were unscrupulous, an embittered laborer X would be charged
perhaps 25% above normal prices, Z paying Y a commission
[Davis, 1900, p. 378].
Small foreign coins such as the ‘bit’ — an eighth of a dollar
(the ‘piece of eight’) — were sometimes available [Nettels, 1934,
p. 170]; these could no doubt serve as payment for petty ex-
penses. And governments increasingly helped by issuing parch-
ment bills with denominations as low as a penny [Davis, 1900, p.
148].
MONEY
Intermediate commodities must surely be included in most
definitions of money. No doubt payment is more acceptable in
the form of official currency; but an intermediate still performs
some of money’s functions even when it takes less convenient
forms.
Money has been defined by economists as e.g. a claim
[Boulding, 1941, p. 258] or promise [Hicks 1946, p. 168], it is
generally acceptable, and — Jevons told us — functions as me-
dium of exchange, measure of value, store of value, and stan-
dard for deferred payments. Melitz persuasively adds means of
payment [1974, p. 8]. Commodity money certainly acted as
means of payment, however clumsily.
The non-existent shilling was a curious form of intermedi-
ary. The lack of a coin must have greatly lessened its usefulness.
But presumably it served not only as value unit but also as an
indication of payment quantity; a promise to pay twenty shil-
lings was really a promise to pay dollars, notes, or merchandise
worth twenty shillings at current rates.
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CONCLUSION
The old ledgers bear ample witness to the scarcity of money
(and thus support the older school of historians). They show
how they themselves enabled the colonists to overmaster the
scarcity: bookkeeping let trade thrive. The ledgers emphasize the
two ways in which barter has been modified — first by the
addition of credit, and second by use of intermediaries (in par-
ticular, book credit in third parties’ accounts, which was thus a
precursor of today’s bank credit).
Further research might find interesting additional ways in
which the colonists used bookkeeping to counter the shortage of
coins.
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Abstract: The accounts of the Hasbrouck family help document how
five generations adapted to economic and social change in New
York’s mid-Hudson River valley from the time of settlement in the
New World through the Civil War era. The accounts of these farmers
and merchants illuminate the role that accounting played during a
period when the key information provided by the accounting system
was the balance in an individual’s account. Personified ledger ac-
counts not only characterized the organizational structure in tight-
knit communities, but were essential in facilitating trade during a
period when the shortage of cash made asynchronous exchanges and
the use of commodity money prevalent.
INTRODUCTION
Accounting history has tended to focus primarily on the
records of large firms and on cultural practices, rather than on
the ordinary accounts of individuals and small family busi-
nesses. Such ordinary accounts were usually kept for personal
and family reasons, rather than to satisfy external users or part-
ners, and are often among the few surviving records that help us
document daily life in the community in which they were
created. They contribute to improving our understanding of
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business and accounting practices in the past, and provide in-
sight into the financial success or failure of individuals and
families [Vollmers and Bay, 2001, pp. 43-45]. Investigation of
the role of accounting in agrarian societies, where the home was
also the primary site of productive activity, should not be ne-
glected. In fields such as history, economics and philosophy, the
home as a sphere of influence has received attention, and ac-
counting for family endeavors is equally deserving of academic
scrutiny [Walker and Llewellyn, 2000, pp. 427, 429, 433].
Jean Hasbrouck was one of twelve partners who obtained a
patent in 1677 for lands at New Paltz, New York.1 Fleeing reli-
gious persecution, these French Huguenots immigrated to the
mid-Hudson River valley during the late 17th century. In
France, the Hasbroucks had generally been merchants and pros-
perous businessmen, and in America this family tradition con-
tinued, providing an example of the entrepreneurial spirit in
colonial America [Perkins, 1989, pp. 169-170]. A nnumber of
recently discovery late 18th century ledgers relating to
Hasbrouck family businesses, and the wealth of additional ar-
chival and secondary material related to this family provided the
principal sources for this study. These sources have been used to
trace the family’s trade and businesses from settlement in the
New World through the Civil War era, and to examine the role
that accounting played in supporting their activities.2 The ac-
counting records also give us insights into the timing of cultural
shifts that were reflected in the use of different recording lan-
guages and currencies. The Hasbrouck family lineage traced in
this paper is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
The Hasbrouck Genealogy
Name Lifespan
Jean Hasbrouck died in 1714
Jacob Hasbrouck 1688 - 1761
Jacob J. Hasbrouck (Jacob, Jr.) 1727 - 1806
Josiah Hasbrouck (Colonel Josiah) 1755 - 1821
Levi Hasbrouck 1791 - 1861
1 Many stone house built by the town’s early settlers have been preserved to
the present day on Hugenot Street.
2 “The Account Books of Jean Cottin” are in the archives of The ‘Old Dutch
Church’ in Kingston, NY. Unless noted otherwise, the remaining original docu-
ments examined for this study are in the collections of the Huguenot Historical
Society Library and Archives, MSS Collection, New Paltz, NY.
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The operation of accounting in organizational and social
contexts is influenced by factors specific in location and time. In
studies of pastoral accounting in Australia, Carnegie [1995, pp.
21-25; 1997, pp. 207-231] traced the influence of economic, le-
gal, political, educational, and professional factors on pre-Fed-
eration accounting records. Carnegie concluded that the per-
sonified ledger accounts used by Australian pastorialists were
characteristic of an organizational culture that had developed in
isolated, tight-knit communities where members were in regular
contact with, and supportive of each other. In this study, we
similarly find a personification of ledger accounts in small agri-
cultural communities in colonial and early America. In these
communities, book debts were recorded based upon face-to-face
transactions between friends and neighbors, with individuals re-
lying upon a mutual sense of trust and obligation between
debtor and creditor. There was typically no explicit promise to
repay at a specified time, and accounts could be settled with
cash or by providing goods or services.
The modern perspective that accounting records should
support the preparation of financial statements was not relevant
for many family businesses in early America. There were no
requirements to calculate or report profits to outside parties
during this period, so single-entry accounting satisfied the infor-
mation needs of many traders. Small businessmen would have
been able to gauge profitability and inventory levels readily
without the need for accounting reports. At the same time, cash
was scarce and transactions were often based upon the asyn-
chronous exchange of goods and services. Exact settlement was
difficult, and bookkeeping was an indispensable device for keep-
ing track of the balances due between individuals. The account-
ing system was thus primarily focused on the need to keep track
of payables and receivables, including exchanges between third
parties. This system served the reporting needs of the commu-
nity at large, as well as the needs of individuals and small busi-
nesses.
The economic goals of the settlers in New York’s mid-
Hudson River valley and their descendants included meeting
annual subsistence needs, increasing the comfort level of daily
life, accumulating land, and passing on a legacy to heirs
[Wermuth, 2001, p. 46]. In this study we examine one family’s
strategies for successfully meeting these goals in a specific spa-
tial and cultural environment. Late 17th and early 18th century
New York underwent a period of social and cultural change as
new immigrants from England, France, and elsewhere in
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Europe and Africa joined the older settlers. A pluralistic social
order evolved in ethno-religious communities, which served as a
basis for group life [Goodfriend, 1992, pp. 5-7, 82].
LITERATURE REVIEW
Account books and related documents have helped illumi-
nate various aspects of life in early America. According to Stone
[1975], lack of qualified accountants added to the hardships of
the Pilgrims during their early years. The Pilgrim Colony’s busi-
ness records were chaotic from 1620 to 1641, as none of the
colonists had any training in, or aptitude for, record keeping. As
a result, on several occasions the London underwriters had to
send out an accountant to review the financial records. Baxter
[1946] studied the accounts of Boston merchants form 1710 to
1775, an era characterized by poor communications, a limited
volume of transactions, and a severe shortage of coins. The for-
eign coins acquired by the colonists circulated for only a brief
period before being sent to England to pay for imports. Local
trade was largely based on commodity money and barter. As a
result, delays in payment were inevitable, since commodities
could not be delivered until after harvest. Also, exact settlement
was difficult, and a balance of debt was often left over. Book-
keeping was therefore necessary to keep track of the balances
due between individuals. Not only did bookkeeping barter ac-
commodate two-way trade, it also facilitated triangular barter.
Merchants typically took on the role of bankers since they could
make cross-entries in two customers’ accounts to facilitate
settlement.
This type of barter is evident in the account books of a
general store operating in Middletown, Delaware at the end of
the 18th century, which was studied by Stone [1979]. The store
served as the collection agent for a wheat broker and used its
account books to facilitate transactions between the wheat
broker and other customers. Barter was common, and custom-
ers settled their accounts with labor, wheat, corn, herring, skins,
and scrap iron. Popular items sold at the store included playing
cards, buggy whips, muskets, flints, saddles, snuff boxes, traps,
tobacco, and brandy.
Disputes sometimes arose over the book debts that resulted
from the business transactions in the colonial American barter
economy, for which legal remedies might be sought. However,
during this period, English common law made it difficult to
introduce account books as evidence to support a claim of debt.
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As the American colonial courts and legislatures began to exam-
ine these rules, and sought to meet the commercial needs of the
New World, they responded by developing a more flexible and
pragmatic legal system with respect to admitting account books
as evidence. Legislative assemblies in several colonies enacted
statutes to codify this liberal approach to accounting evidence
which was also extended during the early 19th century to both
state and federal courts [Wootton and Moore, 2000a, 2000b].
Although commodity money was used for local transac-
tions, long-distance transactions were paid using specie (coin-
age) or bills of exchange. The specie in circulation in the colo-
nies came from Spanish America, Spain, the Netherlands, the
German States, France and other countries. To keep track of
exchanges based upon barter, commodity money and various
types of coinage, colonists from England continued to use
pounds, shillings, and pence as the monetary units of account.
However, these units were valued differently in each colony ac-
cording to the premium that each had legislated for silver coin-
age. Colonies eventually began to issue paper currency to ad-
dress the shortage of coinage, and New York first did so in 1709.
The New York currency, denominated in pounds and shillings,
was in the form of bills of credit issued by the government,
which the colonists could use to make tax payments [Jordan,
1999; Matson, 1998, pp. 240, 325].
Matson [1998] examined the activities of the ‘lesser’ or mid-
dling merchants in New York City during the colonial period,
many of whom were identified with an energetic trade in the
coastal and West Indian markets. Merchants acquired the ex-
ported commodities from the New York colony through their
ongoing affiliations with retailers, artisans, millers, and farmers.
As Johnson [1974] found in a study of New York City mer-
chants, 1765-1820, merchants performed their own accounting.
Most businesses were small and there were few practicing ac-
countants to provide such services.
Wermuth [2001] used the ledgers of several businesses in
New York’s mid-Hudson River valley from 1726 until 1840 to
document changes in the area’s economy. Although the region
remained primarily agricultural throughout this period, a trans-
formation in the nature of production was noted. In the colonial
period, most farm families produced much of what they ate and
wore, trading with neighbors for goods that they could not pro-
duce. Although some surplus commodities were sent to non-
local markets, the output of farm households was not market-
directed. However, beginning in the second half of the 18th
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century and accelerating into the 19th century, there was a shift
towards market-orientated production.
Baxter [1978] found that single-entry accounting predomi-
nated in the colonial accounts of 18th century New England
merchants. The primary purpose of single-entry accounting was
to record indebtedness, and account books consequently con-
tained only accounts for persons. These accounts cannot readily
be divided between debtors and creditors, since the colonial
merchant bought from and sold to the same person. However,
the nature of the goods generally permits accounts with custom-
ers to be distinguished from accounts with suppliers. Single-
entry accounting satisfied the information needs of these colo-
nial traders who had no need to report income and little use for
the profit calculations permitted by double-entry methods.
Densmore [1980, p. 6] similarly reported that single-entry book-
keeping was typical of the accounts found in rural western New
York and southern Ontario during the first half of the 19th cen-
tury.
Whereas single-entry accounting included only personal ac-
counts, double-entry accounting would also include accounts
such as capital, cash, inventory, and profit and loss [Sheldahl,
1985, p. 15]. Keeping separate accounts for various types of
merchandise, on which profit or loss could in theory be com-
puted, was one of the major characteristics of double-entry
bookkeeping as developed in Europe [Yamey, 2000, pp. 1-2].
Bruchey [1958] acknowledges that although small shopkeepers
may have used single-entry accounting, double-entry accounting
might have been more useful to larger merchants, and would
have become increasingly popular as the 18th century advanced.
According to Chatfield [1977, p. 61], the adoption of double-
entry bookkeeping by a majority of businesses did not occur
until after 1850, with the emergence of manufacturing corpora-
tions, income tax, and the accounting profession.
Double entry accounting was likely used by the leading co-
lonial store in 18th century Williamsburg, Virginia studied by
Coleman, Shenkir and Stone [1974]. From 1733 to 1779 the
store prepared a year-end balance sheet accompanied by a re-
port attesting to the subscribers’ audit of the company accounts.
An income statement was not prepared, but managers’ commis-
sions were calculated based upon sales figures, and currency
exchange gains were included in owners’ equity.
Kreiser and Dare’s [1986] study of the Shakers of Pleasant
Hill, Kentucky, 1830-1850, shows that this community did not
keep revenue or expense accounts either. However, they did
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prepare yearly analyses that attempted to correlate expenses
with revenues from various ventures. Village trustees had a fidu-
ciary responsibility to members, so an annual accounting may
have been more important in the Pleasant Hill community than
in most individual or family businesses. Vollmers and Bay
[2001] report that at the end of the 19th century, a meat mer-
chant in Maine summarized the revenues and expenses related
to a particular product category in order to compute profit or
loss. The merchant’s journal, however, was not in double-entry
format.
In this study, we find that single-entry accounting proved
adequate to meet the recording needs of the Hasbrouck family.
The Huguenot settlers and their descendants maintained only
personal accounts, which served a vital function by facilitating
the asynchronous exchange of goods and services in a rural
environment. The personification of the accounts reflected the
organizational culture that developed in small, close-knit com-
munities, where transactions involved face-to-face exchanges be-
tween friends and neighbors. Consistent with the lack of legal or
regulatory requirements, no calculations of profits or capital ap-
pear in these account books. However, some changes in book-
keeping procedure did appear over time. Before examining these
themes further and the business and financial affairs of the Jean
Hasbrouck family, we consider, in the next section, the nature of
the environment encountered by settlers in the New World.
CONTEXT
In 1609, Hendrick Hudson’s exploration of the river that
now bears his name provided the first stimulus to European
colonization of the Hudson River valley. The Dutch West India
Company subsequently established trading posts at the current
sites of New York City and Albany, as well as at an intermediate
point in the area inhabited by the Esopus Indians (near what is
today Kingston, New York). The Dutch West India Company
conducted a profitable fur trade with the Indians and estab-
lished policies that influenced the institutional framework of the
community and the composition of the population. The per-
petual need for new settlers led to a diverse population and
resulted in the institutionalization of slavery. Over time, the ag-
ricultural importance of Esopus (also known as Kingston or
Wiltwyck) increased, and by the 1680s, it had become a high-
yield, wheat producing area populated largely by farming fami-
lies [Kammen, 1975, pp. 1-2; Schoonmaker, 1888, pp. 2-3, 21;
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Goodfriend, 1992, pp. 10-11; Wermuth, 2001, pp. 13-14].
The Dutch controlled the region until it was surrendered to
the English in 1664. The laws, institutions, and cultural prac-
tices introduced by the Dutch had an enduring effect on New
York society and culture. The English were initially a cultural
minority in a predominately Dutch society, and realism dictated
that they be tolerant, allowing diverse cultural practices to per-
sist [Schoonmaker, 1888, pp. 65-66; Goodfriend, 1992, pp. 5-7].
Along with the Dutch and English, the Kingston region also
attracted some French Huguenot families, who had fled Europe
to escape religious persecution. Endeavoring to maintain their
own cultural identity in this predominately Dutch region, a
dozen of these families established a new community about 15
miles from Kingston [LeFevre-Stratton, 1999, pp. 1-2; DuBois,
1936, pp. 12, 19].
The 12 families that established the New Paltz settlement
were tied by marriage or friendship before their arrival in North
America. Because they left France well in advance of the 1685
revocation of the Edict of Nantes—which triggered the largest
diaspora of Huguenots—they were able to bring their material
assets with them. This enabled them to purchase a relatively
large tract of land, which succeeding generations would divide
and subdivide, supporting many families in the area. New Paltz,
which began as a communal endeavor, retained this pattern of
land distribution until well into the 18th century [Carlo, 2001, p.
397].
The New Paltz settlers obtained a patent for nearly 40,000
acres of land in 1677 in exchange for a yearly quitrent of five
bushels of good winter wheat. In the following year they settled
and cultivated the rich lowland area along the Wallkill River
[Schoonmaker, 1888, p. 69]. The land had previously been pur-
chased from the Esopus Indians, who retained the right to hunt
and fish on it, for a price that included:
. . . 40 kettles, 10 large, 30 small; 40 axes; 4 adzes; 40
shirts; 400 fathoms of white net-work; 300 fathoms of
black net-work; 60 pairs of stockings, half small sizes;
100 bars of lead; 1 keg of powder; 100 knives; 4 kegs of
wine; 40 oars; 40 pieces of “duffel” (heavy woolen
cloth); 60 blankets; 100 needles; 100 awls; 1 measure of
tobacco; 2 horses - 1 stallion, 1 mare [LeFevre, 1909, p.
13].3
3 The “net-work” in the above translation most likely refers to wampum,
which circulated in strands of white or black beads [Jordan, 2000].
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The extent to which immigrant groups made an effort to
maintain their ethnic solidarity can be judged from choices
made in relation to language retention, church affiliation, edu-
cation, philanthropic activity, and selection of marital partners
[Goodfriend, 1992, p. 86]. The New Paltz patentees made efforts
to maintain their French language and religion by engaging,
when possible, French schoolteachers and pastors. Marriages in
the community remained endogamous as long as suitable mar-
riage partners existed, but after the second generation, partners
were often found in the predominantly Dutch communities in
the surrounding countryside. The increasing Dutch presence
also influenced efforts to maintain the French language and reli-
gion. Many of the French settlers also knew Dutch, and both
languages appear in early official documents. The English lan-
guage did not assume a significant presence in the area until
well after the American Revolution [Carlo, 2001, pp. 397-399].
By 1703, the county census reported a Pals population of
130, including 64 white adults and their 57 children, and seven
Negroes and their two children. The same year, an agreement
was made giving each of the New Paltz patentees or their repre-
sentatives one-twelfth of the New Paltz lands. In 1728, the lands
were further subdivided, and the families of the 12 original pat-
entees elected a member to a governing body that later became
known as the ‘Twelve Men’ [O’Callaghan, 1850, p. 966; DuBois,
1936, p. 20; LeFevre, 1909, pp. 111-112; Hasbrouck, 1963, p. 7].
Among the 12 New Paltz patentees were Jean Hasbrouck
and his brother Abraham. Jean Hasbrouck may have built a
wood frame house in New Paltz as early as 1678 [Crawford &
Stearns and Neal Larson & Associates, 2002, pp. 1.3-1.4]. On a
tax list dated January 1712, Jean Hasbrouck’s real and personal
property was assessed at £150, making him fifth wealthiest of
the 22 New Paltz taxpayers. The taxes were used to pay for
representatives to the New York Assembly as well as the county
treasurer, bell ringer, and clerk, and to pay bounties for killing
the wolves that threatened the farmers’ livestock.4
In August 1712, Jean Hasbrouck signed a will, written in
Dutch, which enumerated assets characteristic of the agricul-
tural economy. The bulk of his estate was bequeathed to his
unmarried son Jacob, who lived with him, including:
4 Records for the meetings of the Board of Supervisors from 1710 to 1730
are housed in the Ulster County Archives, Kingston, NY.
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. . . all my land lying within the boundaries of the pa-
tent of New Paltz with house, barn, and all my other
buildings thereon being and standing, also my wagons,
ploughs, harrows, and everything thereto belonging and
also my two negroes named Gerrit and James; further
the gun and what belongs to it and the clothing of my
deceased son Isaac Hasbrouck and all my books except-
ing three hereafter bequeathed to my daughter Eliza-
beth [Anjou, 1906, p. 90].
When Jean Hasbrouck died two years later, the 26-year-old
Jacob was left in possession of his father’s farm and most of his
other assets, including his one-twelfth share of the lands in the
New Paltz patent. By contrast, many of the estates of other New
Paltz patentees were divided among numerous heirs, diminish-
ing their value. Shortly after his father’s death, Jacob Hasbrouck
married Esther Bevier, whose father had had the highest prop-
erty assessment in the community on the 1712 tax list, which
would have enhanced his already substantial assets [Crawford et
al., 2002, pp. 1.2-1.9, 1.20].
The agricultural economy depended on family labor, which
the New Paltz Huguenots supplemented with slave labor. In
New York, the average master had between one and three slaves
who typically worked with their masters and lived in their
households. In rural counties, slaves engaged in a variety of
farm and domestic work [Kobrin, 1971, pp. 3-10; Hodges, 1999,
p. 82; Williams-Myers, 1994, pp. 24-25].
Given good weather and soil, more grain could be produced
than needed by the farming household. Some of the excess was
used locally in barter exchanges during the winter months, but
the remainder was exported. By the late 1690s, wholesalers in
New York City were concerned with obtaining wheat, rye, and
corn for export to the Caribbean, and they ultimately obtained
these grains from the docks at Kingston and the rest of the
Hudson River valley [Matson, 1998, pp. 27, 125].
THE COTTIN LEDGERS, 1707-1721
Farmers in New Paltz and Kingston sold their surplus grain
to Kingston merchant Jean Cottin [Schultz and Hollister, 2004].
Cottin had been the first French schoolmaster at New Paltz and
later became a merchant in Kingston [Brink, 1905, p. 64]. He
bought wheat and peltries from local farmers, hunters and trap-
pers, and transported them to New York City for sale to Manhat-
tan merchants. In exchange, he obtained wholesale quantities of
the imported goods that his local customers desired. Many of
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the New York business people with whom Cottin dealt were also
French Huguenots, lending support to the thesis that trade, fam-
ily life, and religion were highly interrelated during this period
[Bosher, 1995, p. 80]. We also see proof of this in Cottin’s will,
which included a bequest to support the French church in New
York. Since there was no French church in Kingston, Cottin
worshipped at the Dutch church, and it was to this church that
he bequeathed his books, debts, bills, bonds and notes in order
that interest earned could be used to support the poor.
Some of Cottin’s account books, which date from 1707-
1721, have survived in the archives of Kingston’s ‘Old Dutch
Church,’ and appear to be the earliest surviving financial ledgers
relating to the Kingston-New Paltz area. The four extant ledgers
include a bound daybook, an unbound daybook, and two ac-
counts books that contain postings from the daybooks. In addi-
tion, a separately bound index lists the accounts alphabetically
by first name. The account books are bound in leather and tied
with strings made from hide. According to Merwick [1990, p.
52] good account books were a conspicuous display of a
merchant’s status, their bindings and paper quality were as im-
portant as their contents.
With few exceptions Cottin’s accounts with local individuals
were recorded in French. The monetary unit was Dutch guilders
and stuivers. Although the use of Dutch coins was popular in
Dutch settlements such as Kingston, their use as a unit of ac-
count does not mean that transactions were necessarily settled
in guilders; settlement might be based on the exchange of vari-
ous types of coins as well as commodities. By contrast, the ac-
counts that Cottin kept with Manhattan merchants were de-
nominated in pounds, shillings, and pence, doubtless reflecting
the units used by those merchants. In cosmopolitan New York
City, there was a much quicker shift from Dutch to English
customs than in Kingston. In 1698, the Dutch comprised slightly
less than one-half of the white population in New York City
compared to two-thirds of the white population in Kingston
[Bonomi, 1971, p. 22].
The Cottin ledgers include accounts with Jean Hasbrouck
and his son Jacob for the period 1709-1717. The debit entries
from a page in Cottin’s account book have been translated in
Table 2. The opening balance in Jean Hasbrouck’s account on
this page had been carried forward from a previous page on
which purchases of items such as lead, ginger, paper, rum, but-
tons, cloth, a quilt and a hat had been recorded. When no more
room remained on a page in the account book, the account
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would be carried forward to an available page in that or a subse-
quent book.
TABLE 2
Translation of the Debit Side of Jean Cottin’s Accounts
with Jean and Jacob Hasbrouck, 1709-1717
Jean Hasbrouck owes for the settlement of an account
in the ledger on page 93 for several articles from
August 6 1709 until ?* 25 January 1712
the sum of 32 guilders 6 stuivers 32 6
14 February 1712 owes for one ounce of silk delivered
to Jacob Hasbrouck 9 0
2 July 1712 owes for one half ? of syrup to Lisbette at 25 guilders 25 0
15 October 1712 Jacob owes for a small ? 1 0
22 Oct 1712 Lisbette owes for two gallons of syrup at 51⁄2 francs 11 0
and two white quilts with stripes for 63 guilders 63 0
and one cotton handkerchief for 5 10
31 Dec 1712 Jean Hasbrouck owes for delivered to
Jacob Hasbrouck 200 shoe nails 2 0
and a carpenter’s scissors for 4 guilders 5 stuivers 4 5
3 Mar 1713 owes for one quart of rum delivered to
Jacob Hasbrouck 3 0
18 Apr 1713 owes for two pounds of cotton at 2-1/2 guilders
delivered to Jacob 5 0
11 Nov 1713 owes for his son Jacob one large deerskin 18 0
5 Dec 1713 owes for Jacob his son six dozen metal buttons
at 30 stuivers and 100 shoe nails all for 10 0
189 1
4 Aug 1714 Jacob Hasbrouck owes for one pound of
gunpowder delivered to the son of Dick Muvéz 7 0
22 Oct 1714 owes for one pound of ginger and 300 shoe nails all for 4 0
31 May 1715 owes for five gallons of rum at 7 guilders has paid
for one gallon and owes for 4 gallons 28 0
28 Oct 1715 owes for one and a half aunes of red ? at 14 guilders
delivered to himself 20 10
in addition owes for a hammer and a carpenter’s scissors
together for 11 guilders 300 shoe nails 14 0
and 4-1/2 aunes blue cloth at 2 guilders for 9 guilders and
1-1/2 aunes of fine blue cloth for 10 guilders 19 0
and one aune of cotton at 2 guilders 15 stuivers and
1/2 pound of pepper at 4 guilders 5 stuivers all for 7 0
and a barrel of soap at 26 guilders and for 24 stuivers
of red wood all for 27 4
4 April 1716 delivered to Jacob Hasbrouck 23 guilders for ?
to Jacob DuBois 23 0
8 August 1716 owes for a pound of ginger delivered to his wife 7 5
1 February 1717 owes for delivered to himself one pound
of barrel nails 2 0
10 June 1717 owes for one half quateron** indigo delivered to ? 3 0
155 19
* Words that could not be translated are indicated by a question mark.
** Quateron is an agrarian unit of measure.
Source: The Account Books of Jean Cottin, ‘Old Dutch Church,’ Kingston, NY.
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In 1712 and 1713, the purchases debited to Jean Has-
brouck’s account included various types of dry goods along with
items such as nails, syrup, and rum, with the most costly items
being two quilts. As was typical, Cottin recorded both the items
sold and the identity of the party who took delivery of the goods.
Hasbrouck’s son Jacob and daughter Lisbette (Elizabeth) took
delivery of most of the purchases charged to their father’s ac-
count. The credit side of Jean Hasbrouck’s account (not illus-
trated here), shows that after his father’s death in 1714, Jacob
Hasbrouck paid the balance due of 189 guilders, 1 stuiver to
settle the account. The use of cash appears to be most prevalent
when an account was settled.
On the same page in the ledger, Cottin started a new ac-
count in his the son’s name. In 1714-1715 the purchases charged
to Jacob Hasbrouck’s account included gunpowder, cloth (mea-
sured in aunes, an old French measure equivalent to about 47
inches), sewing supplies, quilts, soap, tools, nails, spices and
rum; items typical of those sold by Cottin. Apparently, Cottin
made an error totaling the charges to Jacob Hasbrouck’s ac-
count, which should equal 161 guilders, 19 stuivers, rather than
155 guilders, 19 stuivers. The Hasbroucks visited Cottin’s store
in Kingston between two and five times a year during this pe-
riod. Jacob Hasbrouck’s name also appears in the Cottin ledgers
on a list of farmers who had delivered wheat to the granary in
1719. Cottin recorded the receipt of 25 schepels and an addi-
tional 3 schepels from Jacob Hasbrouck. This amount was com-
parable to that delivered by other large farmers in the area.
Most of the other farmers had much smaller operations and
delivered between 1 and 15 schepels of wheat to Cottin.5
Many of the goods that Cottin sold were obtained from his
Manhattan suppliers who had imported them from Europe, the
West Indies, or the Southern colonies. Rum was imported from
the West Indies, or possibly from one of the rum distilleries that
had sprung up in the American colonies to process imported
sugar and molasses. The ginger may also have come from the
West Indies, and the cotton from the Southern colonies. How-
ever, Cottin probably acquired the deerskin and syrup (likely
maple syrup) in a local barter transaction. During the 18th cen-
tury, the colonists imported a range of commodities from En-
gland, including some that had originated in the Orient. Dry
goods were one important import for New Yorkers, who were
unable to provide sufficient cloth and clothing for themselves,
5 A schepel was equivalent to .764 bushels of wheat [Versteeg, 1976, p. 765].
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and could import textiles more cheaply than producing them
locally [McCusker and Menard, 1985, p. 290; Matson, 1998, pp.
139-141, 182-183].
INCREASING WEALTH, 1717-1782
Jacob Hasbrouck appears on the list of New Paltz taxpayers
in January 1717
 
with property assessed at £160, making him the
fifth wealthiest of the 28 taxpayers for that year.6 In 1721, he
began construction on a new house that would be built to a
scale beyond that of any other properties in the area, and which
was seemingly a clear statement of his position in the commu-
nity.7 At that time, the use of stone as a building material was an
emblem of wealth and class, and the construction of a whole
street of stone houses in a small town like New Paltz reflected
the economic and social composition of the settlement
[Crawford & Stearns and Neil Larson & Associates, 2002, 1.3-
1.9, 1.19-1.21].
On the 1728 tax list for New Paltz, Jacob Hasbrouck’s prop-
erty was appraised at £92, making him the fourth wealthiest of
the 33 taxpayers. Hasbrouck served for nearly two decades as a
member of the Twelve Men that governed New Paltz, and in his
later years, also served short terms as tax collector and chimney
inspector, suggesting that he may have passed the day-to-day
responsibilities for running the farm to his son, Jacob J. Has-
brouck, Jr. (Jacob Jr.), who shared the house with him [LeFevre,
1909, pp. 91-93, 117; Crawford et al., 2002, p. 1.22].
Jacob Hasbrouck’s name also appears in a 1733 listing of
goods sold on the death of Jean Tebanin. Tebanin, who suc-
ceeded Jean Cottin as French schoolmaster in New Paltz, be-
queathed his property to the New Paltz church in a will dated
1730 [LeFevre, 1909, pp. 25-27]. His household goods were sold
on his death, and Jacob Hasbrouck was among the purchasers;
6 The tax assessment lists for Ulster County are housed in the Ulster County
Archives, Kingston, NY. The assessment list for 1716⁄17 can be viewed online at
http://archives.co.ulster.ny.us/taxassessment.htm (accessed July 20, 2003). Al-
though the rest of Europe had switched to the Gregorian calendar by the end of
the 17th century, Britain and the colonies continued to use the Julian calendar
until 1752. The dual designation for year, which appears in documents of the
era, reflects both approaches, with the later year being comparable to our cur-
rent system.
7 The house, traditionally known as the Jean Hasbrouck house, had been
assumed to have been built by the patentee until recent dendrochonological
evidence indicated that it was built after his death [Crawford, et al, 2002, pp. 1.1-
1.2].
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he spent £0/3/10 primarily on three books and some salt. While
this list was written primarily in French, it also included several
Dutch terms, as might be expected in a community that was
becoming increasingly multilingual. The units of measure used
in the list appear to be pounds, shillings, and pence. However,
the bookkeeper has used the term piestol in heading the pounds
column and in other locations in the list. This may suggest that
during this period the pound was considered approximately
equivalent in value to the pistole, a gold coin of Spanish or
French origin.8
In his own will of 1747, Jacob Hasbrouck bequeathed land
in the New Paltz patent and elsewhere to his sons along with
other assets, which included Negroes, horses, cows, and sheep; a
cart, plough, spade, and hoe; as well as gold and silver, money,
bonds and mortgages. When he died in 1761, Jacob, Jr. inher-
ited the New Paltz property. Like his father, he enjoyed the sole
benefit of inheriting the family homestead with its established
house and farm [Hasbrouck, 1986, pp. 42-43; Crawford et al.,
2002, pp. 1.21-1.22].
Jacob, Jr.’s marriage to Jennetje DuBois in 1751 had aligned
the Hasbroucks with another of the town’s wealthiest families.
He had succeeded his father as a member of the Twelve Men in
1757, and would serve in that role for the next 48 years. He also
served variously as town supervisor, fence viewer, and highway
commissioner [Crawford et al., 2002, pp. 1.22-1.23]. On the 1765
New Paltz tax list, Jacob, Jr.’s property was valued at £65, mak-
ing him the fifth wealthiest of the 112 taxpayers.
According to a census in 1782 there were 1,351 white inhab-
itants in New Paltz. During the second half of the 18th century
local farmers cultivated about 10 acres of grain, on average,
producing approximately 102 bushels of wheat and 67 bushels
of rye [LeFevre, 1909, pp. 94-96; O’Callaghan, 1850, p. 996;
Wermuth, 2001, pp. 48-50].
THE ROGGEN LEDGER, 1750-1795
The account book of Johan Jacob Roggen (also know as
Jacques Roggen), which begins in 1750, is the earliest surviving
ledger in the archives of the Huguenot Historical Society in New
Paltz. A connection exists between Johan Jacob Roggen, Jacob
Hasbrouck and Jacob Hasbrouck, Jr., although the precise
8 According to a chart published in an almanac in 1759, in New York the
Spanish pistole was equivalent to £1/9/0, and the French pistole was equivalent to
£1/8/0 [Jordan, 2002].
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nature of their relationship is a matter of speculation. The men
are linked through several notes (in Dutch) accompanying the
account book inscribed in Roggen’s name. One note indicates
that Roggen received payment based on an accounting he made
to Hasbrouck, and the others similarly relate to accountings
made between the men. Another link between these men ap-
pears on the first page in the account book. In 1750, the account
of one Sem Sames was debited three shillings for work done at
the house of Jacob Hasbrouck making a corset. An account for
Jacob Hasbrouck also appears on page 20 of this ledger.
The Roggen account book, which spans the period 1750 to
1795, primarily reflects the work of a tailor. Most of the entries
record various types of garments made, including camisoles and
culottes (shirts and pants), suits, coats, and gloves. Sewing sup-
plies were also sold, including buttons from Philadelphia,
thread, cloth, indigo (a fabric dye), and buckles. In addition to
charges for garments made, Roggen also recorded receivables
for days he worked for others, but no detail is given about the
type of work performed. Bartering labor with neighbors was
common practice during this era.
Like the Cottin ledgers, Roggen’s account book is based on
single-entry accounting with the use of personalized accounts.
During the second half of the 18th century, New Paltz continued
to be a rural, tight-knit community whose economy revolved
largely around exchanges of goods and services with neighbors.
Keeping track of the indebtedness that existed between people
continued to be the key information function of the accounting
system. Roggen, who was likely Swiss, used the French language
to record entries during the earlier years of the account book.9
The debit side of each customer’s account was labeled doit and
showed the services or goods provided, while the credit side was
labeled avoir and showed what Roggen received in exchange.10
Use of the Dutch language was introduced in the ledger around
1777. Dutch was used interchangeably with French at first, and
then it eventually became predominant. The units of measure
used in the account book were pounds, shillings, and pence,
although descriptions of transactions during the earlier years
included valuations in francs. Beginning about 1756, references
to escallions (shillings) as well as francs appear in product
9 The father, probably Roggen’s brother, of the child whose baptism Roggen
witnessed in Kingston in 1755 was Swiss [The New York Genealogical and Bio-
graphical Record, 1903, p. 172].
10 In English language ledgers of this period, the debit entries were preceded
by the word “to” and credit entries were preceded by the word “by.”
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descriptions. The colonists were still using multiple currencies
during this period, but the use of the pound as the unit of ac-
count suggests a more widespread adoption of the New York
monetary units by the middle of the 18th century. For personal
record keeping needs, both Roggen and Cottin had largely re-
tained use of French, their native tongue. However, the eventual
shift to Dutch in the Roggen ledger may illustrate the difficulty
that the New Paltz settlers had in continuing the use of French
in a largely Dutch region.
Jacob Hasbrouck’s account in the Roggen ledger dates from
1763 to 1766. It shows debits for work done at Hasbrouck’s
house each year, at the rate of three shillings a day, but with no
mention of the type of work performed. The credits to the ac-
count reflect the receipt of bushels of rye and corn, and, when
the account was being settled, of money from the cash box. In
the ledgers examined, it appears that cash was used primarily as
a means of balancing out accounts that had been running for a
number of years to record exchanges of labor and commodities.
In addition to the entries for garments manufactured, sew-
ing supplies sold, and labor provided, some entries in the later
years of the Roggen account book record the sale of other items,
including tea, tobacco powder (snuff), handkerchiefs, rum and
gunpowder. A few entries note that the goods had been shipped
from Manhattan, in particular, soap and one pound of veal from
York, for which the bookkeeper noted that he had paid too
much. Account credits show that payment was frequently re-
ceived in wool and cloth. Rural farm families produced home-
spun to meet their own needs and to trade with neighbors for
goods or services. Towards the end of the 18th century,
Wermuth [2001, pp. 51-52] reports an increase in the prevalence
of looms and spinning wheels in probated inventories and in the
exchange of labor in spinning and weaving for other services.
BUSINESS LIFE IN NEW PALTZ DURING
THE LATE 18TH AND EARLY 19TH CENTURIES
Tradition holds that the right front room of the Hasbroucks’
stone house was used as a retail store from as early as the 1760s
[LeFevre, 1909, p. 398; Crawford et al., 2002, p. 1.24]. There is
no clear indication that the Roggen account book is related to
this store. However, it does appear that at times Roggen may
have been working out of Hasbrouck’s house, and perhaps work-
ing for them. There is evidence that a store was operating in the
Bevier-Elting house on Huguenot Street during the 1760s. An
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inventory of this store prepared in 1768 (which is in the archives
of the Huguenot Historical Society) lists a wide variety of goods
though monetary values are not given to the items. During this
period shopkeepers were interested in keeping track of inven-
tory but did not focus on valuing their business or its assets.
Listed among the items in the Bevier-Elting store inventory was
one iron shovel for Jacob Hasbrouck.
Around the turn of the 19th century, farm families in Ulster
County were cultivating grain, keeping dairy and gardens, and
manufacturing textiles. Most continued to use the same tools as
their grandparents: scythes and sickles for reaping wheat and
cutting grass, and wooden plows and harrows. Iron tools ap-
peared in less than 20 percent of probate inventories from the
1790s. During that decade, Ulster farmers cultivated, on average,
about 12 acres of grain, producing 145 bushels of wheat and 100
bushels of rye. Storekeepers were the primary source of con-
sumer goods produced outside of the county. Some accounts
were settled in cash, but cash continued to be scarce during this
period, and the parties frequently relied on an exchange of
goods and services, which were recorded in the shopkeeper’s
ledger at a cash equivalent value. As in prior generations, mer-
chants either resold goods received locally or facilitated their
export to the market in New York City [Wermuth, 2001, pp. 92-
96].
An assessment list made for the U.S. Direct Tax in 1798
contains an extensive, itemized listing of property owned by
Jacob J. Hasbrouck, Jr. The listing is divided between Jacob, Jr.,
who had built a new house north of the village in 1786, and his
son Josiah, who was then occupying the family homestead on
Huguenot Street. The two entries include 39 parcels of land
amounting to nearly 2,000 acres valued at $13,862. Only one
other taxpayer—Jacob, Jr.’s brother-in-law—had a comparable
assessment; the next highest assessments were considerably
smaller. This extensive and diverse real estate portfolio demon-
strates the extent to which the legacy of Jean Hasbrouck had
been preserved and built upon by his heirs [Crawford et al.,
2002, p. 1.10].
On his death, the bulk of Jacob, Jr.’s estate was left to his
two surviving sons. Josiah, the elder son, inherited the stone
house when his father died in 1806 and took his place as a
member of the Twelve Men. Married to Sarah Decker in 1785,
he had served in the Ulster County Militia (where he apparently
acquired the moniker ‘Colonel Josiah’), and had a political
career that included town positions as well as membership in
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the New York State Assembly and the U.S. Congress [Crawford
et al., 2002, pp. 1.26-1.29; LeFevre 1909, p. 401].
Whether Josiah Hasbrouck started the store in the north
front room of the stone house or expanded the business started
by his father is a matter for conjecture. Renovations made to the
stone house around 1786, when his father would have moved
out, included installation of a public sales area in the north front
room. The extant ledgers document the existence of a prosper-
ous general store and tavern in the house during the late 18th
and early 19th centuries. By 1794, Josiah Hasbrouck brought his
cousin and future son-in-law, Josiah DuBois, into the business
and DuBois assumed increased responsibility when Hasbrouck
entered state politics [Crawford et al., 2002, p. 1.26]. An expand-
ing New Paltz population supported this local store, which in
turn saved the residents the trip to Kingston to shop for basic
supplies and luxury items. Josiah Hasbrouck’s daughter, Eliza-
beth, married Josiah DuBois in 1805, and the couple lived in the
stone house and managed the store. In 1811, DuBois and a new
business partner moved the store to a new location, and in 1815
Elizabeth died [Crawford et al., 2002, p. 1.30; LeFevre 1909, p.
402].
THE HASBROUCK STORE LEDGERS, 1793-1813
The transactions of the store are documented in two surviv-
ing account books and related daybooks. One account book cov-
ered the period 1793-1796 and contained postings from three
daybooks (one of which included dates into 1797). Another ac-
count book, dating from 1797-1813, contained postings from
four daybooks (dating through 1801 only). Transactions were
recorded chronologically in the daybooks, which were books of
original entry, and then posted to the customer’s page in the
account book. An alphabetical index of customers allowed the
bookkeeper to find the customer’s page in the account book.
The relationship between the daybook and account book
can be seen clearly in the transactions recorded for Hasbrouck’s
customer, John Slut. Figure 1 shows a portion of the daybook
for November 28, 1793 in which Slut’s purchases were recorded.
After John Slut’s name is the abbreviation indicating that these
transactions are to be debited to his account. The entries note
the items purchased, the unit price where applicable, and the
total price denominated in pounds, shillings, and pence. Slut
purchased a pair of buckles for two shillings, six pint bowls at
six pence apiece, as well as plates, one dozen cups and saucers,
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one sugar cup, one salt cellar and butter plate, one earthen cup,
one bushel of corn and four pieces of square timber. The total
for these purchases is 16 shillings, 6 pence. Although this
amount does not appear in the daybook, it was posted to John
Slut’s page in the account book.11 Slut’s account, which has been
transcribed in Table 3, included entries for 1793 and 1794. The
bookkeeper labeled the debit side of the account “Dr.” and the
credit side “Contra Cr.” The third debit entry in Slut’s account,
in the amount of £0/16/6, represents the total of the November
28th purchases from the daybook that appear in Figure 1. The
bookkeeper noted that the amount recorded came from page
“No. 4” in the daybook. On November 12, a debit for £1/4/9 was
recorded, which was the sum of the £0/23/9 that had been re-
corded on page one of the daybook plus the £0/1/0 recorded on
page two of the daybook. Similarly, the second entry on the
same date for £0/12/3 reflects purchases recorded on page two of
the daybook for £0/5/9 plus purchases for £0/6/6 recorded on
page three of the daybook. Interestingly, the bookkeeper did not
11 There were 20 shillings to the pound, 12 pence to the shilling, and four
farthings to the pence.
FIGURE 1
Daybook Entries November 28, 1793 — John Slut
Source: [Figures 1-3 and Tables 3-5], The Account Books of Josiah and Levi
Hasbrouck, The Levi Hasbrouck Family Papers Collection, Huguenot Historical
Society Library and Archives, MSS Collection, New Paltz, NY.
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record the balance brought forward from the previous book on
the first line of the account but entered it on December 2.
TABLE 3
Account of John Slut, 1793-1794
1793 John Slut Dr. £ s d 1793 Contra Cr. £ s d
November 12 To Sundries in December 26 By Work Done 4 9 4
page No. 1 23/9 and
No. 2 1/ 1 4 9 By Cash 7/ 0 7 0
No. 2 5/9 May 19 By Cash by John
No. 3 6/6 0 12 3 Roosa 50/ 2 10 0
28 in no. 4 - 16/6 0 16 6 19 By Cash by John
December 2 in No. 5 41/5 Roosa 3/ 0 3 0
No. 9 /3 2 1 8 7 9 4
from my Old
Book 40/6 2 0 6
No. 11 10/4 0 10 4
January 1 No. 12 /7 0 0 7
No. 25 3/ 0 3 0
7 9 4
Although John Slut’s account showed a total of £7/9/4, the
pence column on the debit side was apparently added incor-
rectly; it should total seven pence rather than four pence. On the
credit side of the account, two of the entries reflect cash paid by
John Roosa. Apparently, John Roosa settled his debt to John
Slut by paying part of the latter’s account balance with
Hasbrouck. This transaction illustrates the role of the
shopkeeper’s accounting records, in facilitating exchanges be-
tween customers.
The shopkeeper’s role as a banker who would dispense cash
and serve as an intermediary between individuals is also evident
from several entries recorded in the daybook during 1796. The
sum of £8 was debited to the account of Benjamin Hasbrouck,
Jr. and credited to the account of Petrus J. Schoonmaker. Ap-
parently, Schoonmaker received a credit at the store for the
amount owed to him by Benjamin Hasbrouck, whose account
was charged for the same amount, which he now owed to the
shopkeeper. Similarly, John Walram’s account was charged for
cash of £3/4/0 paid to Doctor Graham in March 1796 and for
cash of £0/4/6 delivered to Walram’s wife. Walram was charged
interest of two shillings on his account, which was eventually
settled by the delivery of grains and goods worth more than the
balance due. To balance the account, the shopkeeper paid him
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the excess in cash. Again, cash appears to have served not as the
primary medium of exchange, but as a means to balance out the
accumulated results of a series of nonmonetary transactions.
Single-entry accounting and personalized accounts contin-
ued to fill the information needs of the owners of the Hasbrouck
store and their neighbors around the turn of the 19th century.
Although the community was expanding, it remained suffi-
ciently small for its residents to have regular personal contact
with each other. In a community whose organizational culture
was similarly based upon interpersonal communal exchanges,
Carnegie [1997, p. 209] noted that “personalized ledgers came to
define and were defined by the organizational culture as the
context within which world views are determined”. During this
era, cash continued to be scarce and the asynchronous exchange
of farm produce for the shopkeeper’s wares was prevalent. A
customer’s account balance was thus the key type of informa-
tion provided by the accounting system. The Hasbrouck store
ledgers do not evidence any attempt to measure income or as-
sets other than customer accounts, reflecting the lack of ac-
countability relationships outside of the community.
Those transactions that were settled immediately with cash
were not posted to the account book, since no indebtedness
existed. This can be seen in the daybook entries in 1798 that
appear in Figure 2, as can the use of “to” and “by” to indicate
purchases versus payments. In the left hand column of the day-
book, we observe a slash [/] recorded when entries were posted
to the account book. All but one of those transactions was re-
corded on account. Gilbert Saxton bought various dry goods and
Stephen Roe imbibed “one jill brandy” evidencing the nature of
the business as both a tavern and general store. Jonathan
Vanwagenen delivered maple sugar and Samuel Hunt delivered
wheat, for which their accounts would be credited. However,
Rachel Schoonmaker was paid immediately for the flax she de-
livered, as the cross [X] in the left hand column shows.12 As no
indebtedness existed, there was no need to post this transaction
to the account book, which included only accounts for people,
and no cash account. The 1798 daybook also shows that, as the
old Dutch traditions faded, wheat was measured in bushels
rather than schepels.
12 In contrast, in the daybooks kept by Kingston merchant Jean Cottin dur-
ing the first quarter of the 18th century, a cross (X) was used to indicate that an
entry had been posted to the account book.
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The wide range of products sold at the store from 1793 to
1796 is evident from Table 4. Customers were buying spices,
beverages, and tobacco products as well as textiles, sewing sup-
plies, and limited clothing items, particularly hats and shawls.
Tools and building supplies, kitchenware, a few books, and vari-
ous household and general supplies were also available. Typi-
cally, neither meats nor grains were sold. The few exceptions
include some corn, undoubtedly received from a customer as
payment on account and being resold, and 200 oysters, likely a
special order on which the customer was also charged freight.
Wermuth [2001, p. 92] presented evidence concerning the
extent of home manufacture of textiles in Ulster County during
this period. However, as Table 4 shows imported textiles were
widely purchased by customers of the Hasbrouck store. In the
ledgers, the Hasbrouck store bookkeeper was careful to specify
the type of product sold in categories such as tea (Shushan or
Bohe), sugar (brown or loaf), shawls (Chinese, chintz, or green),
hammers (screw, hand, sledge, or nail), augers (one-inch or
screw), combs (crooked or coarse), and earthenware (platters,
cups, plates, pots, and pitchers). In contrast, the ledgers of
FIGURE 2
Daybook Entries, 1798
172
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss1/9
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2004164
TABLE 4
Hasbrouck Store Merchandise, 1793-1796
“To” indicates the goods sold to customers and “by” indicates the items received by the
shopkeeper to settle the account.
* Possibly metheglin or spiced mead
Other
Agricultural
Products
Food &
spices:
butter
cheese
chocolate
salt
pepper
allspice
ginger
sugar
molasses
Beverages:
tea
wine
rum
grogg
gin
Tobacco:
tobacco
snuff
chew
twist
butter
mathegulem*
Grains /
Fish
corn
200
oysters
wheat
flax
flaxseed
rye
flour
corn
Drygoods
Clothing:
pair of mitts
stockings
pocket
handker-
chief
cravat
pair of
spectacles
hats
vest
shawls
skates
Textiles &
skins:
velvet
India taffeta
linen
silk
cotton
cambrick
calico
flannel
muslin
woolen check
mohair
baize
blue cloth
ribbon
piece of
curtains
sheepskins
Sewing
supplies:
buttons
buckles
brass ring
paper of pins
needles
thimbles
indigo
Tools &
Building
Supplies
Building
supplies:
plaster of
Paris
lime
sand stone
square
timber
nails
hooks
chain
Tools:
saw
chisels
awls / awls
handles
hammers
gimlet
shovel
files
tap bore
tongs
auger
sawset
two-foot rule
caster hats
lime
nails
Homewares
and
Supplies
Kitchen
ware:
saltcellar
sugar cup
plates
cups &
saucers
3 gallon pot
gallon jug
pint bowls
frying pan
knives and
forks
earthenware
Books &
paper:
Latin book
almanac
spelling book
paper
Household
supplies:
soap
tallow
beeswax
snuffers
chamber pot
tobacco box
pipes
brass
candlestick
rat trap
combs
Other:
surcingle
powder
shot
penknife
pocket knife
ashes
tallow
beeswax
Services /
Cash
riding goods
shoeing
horses
upsetting an
ax
cash
B
y
T
o
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Abraham Hasbrouck, Jr., which relate to 1797-1843 and detail
the business of this Kingston shopkeeper and export merchant,
did not specify the exact type of goods purchased by customers,
but simply indicated a general category such as foodstuffs,
household items or sundries [Wermuth, 2001, pp. 93, 129].
FARMING AND MILLING AT LOCUST LAWN, 1806-1861
Around the turn of the 19th century, Josiah Hasbrouck be-
gan purchasing parcels of land in the Jenkinstown area south of
New Paltz, ultimately acquiring 385 acres with two mill sites,
three stone houses and numerous frame houses and farm build-
ings. With his daughter’s marriage in 1805 and his father’s death
the following year, it was here that Hasbrouck settled and en-
gaged in farming and milling operations. The family likely lived
in a stone house on the premises until their new house was
completed around 1814. Influenced by the new architecture he
had seen along the Potomac while serving in Congress, Josiah
built a grand house in the Federal style. The house was known
as ‘Locust Lawn’ [Crawford et al., p. 1.29; Roth, 1998].
As the 19th century progressed, transportation improve-
ments precipitated changes in agricultural production in re-
sponse to market demands. Better transportation brought the
valley’s farmers closer to the New York City market; but it also
brought competition from the western part of New York State,
where higher yields of better quality grain were being produced.
In response, some valley farmers brought more land under culti-
vation to stay competitive. Others began to move away from
grain production to specialize in the more profitable production
of dairy, meat and poultry. The diversified farming that focused
in earlier years on satisfying much of the family’s own food and
clothing needs was replaced by production to meet demands in
non-local markets. Another consequence of this increasing spe-
cialization was that cash (given that a stable currency was now
available) increasingly became the preferred medium of ex-
change [Wermuth, 2001, pp. 105-134.]
The New Paltz Agricultural Census of 1845 shows the extent
to which local farmers had shifted their production away from
wheat to other crops. During that year, farmers produced nearly
50 thousand bushels of oats, over 39 thousand bushels of corn,
and nearly 22 thousand bushels of rye, but only 6.5 bushels of
wheat. The town, which had four gristmills, one clover mill, 11
sawmills, two fulling mills, four carding machines, two distiller-
ies and two tanneries, remained primarily agricultural, with the
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census listing 243 farmers, 88 mechanics, 11 professionals, and
seven retail merchants.
The surviving ledgers from Locust Lawn deal primarily with
the period before the Civil War, although they include informa-
tion dating through 1871. Josiah’s son, Levi Hasbrouck, inher-
ited Locust Lawn and continued to run the business after his
father’s death in 1821. A prolific real estate speculator, Levi
owned many properties that were leased to other farmers and
entrepreneurs. According to the 1855 population census, Locust
Lawn was valued at $15,000 and Levi resided there with his
wife, four children, and a domestic. The 1855 agricultural cen-
sus showed that Locust Lawn consisted of 200 acres, of which
160 were improved, and reported cash values of $20,000 for the
farm, $1,735 for the livestock, and $375 for the tools. The farm’s
output included 300 bushels of oats, 200 of rye, and 150 of corn,
plus much smaller amounts of wheat and buckwheat. Eight
cows produced 800 pounds of butter and three animals were
killed for beef during the year. Sheep and swine were also
raised, and some honey was produced. When Levi Hasbrouck
died in 1861 he left an estate worth approximately $100,000,
mostly in the form of bonds and mortgages, which was divided
between his wife and three daughters. Thus, the descendants of
Jean Hasbrouck, the New Paltz patentee, continued to thrive as
they expanded their property and wealth through the five gen-
erations studied.
Some of the daybook entries recorded at Locust Lawn in
November of 1826 appear in Figure 3. Sales of buckwheat, corn
and wheat by the bushel were recorded, along with sales of
pumpkins by the load and molasses by the gallon. The barrels
and nailing used for storage were both purchased by Zachariah
Hasbrouck and delivered by Garret Hasbrouck. The production
and trading of barrel staves, which had commenced in the mid-
17th century, increased dramatically during the first two de-
cades of the 19th century. This home industry was one way that
households responded to the challenges of increased market
competition by engaging in non-agricultural pursuits. The pro-
duction of barrel staves gave families a significant degree of
control over their work and required limited capital investment
as production tools were unsophisticated and the wood was al-
ready growing on the land. As staves could be traded with shop-
keepers no new method of marketing was required [Wermuth,
2001, pp. 110-111].
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As Figure 3 shows, the accounts were still being recorded in
pounds, shillings and pence in 1826, as they were into the 1840s
in the Locust Lawn ledgers. However, we find that the ledger
paper is now ruled for dollars and cents, the new Federal cur-
rency. The dollar became the principal unit of currency in the
new nation with passage of the ‘Mint Act’ in 1792. As late as that
year, New York was still emitting currency denominated in
pounds and shillings. Judging from the units of account used in
the Hasbrouck ledgers, it appears that the New York currency
may have continued to circulate for some time. The 1826 day-
FIGURE 3
Daybook November 1, 1826
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book also illustrates a change in bookkeeping procedure, with
numbers rather than slashes now being used to record the post-
ing of daybook entries to the customer’s page in the account
book.
The types of merchandise sold and received at Locust Lawn
in 1826 have been summarized in Table 5. During that year Levi
Hasbrouck sold both goods raised on the farm and general store
merchandise similar to that sold at the family store on Hugue-
not Street. Common customer purchases included grains and
grain products, farm animals, meat, and animal byproducts
such as leather and wool. Although there were some sales of
planks, customers primarily paid for the services provided by
the sawmill rather than buying lumber from it. Sales of general
store merchandise included items such as salt, pepper, tea, to-
bacco, and whiskey, as well as cotton yarn, thread, buttons,
spectacles, candles, brooms and frying pans. To settle their ac-
counts, customers might deliver logs or seeds, provide labor, or
pay cash. Transactions involving financial instruments, such as
the trading of bills and payment of interest on notes, also appear
more frequently in these ledgers.
By 1838 fewer items of general merchandise were sold at
Locust Lawn. This is consistent with the trend towards increas-
ing specialization. Customers could still buy basics like salt, vin-
egar, tobacco, soap and candles. However, there were no longer
any sales of tea, whiskey, pepper, frying pans or thread. The
trend towards using cash as a means of payment is also appar-
ent. Goods were less frequently used as a form of payment com-
pared to the previous decade. However, the Hasbroucks often
exchanged farm products for labor during this period.
One of the ledgers in the collection was clearly that of a
sawmill. It reveals a different customer base than the ledgers
which concerned farm and granary operations. The sawmill led-
ger included a chair account containing a few debits and numer-
ous credits for various types of chairs, likely fashioned from the
sawmill’s output. The manufacture of chairs is another example
of the shift to non-agricultural pursuits that was taking place in
the local economy.
It is not until the end of the third decade of the 19th century
that the first limited attempts were made to record assets other
than customer accounts in the ledgers. A corn account dated
1829 included only two debits and two credits. A debit was re-
corded for corn delivered for which £30 cash was apparently
paid. Credits to the account reflect corn sales to two customers,
but it is difficult to discern the quantities sold. Based upon the
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monetary values, the quantity recorded as purchased exceeded
the quantity recorded as sold, but there was no attempt to bal-
ance this account.
The front page of one of the daybooks includes a heading
for a “butter account”. Schedules were prepared for 1843-1844
that include the quantity of butter produced (or otherwise
bought or sold), priced in shillings and then converted to dollars
and cents. In 1844 only the quantity column was totaled. Up
until this point, currency conversions in the ledgers were re-
corded at the par conversion rate of $2.50 Federal money per
pound of New York currency. In reality, currency exchanges
could take place at other than par, as students, such as Levi
Hasbrouck’s niece Sarah DuBois, learned in school [Hollister
and Schultz, 2001]. In the butter account, differing exchange
rates appear to have been in use for the first time, suggesting
increasing sophistication on the part of the Hasbrouck book-
keepers. In 1843 the exchange rate was primarily in the range of
$2.15 to $2.50 per pound. However, a couple of transactions, if
recorded correctly, appear to use rates as high as $2.92. In 1844,
a more circumscribed range of exchange rates between $2.16
and $2.38 was used.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Jean Hasbrouck, who settled in New York’s mid-Hudson
River valley in the late 17th century, and his descendents were
farmers and merchants. The accounts that depict the transac-
tions engaged in by this family help document how five genera-
tions adapted to the economic and social changes that occurred
as the colonies grew into the young American nation. Through
these generations the Hasbroucks acted as entrepreneurs who
took advantage of new opportunities and managed to conserve
and expand the family’s wealth. The Hasbrouck accounts also
allow us to examine the role that accounting played in support-
ing trade and business in this family, as well as to gauge some of
the cultural shifts that were occurring in their environment.
In common with Carnegie’s [1997] findings for pastoralists
in 19th century Australia, the accounting system in rural New
York during the period studied was based on personified ledger
accounts. These accounts both defined and were defined by the
organizational culture of a tight-knit community where mem-
bers were in regular contact with, and supportive of, each other.
The account books recorded indebtedness that resulted from
transactions between friends and neighbors. Because cash was
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in short supply in the mid-Hudson River valley during much of
the period studied, asynchronous exchanges involving goods
and services were prevalent. In such an economy, bookkeeping
was indispensable to keep track of the balances due between
individuals. This bookkeeping barter not only accommodated
two-way trade, but also facilitated triangular exchanges. Mer-
chants frequently took on the role of bankers who would assist
in triangular settlement by making cross-entries in the accounts
of two customers. In this way, the accounting records of a small
business also served to facilitate the smooth economic function-
ing of the wider community. The role of bookkeeping barter in
supporting the economy in New York’s mid-Hudson River valley
confirms what has been reported for other locations in colonial
and early America, including Massachusetts [Baxter, 1946] and
Delaware [Stone, 1979]. The ledgers that were examined for this
study also confirm the important role that rural merchants
played as intermediaries, facilitating trade between local farm-
ers and the New York City merchants who were engaged in
international trade [Matson, 1998].
Prior to 1850, when there were few professional accoun-
tants, the Hasbrouck family members or those who worked with
them likely performed the bookkeeping function. Over time,
some changes in accounting procedure were instituted by the
Hasbrouck bookkeepers, which may suggest the need for more
detailed record keeping as the economy became more complex.
During the 19th century account numbers began to replace
slashes to indicate posting of daybook entries and the use of
fluctuating exchange rates also appeared. However, the
Hasbroucks were slow in changing their unit of measure to the
new Federal dollar; they continued to record entries using
pounds, shillings, and pence into the 1840s. The transition to
dollars was quite late when compared with the findings reported
by Baxter [1978, p. 287] who found businesses in colonial New
England making the transition between 1795 and 1810.
In a period when there was no statutory requirement to
report income or wealth we discovered no attempt to measure
these accounting constructs in the ledgers. The adequacy of
single-entry accounting to meet the reporting needs of small
businesses in early America confirms the findings reported by
others, including Baxter [1978], Densmore [1980], Bruchey
[1958] and Chatfield [1977]. Not until well into the 19th century
did the first rudimentary attempts to measure assets other than
customer accounts appear in the Hasbrouck ledgers. At that
time an interest in isolating cash flows associated with specific
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ventures such as butter production or chair manufacturing re-
flected an increasing specialization in response to the wider
shift to a more competitive market economy [Wermuth, 2001].
Growth in the size of the community and the greater availability
of cash during the 19th century were likely precursors to ac-
counting changes to come.
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NOTICEBOARD
Accounting Historians Journal
Prize Winners 2003
Following a vote by the members of the editorial board, the prize for
best paper in Volume 30 is awarded to:
Richard K. Fleischman and R. Penny Marquette
for their article
“The Impact of World War II on Cost Accounting
at the Sperry Corporation”
which appeared in the December issue.
The following authors were also also highly commended:
Trevor Boyns
 for his article
“In Memoriam: Alexander Hamilton Church’s System of
‘Scientific Machine Rates’ at Hans Renold Ltd, c. 1901-c, 1920”
which appeared in the June issue
and
Lisa Evans
 for her article
“Auditing and Audit Firms in Germany before 1931”
which appeared in the December issue
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16 Annual  Conference on
Accounting, Business & Financial History
at Cardiff Business School 16-17 September 2004
Announcement of Conference and Call for Papers
Guest Speaker — Graeme Dean, Editor ABACUS
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of account-
ing, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an  informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to
fully developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approximately
40 minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile
feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of interna-
tional, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF14 3UX,
UK, from lunchtime on Thursday, 16 September 2004 to mid-afternoon on Fri-
day, 17 September 2004.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on
Tuesday and accommodation) is £100.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the
conference should send an abstract of their paper (not exceeding one
page) by 31 May 2004 to:
Debbie Harris, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF 10 3EU
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5730 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419
Email: HarrisDL@cardiff.ac.uk.
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference
organizers’ decision on 30 June 2004.
Sponsored by:
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Accounting History
Call for Papers
The fourth Accounting History International Conference
University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
7-9 September 2005
Accounting History is the journal of the Accounting History Special
Interest Group of the Accounting and Finance Association of Australia
and New Zealand. The conference will feature papers which comply
with the editorial policy of Accounting History. The journal publishes
quality historical papers that may be concerned with the establishment
and development of accounting bodies, conventions, ideas, practices
and rules. The should attempt to identify the individuals and the local,
time-specific environmental factors which affected accounting, and
should endeavour to assess accounting’s impact on organisational and
social functioning.
Conference papers will be accepted across a wide range of topics, using
a variety of approaches including biography, prosopography, business
history through accounting records, institutional history, public sector
accounting history, comparative international accounting history and
oral  history. The use of theoretical perspectives drawn from relevant
disciplines such as sociology, economics and political theory is encour-
aged in conducting investigative, explanatory studies of accounting’s
past.
As part of the fourth Accounting History International Conference, the
Accounting History Doctoral Colloquium will be held on 7 September
2005.
Submission and Review of Papers
Papers written in the English language should be submitted electroni-
cally by 31 May 2005, to: 4ahici-group@deakin.edu.au
All papers will be subject to a double-blind refereeing process and will
be published on the conference website, as refereed conference pro-
ceedings, unless otherwise advised.
Notification of Acceptance
Notification of papers accepted for inclusion in the conference program
will be made by 30 June 2005.
Conference information will be available through the Conference
website at: http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/4AHIC
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Accounting  and Business Research
Volume 33 Number 3 2003
Contents
Articles
Financial reporting of good news and bad news: Mark Clatworthy 171
evidence from accounting narratives Michael John Jones
Disclosure interactions: accounting policy choice Miles B. Gietzmann 187
and voluntary disclosure effects on the cost of Marco Trombetta
raising capital
Audit fee determinants and auditor premiums: Michael J. Peel 207
evidence from the micro-firm sub-market Roydon Roberts
Towards an understanding of profitability analysis Martin Walker 235
within the residual income valuation framework Pengguo Wang
Book Review
Clive Lennox, Opinion shopping and the role of David Hatherly 247
audit committees when audit firms are dismissed
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Accounting  and Business Research
Volume 33 Number 4 2003
Contents
Articles
The use of financial accounting information J. M. Argilés 251
and firm performance: an empirical E. John Slof
quantification for firms
Undertaking large-scale disclosure studies when Khaled Hussainey 275
AIMR-FAF ratings are not available: the case of Thomas Schleicher
prices leading earnings Martin Walker
The determinants of voluntary disclosure of Martin Walker 295
adjusted earnings per share measures by Evagelia Louvari
UK quoted companies
Commentary
The true and fair view and the ‘fair presentation’ Lisa Evans 311
override of IAS1
Notices 327
Editorial Office:
K. V. Peasnell, Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK
Tel: 01524 593977, Fax: 01524 593334. E-mail: k.peasnell@lancaster.ac.uk
Subscription Office:
145 London Road, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey KT2 6SR, UK.
Subscriptions: Tel: 08702 404 388. Fax: 0208 257 1124.
E-mail: magazine_customerservices@croner.co.uk
Advertisements: 0208 247 1350.
Articles in Accounting and Business Research are published without responsibility on the
part of  publishers or authors for loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from
action as a result of any view express therein.
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10th WORLD CONGRESS OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
An Invitation to Join Us
All those with an interest in accounting’s past and present are invited to partici-
pate in, and enjoy the experience of, the 10th World Congress of Accounting
Historians being held with a dual venue of St. Louis, Missouri, and Oxford,
Mississippi, August 1-5, 2004.
Congress Highlights
St. Louis
2004 marks the 100th anniversary of the First International Congress of Accoun-
tants, held in St. Louis, September 1904. To date there have been sixteen such
Congresses, and in addition nine Congresses of Accounting Educators have been
held. Nine previous Accounting Historians’ Congresses have also been held be-
ginning in 1970.
Oxford
Because the library at the University of Mississippi is a treasure trove of ac-
counting archival records, one of the Congress themes will be to emphasize
archival-based research. Such research can be based on any type of organiza-
tion. Examples include analyses of accounting innovations, diffusion of account-
ing innovations, impact of the environment (such as war, depression, or compe-
tition) on accounting, impact of accounting on the environment, and examples
of company histories based on accounting records.
Website Links of Interest
Official 10th World Congress of Accounting Historians Website: http://
accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/worldcongress/.
Congress Venue
St. Louis
The Congress will be held at the Renaissance St. Louis Hotel - Airport in St.
Louis, and the Triplett Alumni Center Hotel in Oxford. The Renaissance is half a
mile from the Lambert International Airport and minutes from downtown St.
Louis and the city’s popular cultural and entertainment attractions. The hotel
offers free airport shuttle service, in-room coffee and newspaper, health facilities
and swimming pool, and restaurants. Light rail service connects to many attrac-
tions.
Congress Information
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Oxford
The Triplett Alumni Center Hotel is located on the eastern edge of The Univer-
sity of Mississippi campus. A leisurely, fifteen-minute stroll will put you right in
the heart of Oxford’s historic town square. Standard amenities at this hotel
include swimming pool, high-speed Internet access, free continental breakfast
(7-9 a.m.), golf, tennis, and many other recreational activities located nearby.
Preliminary Program
Saturday, July 31
6:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. Early Bird Reception, Renaissance Hotel
Sunday, August 1
6:30 p.m. - 8:30 p.m. Opening Reception: The Mercantile Library -
St. Louis, Missouri
Monday, August 2
8:30 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. Opening Session: David Walker, U.S. Comptroller
General
10:15 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Concurrent presentation sessions A and workshop
11:20 a.m.- 12: 30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions B and workshop
12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Lunch
2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions C
3:45 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions D
Tuesday, August 3
8:30 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. Plenary 1: J. R. Edwards, Cardiff Business School
10:15 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Concurrent presentation sessions E
11:20 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions F
12:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. Trip from St. Louis to Oxford (Box lunch provided)
Reception in Oxford, Mississippi
Wednesday, August 4
8:30 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. Opening Session: S. Scott Voynich, Chairman of the
Board, AICPA
10:15 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Concurrent presentation sessions G
11:20 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions H
12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Lunch at Rowan Oak (Faulkner’s home)
2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions I
3:45 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions J
7:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. Closing Dinner
Thursday, August 5
8:30 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. Plenary 2: Tony Tinker, CUNY-Baruch
10:15 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Concurrent presentation sessions K
11:20 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Concurrent presentation sessions L
12:30 p.m. Closing Lunch dedicated to S. Paul Garner
TBA Academy Business Meeting
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Registration
Registration fee: (Please note: All prices are in US dollars.)
If postmarked or communicated by June 1, 2004 $295
If postmarked or communicated after June 1, 2004 $360
For each person accompanying registered participant $145
Attending only one segment of the conference (either St. Louis or Oxford)
If postmarked or communicated by June 1, 2004 $175
If postmarked or communicated after June 1, 2004 $195
For each person accompanying registered participant $75
The registration for participants includes the name badge (required for admis-
sion to all events), one copy of the Proceedings, the Early Bird reception and
opening reception in St. Louis, all lunches, the reception and banquet in Oxford.
The registration fee for persons accompanying the registered participant
includes the three receptions, the banquet, lunch at Rowan Oak, and the closing
luncheon on Thursday.
On site registrants cannot be guaranteed any meals due to the hotels’ policy
for food guarantees prior to event.
use the Official Congress website for on-line registration secured by VeriSign
(http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/worldcongress/)
Congress Sponsorship
Academy of Accounting Historians
BKD, LLP
James Don Edwards
John Carroll University
Missouri Society of CPAs
Sherri and Walt Kennamer
Rubin, Brown, Gornstein & Co. LLP
Richard Vangermeersch
Anonymous Donor
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
APPLICATION FOR 2004 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership: $45.00
Student Membership: $10.00
Name:  (please print)
Mailing Address:
City: State:
Zip Code: Country:
Accounting History Area of Interest:
Phone: Fax:
E-mail:
 ____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
 ____  ____
/___/ Mastercard /___/ VISA
Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Signature:
Mail to: Mrs. Kathy H. Rice
The Academy of Accounting Historians
The University of Alabama
Box 870220
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
USA
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